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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I present a new argument for the autonomy of literature.  The conclusion that 
literature is autonomous is a claim that there is, first, a distinctively literary value, and 
second, that this distinctively literary value is independent of the other values associated with 
literature.  In Part I, I enumerate the premises of my argument, distinguishing between final 
and instrumental value on the one hand and non-relational and relational value on the other.  I 
accept literature as characteristically fictional and literary works as institutional objects.  I 
argue for two different instantiations of form-content inseparability, poetic thickness and 
narrative thickness, which I then subsume under the concept of literary thickness.  Part II 
argues that there are two conflicting interests that can be taken in literary works, the formal 
and the substantive, and that these are reconciled in the integrative standpoint.  I contend that 
the integrative standpoint is characteristic of literary appreciation and that the distinctively 
literary value is the literary satisfaction that accompanies the experience of a literary work.  I 
complete my argument by establishing a necessary relation between the integrative 
standpoint and final value rather than instrumental value, with the consequence that literature 
is autonomous.  I address the two strongest objections to my argument in Part III.  Both Noël 
Carroll and Martha Nussbaum maintain that cognitive value and moral value are part and 
parcel of literary value, which is thus heteronomous.  I demonstrate why neither objection 
succeeds, focusing on the failure of Carroll’s literature in three dimensions approach to 
account for the literary value of morally ambiguous works of literature and the failure of 
Nussbaum’s theory of literary education to account for the literary flaws in morally 
meritorious works of literature.  I conclude that my argument from literary thickness stands 
and that literature is therefore indeed autonomous. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
This thesis is a defence of the value of literature.  I shall argue that literature has value for art, 
for culture, and for humanity – in short, that it matters.  Unlike most contemporary defenders 
of literary value, my strategy does not involve arguing that literature is good as a means to 
one of the various ends that matter to human beings.  I do not think that literature necessarily 
makes us cleverer, more sensitive, more virtuous, more creative, or just generally better 
people.  Nor do I think that there is a necessary relation between literature and edification, 
clarification, cultural critique, catharsis, or therapy.  The oral and written traditions of 
literature that developed across the globe in the last three thousand years have clearly 
provided all these goods and been good for human beings in all of these ways, but the 
relations are contingent rather than necessary.  As such, rather than offer an argument that 
forges a tenuous link between literature and truth, or literature and virtue, or literature and the 
sacred, I shall analyse the non-derivative, sui generic value characteristic of literature and 
attempt to show why that matters as an end in itself. 
 
The claim that there is a distinctively literary value – like the claim that there is a distinctly 
artistic value – is not controversial.  What is controversial is the nature of the distinctively 
literary value, which seems to resist quantification, definition, and even articulation.  In other 
words, most people agree that literature is valuable in some special way, but most people 
cannot delineate that way with any certainty.  James Joyce captures the puzzling nature of 
this apparent paradox perfectly in a delightful passage in the ‘Ithaca’ episode of Ulysses.  
Sitting in his kitchen with Stephen Dedalus in the early hours of the morning, Leopold Bloom 
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reflects on the value of Shakespeare’s oeuvre.  He knows that Shakespeare matters, that his 
works belong to the category of literary rather than popular fiction, and conceives – in his 
prosaic and eminently sensible manner – of this significance in terms of instruction.  Yet 
Bloom finds that despite his best efforts, he has failed to apply any of the alleged lessons to 
his own life.  Shakespeare has, in practical terms, proved entirely useless.  I described this 
passage as ‘delightful’, which it is, and this delight – albeit revealed as a peculiarly and 
particularly intellectual type of delight – is indeed all that I shall have to offer for literary 
value.  I shall maintain that the pleasure which characterises the literary experience is the 
source of literature’s sui generic value, and that literature therefore does not serve much of a 
purpose at all.  The only practical consequence of reading about Bloom’s attempts to solve 
the puzzle of literary value – to which, in typically literary fashion, no explicit answer is 
offered – is the likelihood that one will persevere through all three hundred and nine 
questions of ‘Ithaca’.  All Ulysses seems to do is make us want read more – more of the 
novel, more Joyce, more literature.  Ulysses achieves this modest result by providing a 
distinctive kind of pleasure and I shall argue that this pleasure alone accounts for why 
literature matters.   
 
My argument for the sui generic value of literature will draw on the ancient distinction 
between literary form and literary content and offer a fresh perspective on the relationship 
between the two, which I call literary thickness.  I shall argue that the satisfaction taken in 
literary thickness is realised by means of the adoption of the integrative standpoint.  The 
integrative standpoint reconciles two conflicting interests readers take in literary works – the 
formal interest in the mode of representation and the substantive interest in the subject of 
representation – and is characteristic of literary appreciation, the evaluation of literature qua 
literature.  I shall then argue for a necessary relation between the integrative standpoint and 
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non-derivative or final value and thus for the claim that literature is autonomous.  CHAPTER 
ONE begins with a discussion of the different types of value, derivative, non-derivative, 
relational, and non-relational, and the way in which the different types of value have been 
associated with literature.   
 
My argument then proceeds as follows:   
(1) Literary works are thick, i.e. to read a work as literature demands that form 
and content in the work be taken as inseparable. 
 (2) If a work is thick, then both the substantive and formal axes are salient. 
 (3) If both the substantive and formal axes are salient, then literary appreciation 
  requires the adoption of the integrative standpoint. 
 (4) Therefore the appreciation of literary works requires the adoption of the  
  integrative standpoint. 
 (5) Literary value is the value of the experience of literary appreciation. 
 (6) If the experience of literary appreciation requires the adoption of the  
  integrative standpoint, then literary value is final. 
 (7) Therefore literary value is final.  
 
(1) is based on arguments in CHAPTERS TWO, THREE, and the first section of CHAPTER 
FOUR.  I set out (2) in CHAPTER FOUR, defining the substantive axis and formal axis as 
measures of the conflicting interest taken in literary works by readers.  I argue that the 
integrative standpoint reconciles the substantive and formal axes in CHAPTER FIVE, and 
thus for (3).  I demonstrate (5), that literary value is experiential, in CHAPTER FIVE.  
CHAPTERS FOUR and FIVE offer evidence for the necessary relations between 
instrumental value and the substantive axis on the one hand and final value and the 
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integrative standpoint/formal axis on the other.  In the same chapters, I show that the formal 
axis is not characteristic of literary appreciation and therefore (6).  In the terms set out in 
CHAPTER ONE, the argument establishes the autonomy of literature:  
the value of a work of literature qua literature is the value of the experience afforded 
by the work and the experience afforded by the work is valuable to the degree that this 
experience is finally valuable, i.e. produces literary satisfaction.   
CHAPTERS SIX and SEVEN identify my two main opponents, Noël Carroll and Martha 
Nussbaum, who maintain that literature is essentially good for educational and moral 
purposes, and therefore provide a conflicting account of literary value.  I respond to both sets 
of objections, demonstrating why my argument is rationally more justifiable than either of 
theirs.  In this way, I hope to complete the project that A.C. Bradley began in 1901, in his 
‘Poetry for Poetry’s Sake’ lecture, which made an original but unsuccessful attempt to link 
the intimate relation between form and content in poetry to the sui generic value of poetry.  
My aim is, first, to succeed where Bradley failed, and second, to extend his thesis beyond 
poetic literature to the art form of literature.  In so doing, I shall show why literature matters 
despite being useless. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LITERARY VALUE 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear statement of the autonomy of literature for 
which this thesis argues.  I specify the categories of value with which I am concerned, 
distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic value on the one hand and final and 
instrumental value on the other, in §1.1.  §1.2. explains the assumptions I shall make 
concerning the relations between fiction and literature, and literature and art.  Although I 
offer reasons for adopting these assumptions, they are not defended here or elsewhere.  I 
distinguish the characteristically literary value from other values literature might possess in 
§1.3., restricting the final value of the former to a particular type of pleasure.  I define my 
version of literary autonomy in §1.4. and situate it within the tradition of artistic autonomy.  I 
conclude by identifying Noël Carroll and Martha Nussbaum as my main opponents, on the 
basis that cognitive value is part and parcel of literary value for Carroll, and moral value part 
and parcel of literary value for Nussbaum.    
 
1.1. Value 
 
1.1.1. Instrumental versus Non-Instrumental 
To attribute value to an entity is to judge that the entity counts in some way, that it is worth 
something.  The most basic distinction in value is between instrumental values and non-
instrumental values.  Money is typically valued for its purchasing power rather than for the 
values of the metal coins or paper notes themselves and is therefore instrumentally valuable, 
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i.e. valuable as an instrument for purchasing goods and services.  Analgesic pills are similarly 
typically valued as an instrument for relieving pain rather than for their taste.  Instrumental 
value is often called extrinsic value because the value attributed to the entity (currency note, 
pill) is attributed in virtue of something (purchasing power, pain relief) to which the entity is 
related as opposed to the entity itself.  Another way to characterise instrumental value is that 
it is derivative, because the values of currency notes and analgesic pills to which I have 
alluded are derived from their value in purchasing and pain-relieving respectively.  For 
obvious reasons, instrumental value is further characterised as the entity having value ‘for the 
sake of’ (something else) and being valuable as a means (rather than an end).   
 
If the above values are derivative, then it seems that there is a category of values – or perhaps 
just one value – which is not derivative.1  In the case of money, the chain between the 
currency note and non-derivative value may be long and complex, but in the case of the 
analgesic pill it might be short: a derivative value of the pill is its value in removing pain and 
if the reduction of pain is considered pleasurable, then the pleasure produced by the pill could 
be considered non-derivatively valuable.  One does not appear to have to seek something else 
from which pleasure derives its value, to ask why pleasure is good or desirable; the goodness 
and desirability are self-evident, part of the meaning of the concept itself.  Non-derivative, 
non-instrumental value is also called intrinsic value because the value of, for example, 
pleasure with which I am concerned is not related to something outside it, but to the pleasure 
itself, the experience of pleasure by an individual.  Robert Audi articulates a widely-held 
view when he states: “The clearest case of an intrinsic good is probably pleasure; pain is 
                                               
1
 I use seems because there is debate about whether instrumental goodness implies non-instrumental goodness.  
Earl Conee discusses the question in: ‘Instrumental value without intrinsic value?’ Philosophia 11 (1982), 345-
359.  I accept the existence of both instrumental and non-instrumental value, regardless of whether the latter is 
entailed or implied by the former. 
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probably the clearest case of an intrinsic evil” (1998: 365).  Pleasure is also characterised as 
having value ‘for its own sake’ or being valuable (as an end) in itself.   
 
In summary, I shall accept that there are at least two categories of value: 
(i) instrumental, derivative, or extrinsic value; value for the sake of (something 
else) or as a means (to an end); and 
(ii) non-instrumental, non-derivative, or intrinsic value; value for its own sake or 
(as an end) in itself. 
Despite this dual categorisation, an entity can be valuable both instrumentally and non-
instrumentally simultaneously and instrumental values are both numerous and difficult – if 
not impossible – to catalogue comprehensively.  A pound coin is valuable as a pound sterling 
in the United Kingdom (instrumentally), but it could also be valued as a piece of nickel brass 
alloy (either instrumentally or non-instrumentally, dependent upon the reason the alloy is 
valued) or as a prop to stop a table from rocking (instrumentally); if the coin was a rare issue, 
a collector might take pleasure in its possession (non-instrumental value) and a careless 
collector with a rocking table could regard it as being valuable in all these ways at the same 
time.  Similarly, even if pleasure is uncontroversially non-instrumental, the pleasure of pain-
relief might be instrumentally valuable in, for example, allowing one to focus on one’s work 
and thereby meet a deadline. 
 
1.1.2. Intrinsic versus Extrinsic 
There seems to be a difference between the pleasure of the coin collector and the value of the 
coin as nickel brass alloy even though both could be regarded as belonging to the category of 
non-instrumental value.  The value of the coin as alloy appears to have a more direct relation 
to the coin itself than the value of the pleasure experienced by the collector.  The former is a 
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value of the coin regardless of whether or not it has the purchasing power of a pound sterling 
or can be exchanged for currency which has equivalent purchasing power; the latter is 
dependent upon not only a response, but a response from an individual who can appreciate 
the particular features of the coin which produce the pleasure of the experience.  The value of 
the coin to the collector may not be derivative, but it is related to something outside itself, i.e. 
the collector, in a way which the value of the alloy is not.  Christine Korsgaard addresses this 
concern, questioning the naïve dichotomy between instrumental and non-instrumental value 
and proposing two distinctions rather than two categories of value:    
 One is the distinction between things valued for their own sakes and things valued for 
 the sake of something else – between ends and means, or final and instrumental 
 goods.  The other is the distinction between things which have their value in 
 themselves and things which derive their value from some other source: intrinsically 
 good things versus extrinsically good things (1983: 170). 
Dale Dorsey summarises Korsgaard’s taxonomy as follows: 
 Final value: ϕ is finally valuable if and only if it is valuable as an end. 
Instrumental Value: ϕ is instrumentally valuable if and only if it is valuable as a 
means. 
Intrinsic Value: ϕ is intrinsically valuable if and only if it is valuable in a way that 
supervenes only on the intrinsic properties of ϕ. 
Extrinsic Value: ϕ is extrinsically valuable if and only if it is valuable in a way that 
supervenes – at least to some extent – on the extrinsic properties of ϕ (2012: 137). 
 
Dorsey’s summary introduces ‘properties’ to the discussion of values.  The values attributed 
to an entity are generally accepted to be supervenient on non-evaluative properties of that 
entity such that there cannot be a change in the evaluative properties of the object without a 
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change in the non-evaluative properties.  Thomas Magnell identifies an ontological difference 
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties as follows: 
(i) Intrinsic properties: the properties that an entity possesses no matter what 
properties other entities possess (1993: 5).   
(ii) Extrinsic properties: the properties that an entity possesses in relation to other 
entities (1993: 6). 
He uses the example of a desk which is six feet in width.  The property of being six feet wide 
is an intrinsic property, but the property of being a wide desk is extrinsic because it is 
dependent upon the lengths of other desks, which are standardly less than six feet in width.  
Magnell maintains that extrinsic properties are not identical with relational properties, but 
form a sub-class thereof because of the relations which exist between the parts of a whole, 
which are relational, but intrinsic (1993: 8-9).   
 
My inquiry into literary value will consider the value of works of literature as a whole rather 
than parts thereof, however, and I shall follow Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-
Rasmussen in employing 
the expression ‘relational property’ as short for ‘externally relational property’ (i.e., a 
property that an object has in virtue of its relation to something that is not one of its 
parts) (2000: 35). 
I shall thus accept the identity of ‘non-relational’ and ‘intrinsic’ properties on the one hand 
and ‘relational’ and ‘extrinsic’ properties on the other, defining Korsgaard’s second 
distinction as: 
INTRINSIC VALUE: ϕ is intrinsically valuable if and only if it is valuable in a way 
that supervenes only on the non-relational properties of ϕ. 
EXTRINSIC VALUE: ϕ is extrinsically valuable if and only if it is valuable in a way 
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that supervenes – at least to some extent – on the relational properties of ϕ. 
 
1.1.3. Final versus Instrumental 
If one removes the terms ‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’ from my initial dichotomy in §1.1.1., one 
is left with  
(i) instrumental or derivative value; value for the sake of (something else) or as a 
means (to an end); and 
(ii) non-instrumental or non-derivative value; value for its own sake or (as an end) 
in itself. 
Due to its characterisation as non-derivative, (ii) is also described as ‘final’ or ‘telic’ value. 
There is a debate between monists, who claim that there is only one non-derivative value, and 
pluralists, who claim that there is more than one non-derivative value.  The existence of non-
derivative value is uncontroversial, but its nature has proved notoriously difficult to specify.  
The standard solution – offered by Plato in Protagoras – is to elucidate this value in terms of 
pleasure, such that: “We are no longer able to say ‘by pleasure,’ – for it has taken on its other 
name, ‘the good’ instead of pleasure” (355c: 4-6).  Plato associated non-derivative goodness 
with pleasure and non-derivative badness with pain, but did not hold a monistic view of 
value.  Monists, such as Epicurus2 and John Stuart Mill (1861), have tended to associate non-
derivative value with either the absence of pain or with pleasure.  Epicurus and Mill have 
therefore been described as hedonists, but the label belies the sophistication of their 
respective positions.  Mill, for example, recognised different categories of pleasure and 
famously claimed: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to 
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (1861: 212).  Pluralists attribute non-derivative 
                                               
2
 See: Epicurus: The Extant Remains, trans. C. Bailey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926). 
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value to other forms of goodness – like truth and virtue – but both monists and pluralists 
recognise pleasure as non-derivatively valuable.   
 
There is further debate about what types of entity – objects, properties, states of affairs, or 
facts – can be bearers of non-derivative value.  I do not wish to contribute to this debate, but I 
shall accept that works of literature can be bearers of non-derivative value.  Rabinowicz and 
Rønnow-Rasmussen identify ends as facts rather than objects and specify their concern, 
which is with objects, as value for its own sake rather than value as an end (2000: 47-48).  A 
literary work, and – in the institutional theory of literature which I endorse in §1.2.2. – the 
text upon which the work is based, is more accurately described as an object than a fact so I 
shall follow Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen in discounting value as an end in itself 
from category (ii).  Given my definition of intrinsic value above, value for its own sake is 
ambiguous because it could also be construed in terms of non-relational value.  In order to be 
precise, I shall therefore characterise Korsgaard’s first distinction in terms of derivation:     
FINAL VALUE: ϕ is finally valuable if and only if it is valuable in a way that is non- 
derivative. 
INSTRUMENTAL VALUE: ϕ is instrumentally valuable if and only if it is valuable 
in a way that is derivative. 
Due to the frequency with which ‘intrinsic’ is employed as a synonym for ‘final’ when value 
is discussed, I shall use the terms ‘non-relational’ and ‘relational’ instead of ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘extrinsic’ where possible, i.e. employ the following pair of distinctions: final versus 
instrumental value on the one hand and non-relational versus relational value on the other.    
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The relation between these two distinctions is far from clear.  G.E. Moore3 claims that final 
value supervenes on non-relational properties, Korsgaard maintains that final value 
supervenes on both non-relational and relational properties, and Dorsey argues that 
instrumental value can be a form of both relational and non-relational value.  With regard to 
literature, I am a contextualist and hold that historical and cultural properties – both of which 
are relational – are relevant to work identity (which I discuss in §3.2.3) and the value of a 
work qua literature (which I discuss in §1.3.2.).  Jerrold Levinson (1980) makes a convincing 
case for contextualism in his discussion of the ontology of a work of music, the consequence 
of which for literary art is that two identical texts could be different works if their production 
conditions differed.  Jorge Luis Borges parodies an extreme version of this view in his short 
story, ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote’, where he contrasts the literary value of Don 
Quixote as written by Miguel de Cervantes with Don Quixote as written by Pierre Menard (a 
fictional contemporary author).  I shall not attempt to explain the relation between the two 
distinctions, but I shall accept that final value neither supervenes upon non-relational 
properties alone nor upon relational properties alone.4   
 
1.2. Literature 
 
1.2.1. Fiction & Literature 
Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen advance the following conception of fiction: 
 the fictive dimension of stories (or narratives) is explicable only in terms of a rule-
 governed practice, central to which are a certain mode of utterance (fictive utterance) 
 and a certain complex of attitudes (the fictive stance) (1994: 32).   
                                               
3
 See: ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value,’ in G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Co., 1922), 255-275. 
4
 This view is endorsed by Korsgaard (1983), Shelly Kagan (in ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value,’ The Journal of 
Ethics 2 [1998], 277-297), Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), and Dorsey (in ‘Intrinsic value and the 
supervenience principle,’ Philosophical Studies 157 [2012], 267-285), amongst others. 
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To create a work of fiction in an oral or written tradition is to make a fictive utterance and to 
experience that work as a work of fiction is to adopt the fictive stance.  Just as a fictive work 
is conceived of as a fictive utterance, so a literary work is identified on the basis of the 
intention of the author, specifically “the intention to invoke a literary response” (1994: 256).  
Similarly, to read a text as literature is to adopt the literary stance: 
 Adopting the literary stance towards a text is to identify it as a literary work and 
 apprehend it in accordance with the conventions of the literary practice.  The mode of 
 apprehension which the practice defines is one of appreciation (1994: 256). 
To appreciate a work is to recognise its value; specifically, to grasp the literary value of a 
literary work.  The concepts of fiction and literature are clearly not coextensive as there are 
works of fiction that are not works of literature and works of literature that are not works of 
fiction.   
 
In the former case, this may be because the work belongs to another art form, for example a 
cinematic work, such as Christopher Nolan’s Memento; or because the work does not aspire 
to a distinctively literary kind of attention, for example Agatha Christie’s And Then There 
Were None.  The category of literary works which are not fictional includes historical, 
documentary, and philosophical works – such as William H. Prescott’s History of the 
Conquest of Peru, George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia, and Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, A Book for All and None – which are judged to have literary value.5  
‘Fiction’ is a descriptive concept and ‘literature’ an evaluative one: Ulysses and And Then 
There Were None are both fictional works; only Ulysses is a literary work, i.e. both invites 
and rewards literary attention.  Despite the significance of the differences between fiction and 
literature, and the historical problems in the relationship to which Lamarque and Olsen 
                                               
5
 Some lyric poetry could also be categorised as literary non-fiction. 
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allude,6 they hold that “literature for the most part consists of stories that are either invented 
by the author or are mythical or legendary in character” (1994: 268).  Derek Attridge 
indicates his broad agreement with this classification when he claims that while Middlemarch 
can be read as fiction but not literature, it is “unlikely” that it could be read as literature but 
not fiction (2004a: 96).  I shall regard the literary stance as characteristically incorporating 
the fictive stance, accepting Olsen’s claim that “the assumption that literature is invention and 
imagination, ‘story’ and not ‘history’, is central to literary practice” (1987: 160), employing 
‘literature’ to refer to this inventive, imaginative sub-category of works.     
 
1.2.2. Literature & Art 
Literature as described in §1.2.1. is an art form and to adopt the literary stance to a text is to 
experience the text as a work of art.  I do not wish to commit to a definition of art, but the 
characterisations of fiction and literature I have accepted – particularly the references to 
‘practices’ and ‘conventions’ – are compatible with the institutional theory of art.  George 
Dickie is the leading proponent of this theory and his version is based on a series of five 
interlocking definitions – artist, work, public, artworld, and artworld system – with a work of 
art defined as “an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public” (1984: 80).  
Dickie is unconcerned by the circularity of the definition because its function is not 
identification, but the clarification and explanation of an already familiar term: “Virtually 
everyone can recognize some things as works of art” (1984: 79).  I shall take this to be true of 
some works of literary art and focus on works whose status as literature is little contested (or 
at least uncontroversial), employing examples from the literary canon wherever possible.7             
 
                                               
6
 See 1994: 268-276. 
7
 Membership of the canon is of course itself disputed, but the canon remains the most reliable guide to literary 
value available. 
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Lamarque and Olsen identify the institution of literature in terms of a shared practice without 
which works of literature could not exist: 
An institutional practice, as we understand it, is constituted by a set of conventions 
and concepts which both regulate and define the actions and products involved in the 
practice.  […]  An institution, in the relevant sense, is a rule-governed practice which 
makes possible certain (institutional) actions which are defined by the rules of the 
practice and which could not exist without those rules (1994: 256).       
The literary stance and the author’s intention to invoke this stance are reliant upon the 
practice of literature, the set of concepts and conventions which constitute the institutional 
framework within which literary works are presented and received.  Olsen describes the 
consequences of the institutional theory of literature for the ontology of the literary work: 
The suggestion is that the literary work is an institutional object; that the specifically 
artistic features of a literary work are defined by the institutional conventions and 
have no existence independently of the institution; that therefore the literary work has 
no objectively given distinguishing features, but that these features are the product of 
a set of descriptive and classificatory possibilities created by the institution (1987: 
22).    
I shall return to the question of ontology in my discussion of work identity in §3.2.3.  For the 
present, it is sufficient to make my agreement with Lamarque clear: “there is a conceptual 
connection between literature and art such that it would be paradoxical to speak of 
appreciating a work as literature but not as art” (2009a: 16).       
  
1.2.3. Poems, Plays & Novels 
There is a peculiar terminological issue to address when discussing works of the literary art 
form, highlighted by Northrop Frye, who states: “The fact, already mentioned, that there is no 
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word for a work of literary art is one that I find particularly baffling” (1957: 71).  The oldest 
literary categories of art are poems and plays.  Both have ancient origins, arising from an oral 
tradition where they were performed for audiences.  While contemporary appreciators are 
much more likely to read a printed poem than hear a spoken one, performance has remained 
essential to plays.  When I refer to a play as a work of literature, I shall be referring to the 
script of the play (whether heard or read) and excluding the performance elements essential to 
the art form of theatre.  The third category of literature is the novel, which includes (shorter) 
novellas and (even shorter) short stories.  Unlike its predecessors, the novel has a weaker link 
to performance such that to read a novel in silence and solitude is not to have an 
impoverished experience of the work.8  The prototype novels of the Enlightenment were also 
distinguished by being modelled on history and biography rather than poetry or plays.  Short 
of providing a neologism, which seems pretentious, there is no way to overcome this 
problem.  I shall strive to reach conclusions which are true for all literary works and be clear 
to differentiate between – in particular – poems and novels where necessary.       
 
1.3. Literary Value 
 
1.3.1. Disambiguation 
Dominic McIver Lopes (2011: 534-535) sets up the following disjunction: either none of the 
many artistic values are characteristic of art or there is a characteristically artistic value.  My 
first claim is that there is a value characteristic of literature and that this value is literary 
value, i.e. the value of literature qua literature.  My employment of the term literary value 
                                               
8
 Novels have been – and are – performed, but they did not arise from an oral tradition like poems and plays.  
Both Attridge and Peter Kivy envisage a closer link between performance and literature than I am 
acknowledging here.  I discuss Attridge’s view in CHAPTERS THREE and FIVE.  Kivy’s concern with 
performance is ontological: a work of literature is a type and every reading of the work (including silent ones) is 
a token of the type.  While I am not entirely convinced by Kivy’s argument, it is not incompatible with my 
thesis.  See: The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2006). 
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will be restricted solely to this value.  Literary value is distinct from the values of literature, 
which are all the values associated with literary works.  Amongst these, a further distinction 
emerges from Lopes’ discussion: some, like cognitive and ethical values, will be of 
philosophical interest; others, like investment and adventitious values, will not.  My second 
claim will be that literary value is final rather than instrumental (as defined in §1.1.3.) and 
that on the basis of this classification, literary value is autonomous (as explained in §1.3.2.).  
My concern with the autonomy of literature is exclusively with whether literary value is final 
or instrumental and there is a related – but distinct – debate from which I must therefore 
distinguish my thesis. 
 
Until the end of the twentieth century, the main employment of ‘autonomy’ in a literary 
context was in the discussion of critical practice.  Olsen identifies this usage as follows: “It is 
one of the rules of the game that the literary work is autonomous in the sense that the 
understanding of it is independent of the author’s interpretation of his own production (1978: 
118).  His claim that the literary work is autonomous follows a debate which was initiated by 
Monroe Beardsley and W.K. Wimsatt with their paper ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ (1946).9  
Beardsley and Wimsatt argued for the complete rejection of genetic reasons and the partial 
rejection of affective reasons in the process of critical evaluation.  Beardsley defined genetic 
reasons as those which refer to something that preceded the existence of the work, and they 
include intention, expression, originality, and sincerity (1958: 447).  Affective reasons are 
those which refer to the psychological effect of the work on the person experiencing it, and 
include pleasure and emotional impact (1958: 460-461).10  Beardsley maintained that the 
former category were entirely irrelevant to the judgement of aesthetic objects (including 
                                               
9
 See: ‘The Intentional Fallacy,’ Sewanee Review 54 (1946), 468-488.  The paper was revised and republished in 
The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1954), 3-18. 
10
 This ‘fallacy’ was initially discussed in: Beardsley & Wimsatt, ‘The Affective Fallacy,’ The Sewanee Review 
57 (1949), 31-55. 
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works of art) and the latter inadequate on their own.  This debate is related to my concern 
with autonomy because Beardsley’s rejection of genetic and affective criticism forms part of 
his aesthetic theory of art, which is closer to – though still distinct from – my concern.  
Regarding literary art, for example, Beardsley states:  
 what makes literature literature, in part, must be some withdrawal from the world 
 about it, an unusual degree of self-containedness and self-sufficiency that makes it 
 capable of being contemplated with satisfaction in itself (1958: 436-437).   
I shall not employ ‘autonomy’ in the sense in which it relates to either of the above fallacies 
and I distinguish literary autonomy from aesthetic theories of art in §1.4.2.     
    
1.3.2. Literary Value 
The sense of ‘autonomy’ with which I am concerned was popularised in the value interaction 
debate, which was initiated by Carroll with his paper ‘Moderate Moralism’ (1996).  The 
central dispute is whether a moral defect in a work of art is (also) an artistic or aesthetic 
defect, i.e. whether there is a relation between these two spheres of value.  ‘Moralists’ answer 
in the affirmative and ‘autonomists’ in the negative.  Carroll identifies two types of 
autonomism as follows: 
 (i) Radical Autonomism: the view that “it is inappropriate or even incoherent to 
  assess artworks in terms of their consequences for cognition, morality and  
  politics” (1996: 224).  
(ii) Moderate Autonomism: “A given artwork may legitimately traffic in aesthetic, 
moral, cognitive and political value.  But these levels are independent or 
autonomous” (1996: 231).   
Carroll employs ‘aesthetic value’ as inclusive of what I have called literary value, i.e. the 
value of literature qua literature.  This is standard usage in philosophical aesthetics and 
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although I shall not discuss aesthetic value in isolation from literary value I shall take 
aesthetic value to be the value of literature (or art) qua literature (or art) unless otherwise 
specified.11  As I explain in §1.4.2., (i) is an implausible view.  My interest in autonomy is 
with the notion expressed in (ii) as applied to literature, that literary value is independent of 
moral value, cognitive value, and political value.  Within the value interaction debate, 
arguments for this view have been made by James Anderson and Jeffrey Dean,12 James 
Harold,13 and myself.14  I shall not engage with the value interaction debate directly in this 
thesis as – for reasons which I have explained elsewhere15 – I believe that the question of 
literary or artistic autonomy is prior to the question of whether a moral defect is (also) an 
artistic defect.  
 
My claim that literature is autonomous, which I define in §1.4.1., is a claim about the 
characteristically literary value.  Specifically, it is a claim that the characteristically literary 
value is finally rather than instrumentally valuable.  In terms of my definition in §1.1.3., I am 
therefore stating that the characteristically literary value is non-derivative.  I noted that there 
is a debate as to whether there is one or more final value and also that both monists and 
pluralists typically accept that pleasure is finally valuable.  In a similar manner, both those 
who agree with my view of literary value as final and those who disagree – such as Carroll 
(2010) and Nicholas Stang (2012) – agree that pleasure as a literary value is correctly 
characterised as final rather than instrumental (even if that pleasure has, as noted in §1.1.1., 
instrumental value).  I shall follow Malcolm Budd (1995) in arguing that literary value is 
                                               
11
 Although the issue is tangential to my argument for literary autonomy, I am actually in agreement with Lopes 
(2011): that there is a value characteristic of art and that this value is aesthetic value, with the consequence that 
literary value is a species of aesthetic value.  In Louise Hanson’s terms, I am an ‘eliminativist’, maintaining that 
“rather than dispense with all talk of artistic value entirely, we should understand it as really talk of aesthetic 
value” (‘The Reality of [Non-Aesthetic] Artistic Value,’ The Philosophical Quarterly 63 [2013], 493-508: 496). 
12
 James C. Anderson & Jeffrey T. Dean, ‘Moderate Autonomism,’ British Journal of Aesthetics 38 (1998), 150-
166. 
13
 James Harold, ‘Autonomism Reconsidered,’ British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (2011), 137-147. 
14
 Rafe McGregor, ‘Moderate Autonomism Revisited,’ Ethical Perspectives 20 (2013), 403-426. 
15
 See: Rafe McGregor, ‘A Critique of the Value Interaction Debate,’ British Journal of Aesthetics, forthcoming. 
  
30 
 
experiential, i.e. that the value of a literary work is the value of the experience afforded by the 
literary work.16  It should now be evident why I accepted Korsgaard’s two distinctions in 
§1.1.: regardless of whether literary value is final or instrumental, if it is experiential it cannot 
be non-relational, i.e. experiential value is necessarily relational.   
 
If the experience of reading, for example, Ernest Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls is an 
experience which involves the formation of true justified beliefs about the Spanish Civil War 
(or civil wars in general), then one might regard that experience as finally valuable if one 
holds that truth is finally valuable.  Similarly, if the experience of reading J.M. Coetzee’s 
‘The Lives of Animals’ is an experience which involves the recognition of animal suffering 
as morally relevant, then one might regard that experience as finally valuable if one holds that 
virtue is finally valuable.  Alternatively, however, it could be argued that whether or not truth 
is finally valuable, it is a derivative value of the experience of For Whom the Bell Tolls that it 
educates and whether or not virtue is finally valuable, it is a derivative value of the 
experience of ‘The Lives of Animals’ that it educates morally.  Consider the analgesic pill 
mentioned in §1.1.1.  I stated that there could be at least two types of pleasure involved: 
pleasure in tasting the pill and pleasure in the pain-relief produced by the pill.  The pleasure 
of pain relief is typically considered a derivative value of the pill and the pleasure of the taste 
a non-derivative value.  If the education in the experience of the two literary narratives is 
similar to the experience of pain relief, then they could also be considered as instrumental 
values of the work and there is indeed a long tradition in philosophy and criticism of arguing 
for literature as being ‘good for’ a wide variety of reasons.   
 
                                               
16
 I discuss Budd’s theory of value, including his particular use of ‘intrinsic’, in §5.2.1. 
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Within this tradition, however, including defences of didactic literature – which I discuss in 
CHAPTER THREE – there is assent that the value of literature lies not only in its capacity 
for instruction but in the manner in which it instructs, by “delighting” according to Sir Philip 
Sidney (159517) and by “pleasing” according to Samuel Johnson (1765: 126).  The claim that 
pleasure is a final value of literature is uncontroversial and is accepted by those who hold that 
literature is finally valuable for its pleasure, those who hold that it is finally valuable for other 
reasons, and those who claim that literary value is instrumental.  Catherine Belsey makes an 
even stronger statement about the relationship between literature and pleasure: 
Deep down, most critics probably share his [Sidney’s] assessment: the capacity of 
verbal artefacts in every form to solicit and secure the most rapt attention has never 
been seriously disputed.  Indeed, works of fiction are available for us to read at all 
only on the grounds that they once gave pleasure to someone – a populace, an 
aristocratic audience, a monarch, or simply a single editor.  That, amid a diversity of 
critical values and practices, is one widely shared conviction (2011: 17).      
Belsey refers to ‘fiction’ rather than ‘literature’, but I characterised literature as fictional in 
§1.2.1. so her view applies to literature on my account.  The relation between literature and 
pleasure is taken for granted in both the theoretical and philosophical approaches to literature.  
From the analytic perspective, Olsen expresses a similar view: 
Literature is an activity which is highly valued.  In our culture it has been found 
unfailingly interesting and rewarding for more than two thousand years.  Yet the 
reward cannot be specified in terms of any further ends to which it contributes.  It is 
therefore natural to conclude that the reward is in the practice of the activity itself, and 
that one reads literature because one enjoys it (1978: 220).   
                                               
17
 The e-text I have used is a copy of the facsimile of the first authorised edition, by William Ponsonby, and 
therefore contains neither paragraphing nor pagination.   An unauthorised edition, entitled An Apologie for 
Poetrie, was published by Henry Olney in the same year.   
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I shall stipulate pleasure, suitably defined, as the only final literary value.  I shall also follow 
Olsen in stipulating the cognitive value of literature, which I discuss in §1.3.3., as 
instrumental: “To see literature as informative is to see it as instrumental” (1978: 203).  This 
is a not a commitment to value monism, but a means of establishing common ground for 
debate. 
 
This restriction may seem to trivialise the characteristically literary value, but the link 
between art and pleasure extends back to one of Plato’s objections to poetry, that it corrupted 
by making immorality appealing (Republic X: 595b3-6).  In §1.1.3. I noted the varieties of 
pleasure acknowledged by hedonists such as Epicurus and Mill and I shall take Henry 
Sidgwick’s definition of pleasure of all kinds in terms of desire as my starting point:     
I propose therefore to define Pleasure – when we are considering its ‘strict value’ for 
purposes of quantitative comparison – as a feeling which, when experienced by 
intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable or – in cases of 
comparison – preferable (1874, II.2.§2: 127). 
An early attempt to describe the particular pleasure associated with the appreciation of art, 
nature, and beauty was made by Francis Hutcheson, who produced the first systematic study 
of aesthetics with An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.  He argued 
that “the ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to 
us, as well as immediately so” (1726, §1: 11).18  Immanuel Kant developed Hutcheson’s 
prototypical theory in the Third Critique and claimed that aesthetic pleasure was a response 
to the type of perception involved in the judgement of beauty, which placed the cognitive 
faculties of imagination and understanding in harmonious “free play” (1790, §9: 217).  For 
                                               
18
 The Inquiry was first published in 1725, but the first corrected edition appeared in 1726.  Revised editions 
were published in 1729 and 1738. 
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Kant, the judgement of beauty necessarily produced a cognitive harmony which was 
experienced as a particular type of pleasure (1790, §9: 218).   
 
Although Kant’s aesthetic theory came to be associated with the fine arts, as I discuss in 
CHAPTER SIX, his primary concern was with beauty in nature rather than beauty in art and 
his conception of pleasure comes with too much baggage to be useful here, embedded as it is 
in his complex views on the different categories of judgement, which are in turn embedded in 
his transcendental idealism.  I shall present my own account of the particular pleasure 
associated with literature, which I call literary satisfaction, in CHAPTER FIVE.  I want to be 
clear from the outset, however, that despite my rejection of the informative values of 
literature as candidates for the final value of literature, literary satisfaction is an essentially 
intellectual pleasure.  As Olsen states,  
literature demand[s] of the reader imagination, intelligence, intellectual rigour, self-
discipline, and sensitivity both to detail and to language.  These are qualities which 
are highly valued and, where found, they are the result of long and arduous training 
(1978: 215).   
Pleasure is thus neither a trivial nor controversial candidate for literary value.      
 
1.3.3. Literary Values 
By restricting the final value of literature to literary satisfaction, I am stating that all other 
values associated with literature are instrumental and this may seem a sweeping 
generalisation.  Cognitive value and moral value, for example, do not appear to belong to the 
same category as financial or entertainment value and I shall therefore distinguish three sub-
categories of instrumental value.  First, there are the adventitious values of a literary work, 
from its value as a paperweight to resale and investment value to its value in impressing 
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visitors when they see it in a private collection.  It is not clear that any of these values are 
related to the literary experience afforded by the work as even the investment value is a 
function of facts about the author and facts about the particular token of the work rather than 
the value of the literary experience.  I shall have nothing further to say about the adventitious 
instrumental values of a literary work.  The second category of instrumental value is the 
family of values connected with the literary work as a source of entertainment.  The 
entertainment value of a work of literature can be a consequence of the absorbing nature of 
literary satisfaction or from a less intense, less sophisticated ‘light read’ of a literary work or 
favoured part thereof.  This may be what Attridge has in mind when he mentions reading 
Middlemarch as fiction, but not literature.  Entertainment value is also associated with non-
literary works, primarily works of genre fiction, which are typically either formulaic or lack 
the complexity of literary works.  Entertainment value may be a value of literature, but it is 
not the value of literature.  I shall therefore have nothing further to say about this type of 
instrumental value either, although I shall show why literary satisfaction cannot be reduced to 
the pleasure of entertainment in CHAPTER FIVE.  Finally, there are the instrumental values 
with which I am concerned, namely cognitive, religious, moral, and political values – all of 
which may be regarded as non-derivative, i.e. as finally valuable.  I shall focus on the 
cognitive and moral value of works.   
 
John Gibson introduces the former as follows: 
 Whatever ‘cognitive’ may mean in its various technical uses, as I will use the 
 term here (and as it is generally used in the literature on aesthetics), it has the sense of 
 asking whether literature can be seen as in some significant respect informative of 
 extra‐textual reality (2007: 82). 
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Gibson maintains that literature is informative in this way, but not in terms of “the acquisition 
of so-called propositional knowledge”, the type of cognitive value often associated with 
literature (2007: 141).  He is thus in agreement with Catherine Wilson, who claims that 
literature provides non-propositional knowledge and criticises propositional theorists such as 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Morris Weitz, John Hospers, and Peter Jones (1983: 489-490).  
The propositional theory remains popular, however, and adherents include Carroll, Peter 
Kivy, and Catherine Elgin.  It has recently been defended by Richard Gaskin: 
literary works […] may have a cognitive value which is part and parcel of their 
aesthetic value, and […] their cognitive value and aesthetic value, if they do have it, 
depends essentially on their referring to, and making true statements about, the world 
(2013: vii). 
According to Gaskin, where literary value has a cognitive component it is dependent on the 
truth value of the propositions made (or implied) by the work.  His definition draws attention 
to the significance of the second question in the pair Katherine Thomson-Jones employs to 
distinguish aesthetic cognitivism from aesthetic anti-cognitivism: “(1) Can art provide 
knowledge?  And, if it can, (2) how is this aesthetically relevant” (2005: 376)?   
 
Aesthetic relevance requires a link between the capacity of an artwork to provide knowledge 
and its success or failure qua artwork and this is what Gaskin aims to establish in his claim 
that cognitive value is part and parcel of the aesthetic value of literary works.  Carroll holds a 
similar view, clarificationism, which I discuss briefly in §1.4.4. and in detail in CHAPTER 
SIX.  Although she rejects the propositional theories endorsed by Gaskin and Carroll, Wilson 
is also an aesthetic cognitivist, arguing that literature is a source of knowledge by means of “a 
modification of a person’s concepts” (1983: 495).  If one accepts that knowledge is ‘justified 
true belief’ (or ‘justified true belief plus something’), then any position which links literary 
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value to knowledge is concerned with the truth value of literature.  Both Gaskin (explicitly) 
and Wilson (implicitly) therefore advance truth as a value of literature qua literature.  Pace 
Gibson, who refers to himself as a cognitivist, but rejects truth and knowledge as literary 
values,19 I shall designate ‘literary cognitivism’ as the thesis that truth is, or can be, a value 
of literature qua literature.  In the terms set out in §1.3.2., the literary cognitivist 
characterises literary value as instrumental.   
 
The second instrumental value of literature I shall discuss at length is moral value.  Where the 
concept of literature having cognitive value is relatively straightforward – whether works can 
inform readers about the world or communicate truth – the case is more complex for moral 
value.  There seem to be several answers to the question of how moral value can be attributed 
to works of literature.  The emphasis in literary criticism and literary aesthetics has tended to 
focus on immorality in literature and A.W. Eaton identifies five ways in which a work of art 
can be ethically defective:  
(i)  the subject matter represented,  
(ii)  the character of the artist,  
(iii)  the methods of production,  
(iv)  the behavioural consequences, and  
(v)  the vision or perspective embodied by the work (2003: 164-165).   
Setting aside the question of defects in particular, Eaton’s list specifies five potential sources 
of moral valence.  (i) is based on the naïve view that some subjects – for example, human 
nudity or lifestyles that are immoral – should not be represented.  I call this view naïve 
because it fails to acknowledge the significance of (v).  Works of art can embody radically 
different perspectives on the same subject and where that subject is immoral – such as rape – 
                                               
19
 I discuss his position in §1.4.3.  
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the work can embody a pro- or anti- attitude, as Eaton’s discussion of the contrasting 
depictions of rape in Titian’s Rape of Europa and Nicolas Poussin’s The Rape of the Sabine 
Women demonstrates.  I shall therefore have nothing further to say about (i).  I noted the 
dispute about the relevance of genetic reasons – (ii) and (iii) above – to artistic criticism in 
§1.3.1.  I also noted that I do not wish to contribute to the intentionalist debate, however, and 
as both intentionalists and anti-intentionalists accept (v), but not (ii) and (iii), I shall ignore 
morally-relevant genetic facts about the literary work.  Finally, Wilson is one of several who 
warns against questions about “the mechanics of the influence of literary works” (1983: 495) 
and Carroll points to the inconclusive or trivial results of studies of the behavioural 
consequences of the experience of work of art thus far (2000: 355-356).20  I shall therefore 
follow Eaton in excluding (iv) and restricting my interest to (v), such that the moral value of a 
literary work is the moral value of the perspective embodied by the literary work.   
 
With this in mind, I can designate ‘literary moralism’ as the claim that the moral value of the 
embodied perspective of a literary work is, or can be, a value of literature qua literature.  In 
§1.2.2. I stated that I would restrict my employment of examples to the literary canon and it is 
an interesting feature of the canon, to which I shall return in §4.3.4., that there is a paucity of 
works which embody morally reprehensible perspectives.  This is why my rejection of (i) in 
favour of (v) above is so important: despite their respective subjects, Vladimir Nabokov’s 
Lolita does not promote paedophilia any more than John Milton’s Paradise Lost promotes 
                                               
20
 There are similar problems in a related area which has been the subject of much more intensive study: the 
causal relation between media violence and violent crime.  In his summary of the empirical evidence, 
Christopher Ferguson notes that research ranges from claims that the effects of media violence have been 
demonstrated conclusively to claims that the results acquired thus far are weak and/or inconsistent.  See: ‘Media 
Violence Effects and Violent Crime: Good Science or Moral Panic?’ in Christopher J. Ferguson, ed., Violent 
Crime: Clinical and Social Implications (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), 37-56.  The prevailing opinion 
appears to be that the proposed causal relation is inconclusive or – at best – disputed.  The actual effect that 
reading literature has on cognitive ability and ethical behaviour is even less clear, with much less empirical 
evidence.  See: Jèmeljan Hakemulder, The Moral Laboratory: Experiments examining the effects of reading 
literature on social perception and moral self-knowledge (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2000).  Richard Posner 
provides several powerful counter-examples to the attempts to link literature with moral behaviour and regards 
the connections as “just another exploded Victorian piety” (1997: 4). 
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Satanism.  Where immorality is found in canonical works it is often in the assumptions made 
by their authors, the moral background of the works rather than the perspective they endorse.  
A vast number of works in the literary canon were written in historical periods where the 
prevailing assumptions are now considered sexist and racist, and the immorality is often 
restricted to this moral framework.  Arguments have been advanced for works such as 
William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and Ezra Pound’s The Cantos embodying 
immoral perspectives, but interpretations are disputed and the apparent lack of canonical 
examples of embodied immorality is often regarded as prima facie evidence that moral value 
is part and parcel of literary value.  There are, however, several paradigmatic examples with 
which literary moralists must deal.  These include surrealist and existentialist works which 
embody a vision of the world as devoid of all value and promote amoralism in response to 
this absence, for example: Louis-Ferdinand Céline’s Journey to the End of Night, Henry 
Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, and William S. Burroughs’ 
Naked Lunch.  If moral value is part and parcel of literary value, then the flawed perspectives 
of these works make them less valuable qua literature, even if only on a pro tanto basis.  I 
discuss the moral value of literature in detail in CHAPTER SEVEN. 
 
1.4. Literary Autonomy 
 
1.4.1. The Thesis 
I began by distinguishing the relational/non-relational value distinction from the 
instrumental/final value distinction.  I then distinguished literary value from the values of 
literature and restricted the final value of literature to the most uncontroversial candidate, 
pleasure.  I identified the cognitive and moral values of literature respectively, indicating that 
if they were part and parcel of literary value, literary value would be characterised as 
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instrumental in my terms.  My thesis will show that literary value is final, where final value is 
understood exclusively in terms of a type of pleasure, and that the value of a literary work 
qua literature is therefore distinct from the cognitive or moral value of that literary work.  
The literary value of For Whom the Bell Tolls, as defined in §1.3.2., is thus distinct from the 
value of the knowledge it imparts about civil wars; and the literary value of ‘The Lives of 
Animals’ is distinct from the moral value of its embodied perspective on animal suffering.  I 
want to emphasise from the outset that my conception of autonomy does not involve a 
commitment to the primacy of this characteristic value, i.e. I am not stating that works of 
literature should always be judged as works of literature or that the literary value of a work of 
literature is more important than its cognitive or moral value.  I shall, however, argue that 
literary value is independent of the other values associated with literature, that these values 
are an external influence from which literary value is free, and that literary value is to this 
extent self-sufficient.  My thesis can thus be stated as:    
THE AUTONOMY OF LITERATURE: the value of a work of literature qua literature 
is the value of the experience afforded by the work and the experience afforded by the 
work is valuable to the degree that this experience is finally valuable, i.e. produces 
literary satisfaction.  As such, the literary value of a literary work is independent of 
the work’s cognitive, moral, and other instrumental values.   
 
1.4.2. More Disambiguation 
The idea of some kind of aesthetic, artistic, or literary autonomy has been debated since the 
Enlightenment, and was particularly popular in the early and mid-twentieth century.  A list of 
autonomists, broadly construed as regarding aesthetic, artistic, or literary value as in some 
way independent of cognitive or moral value, includes: Attridge, Roland Barthes, Beardsley, 
Clive Bell, A.C. Bradley, Benjamin Constant, R.G. Collingwood, Jacques Derrida, Dickie, 
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Richard Eldridge, William Gass, Gibson, Harold, Hutcheson, Gary Iseminger, Roman 
Jakobson, Kant, Lamarque, Olsen, Walter Pater, Richard Posner, I.A. Richards, Michael 
Riffaterre, Roger Scruton, Oscar Wilde, and many others.  This list of twenty-five names 
alone comprises an extremely wide variety of perspectives, from the moderate (Gibson’s neo-
cognitivist autonomism, which I discuss in §1.4.3., and Harold’s no-error argument for 
autonomism21) to the radical (Wilde’s aestheticism, Bell’s formalism, and Derrida’s anti-
realism22).  Artistic autonomy is, in particular (sometimes deliberately), conflated with two 
more extreme positions, which many of those in the above list hold: aesthetic theories of art 
and artistic formalism.  Aesthetic theory, formalism, and aestheticism are all versions of 
artistic autonomy, but they do not exhaust the autonomist position and my thesis is distinct 
from all three.     
 
Bradley describes aestheticism as the “doctrine that Art is the whole or supreme end of 
human life” (1901: 5).  The doctrine has been associated with the Aesthetic Movement, 
which is usually dated from around 1870 to 1900.  The origin of the movement is contested, 
but it seems to have been inspired by Constant’s coining of the phrase ‘l’art pour l’art’ (‘art 
for art’s sake’) in 1804,23 and motivated by reaction to the didacticism of John Ruskin and 
Matthew Arnold.  Aestheticism was dominated by British artists, advocated unity among the 
arts, and valued beauty above all else.  Members included James Abbott McNeill Whistler, 
Albert Moore, Wilde, and Algernon Charles Swinburne.  In art criticism, Pater became the 
voice of the movement, beginning with his collection entitled Studies in the History of the 
Renaissance in 1873.  The most well-known statement of aestheticism is probably from 
Wilde in his preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, where he makes claims such as: 
                                               
21
 See fn.13. 
22
 I discuss Wilde and Bell below; Gibson provides an informed and balanced view of the anti-realist 
implications of Derrida’s deconstructive criticism in 2007: 37-42. 
23
 See: Rose Francis Egan, ‘The Genesis of The Theory of “Art for Art’s Sake” in Germany and in England: Part 
II,’ Smith College Studies in Modern Languages 2, v-33. 
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 (i) There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book.  Books are well  
  written, or badly written.  That is all (1890: 5). 
 (ii) An ethical sympathy in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of style (1890: 
  6). 
The preface ends with the famous statement that: “All art is quite useless” (1890: 6).  Wilde’s 
point seems to be that it is inappropriate to judge art in terms of its moral value – which is 
reminiscent of the view Carroll calls ‘radical autonomism’.  Radical autonomism about art is 
nonetheless a far cry from making art the supreme end of human life and The Picture of 
Dorian Gray is itself a warning against taking aestheticism to such extremes.  My autonomy 
thesis is clearly distinct from both aestheticism and radical autonomism.   
            
Bell’s Art (1913) was highly influential, particularly in the visual arts, and he is probably the 
most well-known formalist.  Bell maintained that the representational and cognitive elements 
of art were irrelevant to art qua art (1913: 225),24 and that the essence of visual art was 
“‘Significant Form’” (1913: 8), which was characterised in terms of provoking “aesthetic 
emotion” (1913: 12).  Bell thus located the value of a painting in the combination of lines and 
colours in the work to the exclusion of what those lines and colours represented, and his 
theory inspired formalists such as Roger Fry, Albert Barnes, and (subsequently) Clement 
Greenberg.  Simultaneously, a parallel movement called Russian Formalism was underfoot in 
literary criticism, led by Viktor Shklovsky, Jakobson, and others.  Formalism in literary 
theory was similarly influential, although it is also something of an umbrella term which 
includes theories as diverse as New Criticism, Structuralism, and Post-structuralism, and 
                                               
24
 Carroll calls Bell the “best known radical autonomist” (1996: 225).  Although there is some evidence for this 
label, Bell did not think it incoherent to make moral judgements of works of art: “You may, of course, make 
ethical judgements about particular works, not as works of art, but as members of some other class, or as 
independent and unclassified parts of the universe.  You may hold that a particular picture by the President of 
the Royal Academy is a greater means to good than one by the glory of the New English Art Club, and that a 
penny bun is better than either.  In such a case you will be making a moral and not an aesthetic judgment” 
(1913: 116). 
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comprises the work of John Crowe Ransom, Brooks, Wimsatt, Beardsley, Tzvetan Todorov, 
Barthes, Michel Foucault, and Derrida, amongst others.  As I shall explain in §2.3.1., Bradley 
characterises formalism as the view that all artistic value lies in the form rather than the 
content of the work, and Bell appears to have adopted precisely such a view when he 
proposed the irrelevance of representational and cognitive elements to artistic evaluation.  
Bradley terms poetic formalism “form for form’s sake” (1901: 7), although poetry for form’s 
sake would be more accurate.  My autonomy thesis is distinct from all theories which locate 
the value of literature in literary form exclusively because my argument for the final value of 
literature is based on the salience of both literary form and literary content, as I emphasise 
throughout this thesis. 
                        
Aesthetic theories of art advance aesthetic properties or qualities as necessary and sufficient 
conditions for works of art.  The most well-known aesthetic theorist is probably Beardsley, 
while Iseminger’s ‘New Aestheticism’ is highly regarded by both allies and opponents.25  
Eldridge argues for an aesthetic theory which is based on a particular relationship between 
artistic form and artistic content:   
The aesthetic quality possession of which is necessary and sufficient for a thing’s 
 being art is the satisfying appropriateness to one another of a thing’s form and 
 content (1985: 308). 
Eldridge’s appropriateness is very similar to – if not identical with – the relation between 
literary form and literary content I describe as literary thickness.  In order to formulate a 
theory of art, a condition which is both necessary and sufficient must be identified, however, 
and I shall argue only that literary thickness is a necessary condition of literature.  In §1.2.2., 
I stated that although I did not wish to commit to a definition of art, the characterisation of 
                                               
25
 See: The Aesthetic Function of Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
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literature I accepted was compatible with the institutional theory.  If a work is a work of 
literature it must therefore not only satisfy the demand for thickness, it must also either be 
created with the intention to invoke a literary response or – in cases such as Outsider Art – be 
appropriated with the intention of invoking a literary response by someone other than the 
author.  I shall propose neither thickness nor intention – nor a combination of thickness and 
intention – as sufficient conditions of literature and cannot thus be accused of formulating an 
aesthetic theory of literature. 
 
1.4.3. Allies 
In my argument for literary autonomy I shall draw most heavily on the work of Bradley, 
Attridge, and Lamarque.  My position is less extreme than Bradley’s as my version of 
autonomy is weaker.  Bradley appears to favour an autonomy which is so strong as to sever 
poetry from the world, claiming that the nature of poetry is 
 to be not a part, nor yet a copy, of the real world (as we commonly understand that 
 phrase), but to be a world by itself, independent, complete, autonomous; and to 
 possess it fully you must enter that world, conform to its laws, and ignore for the time 
 the beliefs, aims, and particularly conditions which belong to you in the other world 
 of reality (1901: 5).   
I shall argue for literary value as independent of cognitive and moral value, but I propose no 
such separation between work and world – contra Bradley, I hold that a particular connection 
between work and world, which I describe in §4.4., is essential to literary value.  In Gibson’s 
(2007: 16-17) terms, but not Gaskin’s, I am therefore a literary humanist.   
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There is some degree of overlap26 between my thesis and Gibson’s view of the cognitive 
achievement of literature: 
This achievement does not consist in the stating of truths or the offering of knowledge 
of matters of fact.  It is rather a matter of literature’s ability to open up for us a world 
of value and significance and of all that this implies about our capacity to understand 
fully the import of various forms of human activity (2007: 116). 
Gibson rejects both truth and reference as relevant to literary value; I reject truth, but not 
reference,27 so there is a sense in which his autonomism is stronger than mine.  There is also a 
sense in which mine is stronger than his.  Gibson refers to himself as a “neo-cognitivist”, an 
umbrella term for approaches which hold that literature is informative of extra-textual reality 
without recourse to propositions, truth, or knowledge (2008: 585).  Gibson’s implication 
throughout Fiction and the Weave of Life (2007) is that the communication of this extra-
textual information is a necessary condition of literary value, whereas I hold that a work of 
literature could be valuable qua literature even if its informative value (whether defined in 
terms of truth or not) is trivial.  This is not to deny that the informative value of literary works 
usually is non-trivial, only that there is no essential link between the communication of 
information about the world and literary value.     
 
In contrast, my autonomy thesis is clearly stronger than Attridge’s.  He explicitly rejects 
conceptions of literature which involve “carrying away from the text some conceptual 
substance for my further use or entertainment” (2004a: 111) and can thus be considered an 
autonomist in the terms set out in §1.4.2.  His literary theory is based on three cornerstones: 
                                               
26
 Gibson’s literary humanism also involves form-content inseparability, for example: “The form of insight 
literature trades in is bound up with the internal structure of a literary work.  In fact, it is inseparable from it.  
The insight into life we find in a great novel is the novel itself, as the New Critics liked to remind us.  It is 
woven into the fabric of the story and the specific ways in which it configures and gives dramatic expression to 
its subject matter” (2007: 118). 
27
 See §4.3. 
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singularity (which I discuss in §3.2.1.), inventiveness (creativity), and otherness.  The first 
two are closely related to the third:  
the singular inventiveness of the work is what constitutes its otherness – not as an 
absolute quality, but one that is meaningful only in relation to a given context; 
otherness is always otherness to a particular self or situation (2004b: 11). 
Responsiveness to this otherness simply is ethical responsibility.  Attridge argues that 
responsiveness to the absolutely new is a form of responsibility, and that inventiveness is 
therefore responsibility for the other conceived as the (meta-)ethical responsibility of the self 
for the other (1999: 27-29).  While he rejects reading a work for the moral lesson it provides, 
the experience of a work qua literature is nonetheless essentially ethical: 
 Reading a work of literature entails opening oneself to the unpredictable, the future, 
 the other, and thereby accepting the responsibility laid upon one by the work’s 
 singularity and difference.  There is also abundant evidence that writing a literary 
 work is often a similar experience.  In a sense, the ‘literary’ is the ethical (2004b: 
 111). 
My thesis proposes no necessary relation between literary value and moral value, at either the 
normative or meta-ethical levels.  Nor do I accept a fundamental link between creativity and 
responsibility: literary creativity can just as easily be turned to inhuman purposes as 
humanitarian.  I do not deny that works of literature usually are morally valuable, only that 
there is a necessary relation between the moral and literary values of a work.     
 
1.4.4. Opponents 
I have defined my autonomy thesis in terms of the literary value of a work being independent 
of the work’s cognitive, moral, and other instrumental values.  This independence has been 
denied on the basis that either cognitive or moral (or both) values are part and parcel of 
  
46 
 
literary value – a position I construe as instrumentalist – and the list of instrumentalists 
understood in this way includes: Arnold, Jonathan Bate, Carroll, Cora Diamond, Horace, 
Terry Eagleton, Gaskin, Alan Goldman, Gordon Graham, Johnson, D.H. Lawrence, F.R. 
Leavis, György Lukács, Colin McGinn, Iris Murdoch, Martha Nussbaum, Plato, Hilary 
Putnam, Ruskin, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Friedrich Schiller, Percy Bysshe Shelley, 
Sidney, Thomson-Jones, Wilson, and many, many others.  It should be noted that this list and 
its predecessor in §1.4.3. are not mutually exclusive; Scruton and Schiller, for example, might 
appear on either depending upon one’s definition of autonomy.  All of those in this list, 
however, promote views of literary value which are incompatible with my autonomy thesis. 
               
Opposition to my thesis comes from two main directions, exemplified by Carroll and 
Nussbaum respectively.  Carroll’s objection to literary autonomy is twofold.  First, “the 
cognitive dimension of aesthetic experience is its primary locus of value” (2010: 102fn.), i.e. 
the experience of a work of art qua art should be valued for the knowledge communicated 
before the pleasure produced.  Carroll maintains that some works of art have the capacity to 
yield “propositional knowledge about the conditions of application of our concepts” (2010: 
189) and this propositional knowledge is part and parcel of the works’ aesthetic/artistic value.  
With respect to narrative works of art and moral understanding in particular, Carroll advances 
“Clarificationism” (1998: 142), the theory that the narratives in question offer insight into 
virtue concepts and thereby clarify moral understanding.  For Carroll both cognitive and 
moral value are part and parcel of aesthetic/artistic value, but I shall focus on his cognitive 
challenge to autonomy.  Second, he holds that the autonomy thesis, understood as the 
conception of art as promoting sui generic value, severs not only art and the artworld from 
life and society (2010: 461), but also aesthetics from other branches of philosophy (2010: 
153-161).  In this respect, realist narratives play a particularly important role for Carroll 
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because it is an essential element of the realist narrative that it communicate knowledge about 
the world and the realist novel thus constitutes a powerful counter-example to autonomism 
(2010: 471).   
 
Nussbaum also has a twofold objection to literary autonomy.  First, “certain truths about 
human life can only be fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic 
of the narrative artist” (1990: 5).  A sub-category of realist novels, exemplified by Henry 
James and Charles Dickens, are indispensable to moral philosophy because they 
communicate non-propositional ethical knowledge which cannot be communicated in another 
form.  In these works, the moral value is “absolutely central” to the literary value (1998: 
360), i.e. moral value is part and parcel of literary value.  These novels convey this distinctive 
knowledge by means of the sustained exploration of morally relevant particulars and the 
imaginative engagement characteristic of the experience of reading literature (1990: 141-
143).  Second, such novels can assist “public deliberations in democracy […] by both 
cultivating and reinforcing valuable moral abilities” (1998: 346).  This is an empirical claim 
about the moral effects of reading James’ and Dickens’ works as literature and although 
Nussbaum focuses on the moral value of the experience of reading, she also maintains that 
this experience will, ceteris paribus, exert a positive influence on the morality of the reader 
(1998: 353).  In my terms, she proposes that the literary value of the works is both finally 
valuable in producing literary satisfaction and instrumentally valuable in developing moral 
character.     
 
Carroll embraces the instrumentalist label: the stated purpose of Art in Three Dimensions 
(2010) is to show that the value of art is derived from its value in promoting various 
cognitive, moral, and cultural values.  I discuss his objections to my position in detail in 
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CHAPTER SIX.  Nussbaum would resist my labelling because she does not regard the 
characteristic value of literary works as being derived from their moral value; moral value is 
instead partly constitutive of non-derivative literary value.  My dispute with Nussbaum 
extends beyond nomenclature, however, to whether the value of the exemplary moral 
perspective of, for example, Hard Times. For These Times contributes to its literary value.  
Despite her claims to the contrary, there is also a sense in which Nussbaum’s instrumentalism 
is more robust than Carroll’s because her empirical claim is – as noted in §1.3.3. – explicitly 
avoided by cognitivists such as Carroll and Wilson.  I discuss Nussbaum’s objections to my 
position in detail in CHAPTER SEVEN.  Having defined my autonomy thesis and identified 
Carroll and Nussbaum as my main opponents, I shall now proceed with my argument for the 
autonomy of literature, beginning with two instantiations of the literary thickness upon which 
that argument is based: poetic thickness and narrative thickness. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POETIC THICKNESS 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the experience of a poem qua poem is an 
experience of poetic thickness, i.e. an experience in which poetic form and poetic content are 
inseparable.  In §2.1. I introduce the philosophical interest in the relationship between form 
and content and discuss Morris Weitz’s scepticism about the value of the distinction.  I 
present a critical analysis of A.C. Bradley’s ‘Poetry for Poetry’s Sake’ lecture in §2.2., 
indicating both the strengths and weaknesses of his conception of resonant meaning.  §2.3. 
draws on subsequent work by I.A. Richards and Peter Lamarque to advance my account of 
the relationship in question, poetic thickness, understood as a demand made of a poem rather 
than a property discovered therein.  I discuss four objections to form-content unity from Peter 
Kivy in §2.4.: perfect circularity, ubiquitous unity, the sugar-coated pill tradition, and the 
defence from tradition.  I show that all these objections fail against poetic thickness.  I 
conclude that the experience of a poem qua poem is indeed an experience of thickness, and 
that poetic thickness is therefore a necessary condition of poetry.       
 
2.1. Form & Content 
 
2.1.1. Terminology 
In everything that can be called art there is a distinction between a work’s form and a work’s 
content.28  The possible exception is pure or absolute music (music without non-musical 
                                               
28
 Even those who are sceptical of the value of this distinction – like Weitz – acknowledge its existence.  
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components), which is thought to have no content and therefore be an instance of pure form.  
It is the apparent absence of this distinction in music which prompts Walter Pater to state: 
All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.  For while in all other kinds 
of art it is possible to distinguish the matter from the form, and the understanding can 
always make this distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it.  That 
the mere matter of a poem, for instance, its subject, namely, its given incidents or 
situation – that the mere matter of a picture, the actual circumstances of an event, the 
actual topography of a landscape – should be nothing without the form, the spirit, of 
the handling, that this form, this mode of handling, should become an end in itself, 
should penetrate every part of the matter: this is what all art constantly strives after, 
and achieves in different degrees (1888: 135).  
Pater refers to form as mode of handling and content as subject and matter.  There are 
numerous ways to characterise the distinction, the most common of which are: form/content, 
style/substance, manner/matter, and medium/message.   
 
Plato distinguished the “style” of stories from their “content” (Republic III: 392c5-7), and 
while there has been philosophical interest in the relationship between form and content ever 
since,29 Bradley’s ‘Poetry for Poetry’s Sake’ lecture marks the beginning of the contemporary 
concern.  Bradley employs the terms “form” (1901: 7), “style” (1901: 8), “versification” 
(1901: 8), “treatment” (1901: 8), and “handling” (1901: 8) to describe one side of the 
distinction in poetry; and “matter” (1901: 7), “subject” (1901: 7), “content” (1901: 7), 
“substance” (1901; 7), “the ‘moral’” (1901: 18fn.), “the ‘idea’” (1901: 18fn.), and “meaning” 
(1901: 19) for the other.  Subsequently, Richards employed “sequences of sounds” (1929: 
227) and “inherent rhythm” (1929: 233) for form; and “meanings of the words” (1929: 227) 
                                               
29
 Kivy for example, explains both Plato’s antagonism towards poetry (1997: 89-91) and Kant’s play of 
cognitive faculties (1997: 94-96) in terms of form and content.  I discuss the former briefly in §2.4.4. 
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and “sense and feeling” (1929: 233) for content.  Moving from poetry to literature, Attridge 
distinguishes between form as “sounds and shapes” (2004a: 108-109) and content as 
“meaning and feeling” (2004a: 109); and Gaskin between “sense and reference” (2013: 
304).30     
 
Literary form includes structure, morphology (the patterns of word formation), syntax (the 
rules of sentence formation), metre (the arrangement of words in regularly measured, 
patterned, or rhythmic lines or verses), and tropes (all literary or rhetorical devices which use 
words in other than their literal sense).  Content includes subject, genre, theme, characters, 
settings, and events.31  Recent discussions of narrative have introduced new versions of the 
distinction, such as Berys Gaut’s narration/narrative (2011: 26) and Gibson’s narrative/story 
(2011a: 71-72).  The proliferation of terms is a source of potential confusion: ‘sense’ is 
content for Richards and form for Gaskin; ‘narrative’ is content for Gaut and form for 
Gibson.  In order to avoid ambiguity, I shall employ form and content wherever possible.  
Following Plato (Republic III: 394c8-10), Bradley offers a simple and effective description of 
the distinction, which I shall take as my starting point:  form is how a poet says something; 
content is what the poet says (1901: 7-8).  
 
2.1.2. Scepticism 
An obvious objection to my thesis is that in basing my argument for the autonomy of 
literature on the relationship between literary form and literary content I am overvaluing a 
                                               
30
 Gaskin is making use of Frege’s terminology: “It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign 
(name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which it refers, which may be called the reference of a sign, 
also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained” (‘On Sense 
and Reference,’ trans. Peter Geach, in P.T. Geach & M. Black, eds., Translations from the Philosophical 
Writings of Gottlob Frege [Oxford: Blackwell, 1892/1970], 56-78: 57). 
31
 Two points to note: (i) ‘genre’ is sometimes categorised as an element of literary form; see, for example, 
Lamarque’s discussion of genre and structure (2009a: 138-139); (ii) I use events as opposed to sequence of 
events as the sequence in which the events of the work are presented is an element of form, not content. 
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dichotomy which is not in fact enlightening or useful.  According to Weitz, the distinction is 
not only uninformative, but actively misleading, “responsible for more of the difficulties in 
contemporary aesthetic thought than any other” (1950: 35).  He refers to the what-how 
characterisation of Bradley’s as a “commonsense” distinction between the elements of a work 
and their organisation (1950: 36), and identifies three variants (1950: 39-40):32 
 (i) content as the subject, theme, or idea of a work; form as the medium in which 
  this content is presented; 
   (ii) content as the subject, theme, or idea of a work; form as the manner in which 
  this content is expressed; and 
 (iii) content as a work’s terms or elements; form as all the relations among these 
  elements. 
Weitz rejects all three usages and reconceptualises the dichotomy in terms of his Organic 
Theory of Art (1950: 44), which identifies a work as “an organic complex or integration of 
expressive elements embodied in a sensuous medium” (1950: 51).  Content and form are 
defined as identical: “the organic unification of the several expressive constituents of the 
work of art” (1950: 48) and “the same coördination of elements, characteristics, and 
relations” (1950: 48).  Weitz’s revision of the distinction is in fact a rejection, as he is explicit 
that there is “no distinction” between artistic form and artistic content (1950: 48).  He (1950: 
50-51) also maintains that this analysis – the identity of form and content – has been 
appropriated by Bradley.    
 
Bradley is unclear about the precise relationship he has in mind, and there is indeed evidence 
for identity: 
                                               
32
 I have altered the order in which Weitz presents the three. 
  
53 
 
 (i) “And this identity of content and form, you will say, is no accident”  
  (1901:15); 
 (ii) “This unity has, if you like, various ‘aspects’ or ‘sides,’ but they are not  
  factors or parts; if you try to examine one, you find it is also the other”   
  (1901: 15). 
Bradley does not, however, appear to mean ‘identical’ in the strict philosophical sense of 
indiscernible identicals.  Prior to the mention of identity in (i) he notes that form and content 
“are one” in the experience of a poem, but not in the analysis or critique thereof (1901: 14).  
If the relation was one of strict identity for Bradley, then form and content would be identical 
in both the experience and analysis of a poem.  Kivy characterises Bradley’s relation as 
follows: “inseparability” (1997: 85; 2011b: 370), “indistinguishable” (1997: 84), “the thesis 
of form-content identity” (1997: 85), “the form-content identity assumption” (2011b: 369), 
“the assumption of form-content unity” (2011b: 368), “indissolubility” (1997: 85), and “total 
fusion of form with content” (1997: 86; 2011a: 165).  Kivy favours identity, but this is hardly 
surprising as he is arguing against Bradley.  Richards is critical of the term, maintaining that 
talk of identity has resulted in “mystery and obscurity” regarding the relationship (1929: 
233), and I am inclined to agree.  I explain Bradley’s conception of form-content unity in 
terms of inseparability in §2.2.2. 
 
Returning to Weitz, my preliminary characterisation of what-how matches his third usage: 
content as a work’s terms or elements, and form as all the relations among these elements.33  
The first usage conflates ‘artistic form’ with ‘art form’ (which is often, but not necessarily, 
related to the artistic medium), and Weitz is right to disambiguate between the two 
                                               
33
 Weitz’s delineation of both elements and relations is broad: “The what, or content of a work of art is its terms 
or elements, which may include dramatic entities like people as well as colors, lines, or shapes, tones, etc., in the 
case of the arts other than painting; and the how, or form, is all the relations – spatial, temporal, or causal – 
among the elements” (1950: 39). 
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employments of ‘form’.  I cannot accept the second usage because it is unnecessarily 
restrictive: even if one takes ‘expression’ to include structure, morphology, syntax, metre, 
and tropes, basic elements such as character, setting, and action are excluded from content.  
This usage could also be considered a sub-category or instantiation of the third if the subject 
is an element of the work and expression is determined by the way in which the elements are 
related.  I therefore agree with Weitz that the first two distinctions are erroneous, but I shall 
argue that the what-how distinction understood in terms of elements and relations not only 
does justice to the literary art form,34 but also grounds a literary humanism which does not 
entail a commitment to either literary cognitivism or literary moralism.35   
 
Weitz’s alternative, the identity claim, is unconvincing because both of the definitions quoted 
above are reducible to my preferred what-how distinction: organic unification and 
coordination appear to be referring to form, and expressive constituents and elements to 
content.  Despite Weitz’s rejection of the form-content distinction, therefore, he fails to offer 
an alternative which cannot itself be understood in terms of the very distinction he is 
rejecting.  Although I stand by my reading of Weitz, I make mention of Thomson-Jones’ 
(2005) interpretation here.36  In my understanding, she maintains that Weitz’s claim is one of 
indistinguishablility: form and content are not identical, but they cannot be distinguished 
(2005: 377).  If Weitz is arguing for this weaker relation, then he is even more susceptible to 
the objection I have just expressed as the different parts of his definition clearly are 
distinguishable in what-how terminology.  
 
 
                                               
34
 Throughout this thesis, but this chapter and the next in particular. 
35
 From CHAPTER FOUR onwards.  
36
 I do agree with some of what Thomson-Jones has to say, particularly her claim that form-content 
inseparability is “indispensable for our understanding of representational art” (2005: 378). 
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2.2. Resonant Meaning   
 
2.2.1. Poetic Autonomy 
Bradley’s inaugural address at Oxford was intended to convince his audience of poetic 
autonomy, the view that the experience of a poem is valuable in itself regardless of any 
instrumental value it may possess.  He does not argue for the final value of poetry, but simply 
assumes that the poetic experience is “an end in itself, worth having on its own account, has 
an intrinsic value” (1901: 4),37 before attempting to answer three objections:  
 (i)  autonomy is a commitment to aestheticism (1901: 5-6); 
 (ii)  autonomy severs poetry from life (1901: 6-7); and  
 (iii)  autonomy is a commitment to formalism (1901: 7-25).38   
The argument for form-content unity is part of Bradley’s attempt to distinguish autonomy 
from formalism, which he conceives as the view that all poetic value lies in the form of a 
poem and that its content is irrelevant – that poetry is in fact form for form’s sake.  Bradley 
attempts to show that an autonomist is not committed to formalism, and he does this by 
arguing against two “heresies” (1901: 24), one which assigns poetic value exclusively to 
form, and the other which assigns poetic value exclusively to content.  If he can prove that 
the value of the poem lies in the form and the content, then he will have distinguished his 
position from the formal heresy – hence the argument for form-content unity.   
 
                                               
37
 According to the taxonomy I set out in §1.1., Bradley is one of several philosophers and critics who conflates 
the two distinctions in value: between final and instrumental value on the one hand (non-derivatively valuable 
versus derivatively valuable) and intrinsic and extrinsic value on the other (non-relationally valuable versus 
relationally valuable).  Understood in these terms, poetic autonomy is a statement of the final value of poetry.      
38
 Interesting, Budd performs a similar operation in Values of Art (1995: 9-11).  I think it is incumbent upon 
autonomists to distinguish their theories from these positions.  I distinguished my thesis from aestheticism, 
formalism, and aesthetic theories of art in §1.4.2.; I discuss the relationship between literature and life in detail 
in CHAPTER SIX. 
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Lamarque characterises the relation for which Bradley argues as being “that neither can be 
specified or identified independently of the other.  In this sense form and content are united, 
indivisible and mutually dependent” (2009b: 409).  I take the evidence Bradley offers to 
support a relation of inseparability, such that once form (or content) is separated from the 
work (the form-content unity), it is no longer identical with the form (or content) in that 
work.  This relation – as distinct from both identity and indistinguishability – is consistent 
with Thomson-Jones’ (2005) work on form and content, and Bradley’s approach can be 
further classified in terms of her taxonomy.  Thomson-Jones divides accounts of form-
content unity in art into three categories: container, functional, and semantic.  The first 
describes the relation between organising and organised elements in a work, the second 
describes form in terms of the function of a work, and the third “describes content as the 
meaning of a work, or what it is about, and form as the mode of presentation or expression – 
the way meaning is made manifest” (2005: 377).  Bradley’s form-content inseparability is a 
semantic account of the relation and poetic thickness will follow suit.      
 
One of Bradley’s most important premises is only made explicit towards the middle of his 
lecture, but should be kept in mind at the outset: the poem is the poetic experience, i.e. the 
reader’s experience of the poem (1901: 15).  His argument begins with a clarification, 
distinguishing the subject from the other elements of content.  The subject of a poem is what 
it is about in a sense which is both general and informed.  The example Bradley provides is 
Paradise Lost, which has the Fall of Man as its subject.  The Fall is a non-specific description 
of what the poem is about, and is informed because one has to know something of religious 
doctrine in order to comprehend the subject.  The opposite of the subject is not the form of 
the poem, but the poem itself because the subject is not exclusive to the poem: many poems 
and even different works of art can share the same subject.  The Fall, for example, is also the 
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subject of the painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, the sculpture on the west façade of 
Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris, and the Book of Genesis; the subject could furthermore be 
communicated by any method, including non-artistic ones such as a newspaper report or 
textbook.  Given that the subject is external to the poem,39 Bradley states: “it is surely 
obvious that the poetic value cannot lie in the subject, but lies entirely in its opposite, the 
poem” (1901: 9-10). 
  
2.2.2. Poetic Experience 
The second antithesis is form versus content, and both sides of this antithesis exist within the 
poem (1901: 12).  Lamarque explains the relation as follows: content is “the-subject-as-
realised-in-the-poem” and form “the-mode-of-realisation-of the-subject-in-the-poem” 
(2009b: 407).  The content of Paradise Lost is the characters and events as portrayed in the 
poem, and although they are similar to the characters and events in the story of The Fall, they 
are not identical.  Satan, for example, in Paradise Lost is not identical with his counterparts 
in C.S. Lewis’ Perelandra, the Qu’ran, or the Book of Mormon.  Bradley then claims that the 
heresies he has identified will either both be false or nonsensical (1901: 13-14).  If subject is 
confused with content and the fallacious antithesis form-subject established, then both 
heresies will be false because they rely on something which is external to the poem.  If form 
is the-mode-of-realisation-of the-subject-as-realised-in-the-poem and content the-subject-in-
the-poem, then the heresies both: 
imply that there are in a poem two parts, factors, or components, a substance and a 
form; and that you can conceive of them distinctly and separately, so that when you 
are speaking of the one you are not speaking of the other.  [...]  But really in a poem, 
                                               
39
 The subject is external to the poem in that it is shared by other poems, art forms, and methods of 
communication; but it is also internal in that it is part of the content of the poem. 
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apart from defects, there are no such factors or components; and therefore it is strictly 
nonsense to ask in which of them the value lies (1901: 14).   
 
Bradley appeals to the imaginative experience of the poem and holds that when one is 
reading a work, one does not appreciate the sound of the words and the meaning of the words 
separately.  His most convincing analogy is the experience of a smile: one does not 
understand the lines on a person’s face and the feeling they express separately (1901: 14).  
One can conceive of the two as distinct later on, when recalling someone’s smile, but to do so 
is to analyse two aspects of a single experience in isolation, an isolation which alters the 
aspects under consideration.  One can similarly dissect the unity of form and content after 
experiencing the poem, analysing form or content in isolation, but this isolation takes place in 
the mind of the critic – it is not in the poem (1901: 15).  And if one makes a value judgement 
based on something external to the poem, then – whether one finds the value in isolated form 
or isolated content – one’s claim will be false (as with the form-subject antithesis above) 
(1901: 16).  The poem is the poetic experience and this cannot be achieved by re-combining 
what one has dissected, only by re-experiencing the poem.  In poetry “the meaning and the 
sounds are one: there is, if I may put it so, a resonant meaning, or a meaning resonance” 
(1901: 14).40  The poem is the experience of the poem and the experience of the poem is the 
experience of resonant meaning.   
 
2.3. Poetic Thickness 
 
2.3.1. Ascribed Rhythm 
Resonant meaning lies at the core of Bradley’s argument for form-content inseparability, but 
                                               
40
 I shall employ the former term exclusively in future. 
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aside from the brief analogy with a smile he offers little explanation of the concept.  This is 
perhaps understandable given the context of the lecture, but nonetheless requires 
extrapolation if it is to convince.  Richards explains the phenomenon Bradley describes as 
follows: “the effect of a word as a sound cannot be separated from its contemporaneous other 
effects.  They become inextricably mingled at once” (1924: 136).  He holds that it is 
impossible to dissociate the formal features of a poem, such as rhythm and metre, from the 
sense and expression of its content (1924: 142).  The evaluation of a poem’s rhythm cannot 
be made without considering the meaning of the words (1924: 227) because the rhythm one 
ascribes to a poem is in part a function of one’s apprehension of the meaning of the words in 
the poem (1924: 231).  The sounds – the inherent rhythm – operate in conjunction with sense 
and feeling, producing the poetic experience, which is an experience of ascribed rhythm 
(1924: 233). 
 
Richards demonstrates this by comparing phrases with identical sound but different 
meanings.  He contrasts “Deep into a gloomy grot” with “Peep into a roomy cot”, stating that 
the “ascribed rhythm, the movement of the words, trivial though it be in both cases, is 
different” (1929: 231).  Although the sound is (almost) identical, the rhythm differs due to the 
meaning of the words.  He employs the following lines to show that poetic value cannot lie in 
form alone, but they serve as an example of the difference between inherent rhythm and 
ascribed rhythm: 
J. Drootan-Sussting Benn 
 Mill-down Leduren N. 
  Telamba-taras oderwainto wearing 
 Awersey zet bidreen 
 Ownd istellester sween 
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  Lithabian tweet ablissood owdswown stiering 
 Apleven aswetsen sestinal 
 Yintomen I adaits afurf I galas Ball (1929: 232).  
 
This, Richards believes, is as much a masterpiece of inherent rhythm as stanza XV of 
Milton’s ‘On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity’ (1645: 7-8): 
 Yea Truth, and Justice then 
 Will down return to men, 
  Th’ enameld Arras of the Rainbow wearing, 
 And Mercy set between, 
 Thron’d in Celestiall sheen,  
  With radiant feet the tissued clouds down stearing, 
 And Heav’n as at som festivall, 
 Will open wide the Gates of her high Palace Hall. 
Inherent rhythm (form) combines with meaning (content) to produce ascribed rhythm (form-
content inseparability).  If inherent rhythm could be isolated, then the above two verses 
would have a similar poetic value.  If meaning could be isolated, then a poem and a 
paraphrase of the poem would have a similar poetic value.  Both of these claims are false, and 
Richards proposes a reciprocal relationship between sound, rhythm, and metre on one hand 
and sense, meaning, and feeling on the other which is completely compatible with Bradley.     
Further evidence for Richards’ ascribed rhythm can be found in an observation by Martin 
Heidegger on the everyday experience of sound:  
 What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, 
 the motor-cycle.  We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker 
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 tapping, the fire crackling.  It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind 
 to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’ (1927, §34: 163-164).  
I do not wish to contribute to the contemporary debate on nonconceptual mental content,41 
but Heidegger is correct in that one usually hears sounds experienced as the sound-of 
something rather than noise.  On the rare occasions when one hears first a noise and then 
discovers its source, the transition from noise to sound-of draws attention to the difference 
Richards proposes between inherent rhythm and ascribed rhythm.  Take, for example, the 
experience of a supersonic jet passing overhead: one hears, first, a loud noise whose origin is 
often difficult to ascertain due to the difference in the speeds of light and sound; when the 
aircraft is spotted and the source confirmed, the experience of the sound – no longer noise, 
but the sound-of a jet – changes, albeit subtly.  The actual sound hasn’t changed, but the 
identification of the noise as a sound-of alters the aural experience.  Similarly, the pure noise 
of inherent rhythm is affected by the apprehension of the meaning of the words such that the 
poetic experience is the experience of the sound-of words-with-meaning.42 
     
The influence of rhythm on meaning is more difficult to determine, but Angela Leighton 
provides an example of the former affecting the latter in her discussion of James Cousins’ 
description of Yeats’ method of composition.  Cousins recalls Yeats murmuring sound 
sequences for periods of up to three hours at a time, and Leighton maintains that Yeats 
“would start with the rhythm, and through its repetition, ‘trial and alteration’, would find 
words to match” (2007: 158-159).  Iambic feet were thus of paramount – even obsessive – 
                                               
41
 The debate concerns whether mental states require conceptual content in order to represent the world.  Those 
who argue that concepts are required – and Heidegger does not, despite the implication of the above quote – 
include: John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Bill Brewer, 
Perception and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Alva Noë, ‘Thought and experience,’ 
American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1999): 257-265.  Arguments for nonconceptual content have been made 
by: Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Christopher Peacocke, A 
Study of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); and Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). 
42
 This observation is restricted to the apprehension of the denotation of the words – “understanding the 
language of a poem” for Gibson, which he contrasts with understanding the poem (2011b). 
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importance to him.  Leighton draws attention to the frequency of representations of human 
and animal feet in his poems and suggests that Yeats’ poetry is “projecting the sound of its 
own rhythm as a kind of content” (2007: 156).  Leighton’s claim is both intriguing and 
compelling, but the manner in which rhythm affects meaning is nonetheless elusive and 
Solomon Fishman criticises Richards in particular and structuralist poetics in general for 
failing to provide an explanation (1956: 456).  Patrick Suppes sketches a neuroscientific 
account of how rhythm enhances associative meaning in poetry that draws attention to the 
significance of rhythm in the activities of humans and animals.  Interestingly, in the light of 
Leighton’s commentary on Yeats, these activities include walking and running as well as 
breathing and the beating of the heart (2009: 161).  Suppes’ account is based on the following 
claim: “The rhythms of the words lock in phase with the rhythms of the brain.  Or, rather to 
put it the other way around, the brain’s processes phase-lock to a poem’s rhythm” 
(2009:165).  Suppes’ thesis can be read as a direct defence of Richards against Fishman’s 
accusation,43 but I prefer Anna Christina Ribeiro’s simpler account, where formal devices 
augment understanding by inviting the comparison and contrast of words with a similar 
sound which are presented in particular patterns (2009: 72-73).   
 
I do not intend to offer a complete answer to the question of how rhythm and meaning exert 
reciprocal influences upon each other.  It is sufficient for my purpose to note that there is 
strong evidence for the existence of this reciprocity in poetry even if there is an absence of a 
consensus as to the mechanism – or mechanisms – by which it operates.  I shall, however, 
                                               
43
 I do not have space to discuss Suppes’ account in detail, in addition to which his thesis is brief and draws on 
three previous and subsequent publications: (with Zhong-Lin Lu & Bing Han), ‘Brain Wave Recognition of 
Words,’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 94 (1997), 14965-14969; (with Bing Han), ‘Brain-
Wave Representation of Words by Superposition of a Few Sine Waves,’ Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 97, 8738-8743; and ‘Three Kinds of Meanings,’ in Richard Schantz, ed., Prospects for Meaning 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 567-579. 
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discuss one of the consequences of this reciprocity for the appearance of real people, places, 
and events in poems.  Consider, as an example, the first stanza of T.S. Eliot’s ‘Gerontion’: 
 Here I am, an old man in a dry month, 
 Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain. 
 I was neither at the hot gates 
 Nor fought in the warm rain 
 Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass, 
 Bitten by flies, fought. 
 My house is a decayed house, 
 And the Jew squats on the window sill, the owner, 
 Spawned in some estaminet of Antwerp, 
 Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London. 
 The goat coughs at night in the field overhead; 
 Rocks, moss, stonecrop, iron, merds. 
 The woman keeps the kitchen, makes tea, 
 Sneezes at the evening, picking the peevish gutter. 
      I an old man, 
 A dull head among windy spaces (1969: 37). 
In §4.2. I shall argue for a pro-reference view of literature, which I pre-empt here by stating 
that ‘London’ in ‘Gerontion’ refers to London.  My interest is in what images one is licensed 
to invoke and what connotations one must bring to mind in one’s imaginative engagement 
with the poem when one reads ‘London’.  Does ‘Gerontion’ licence one to bring an image of, 
for example, ‘the city that hosted the 2012 Summer Olympics’ to mind? 
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According to Richards, the language of a poem – the literal meaning of ‘London’ in this 
instance – must be understood as the means by which the poet communicates feeling, tone, 
and intention (1929: 187-188).  As ‘London’ only appears once in the poem, its connotations 
and relevant associations can be ascertained from the line Blistered in Brussels, patched and 
peeled in London.  The line is an expression of Eliot’s feeling of disgust for the landlord, 
who, like the speaker, may not be a discrete character but a symbol.  As part of the trio 
completed by Brussels and Antwerp, London is one of Europe’s main commercial centres, 
and suggests the anti-Semitic stereotype of the Jewish businessman motivated primarily by 
the pursuit of profit.  The three cities also bring to mind the figure of the ‘Wandering Jew’, 
another negative image, which is augmented by the use of blistered, patched, and peeled, 
words which describe the landlord as deformed, unclean, and cursed.  Resignation dominates 
the tone at this point, with the speaker showing no desire to act on the disgust he feels by 
removing himself from the decaying house, squatting landlord, and goat droppings.  Eliot’s 
intention seems to be the communication of a vision of a morally and spiritually bankrupt 
civilisation which has destroyed itself in war and sold itself to ignoble foreign influences.  
Crucially in this respect, the Jew owns the house and the speaker lives in rented 
accommodation, a relationship which holds for both character and symbol.44  According to 
Richards, therefore, ‘London’ does not licence one to bring to mind just any images of its 
referent, because many of those images would detract from the feeling, tone, and intention of 
the poem.  An image of ‘the city that hosted the 2012 Summer Olympics’ would not 
contribute to the feeling of disgust which is being expressed and the positive associations of 
the Olympic Games would mar the tone and intention of the poem as well.  ‘London’ is an 
instance of resonant meaning in ‘Gerontion’ and invites an imaginative engagement which is 
determined by the combination of its reference with feeling, tone, and intention.  ‘London’ in 
                                               
44
 Regrettably, anti-Semitism appears as a motif in several of Eliot’s works.  For a detailed discussion, see: 
Anthony Julius, T.S. Eliot, anti-Semitism, and literary form (London: Thames & Hudson, 2003). 
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the poem is thus not ‘London’ in its full extension, but London-in-‘Gerontion’, i.e. London 
imagined as an instrument of the feeling, tone, and intention of ‘Gerontion’.45  I shall return 
to the question of extension in my discussion of narrative opacity in §3.2.2.    
 
2.3.2. Poetic Criterion 
Bradley maintains that the form-content distinction is useful and even necessary to the 
analysis and criticism of poetry – as long as the critic realises that he is extracting the form or 
the content from the poem and therefore discussing something which is external to the poem 
(1901: 16).  Both Bradley and Richards admit that there are times when form and content can, 
however, be separated in the experience of the poem, as opposed to in criticism.  Bradley 
holds that separation occurs in poetry which is not: free from defects (1901: 14), “true” 
(1901: 19), “quintessential” (1901: 23), or “pure” (1901: 23).  Form-content inseparability is 
actually a benchmark or criterion for great poetry as opposed to the merely good, mediocre, 
or bad because form and content can be separated in even “good poetry”, and Shakespeare’s 
work shows evidence of this flaw (1901: 23).  If P is a poem, and form-content inseparability 
holds for P, then P is a great poem.  Where inseparability holds for a poem one will not be 
able to paraphrase it, and this inability to admit of paraphrase also identifies great poetry: 
When poetry answers to its idea and is purely or almost purely poetic, we find the 
degree of purity attained may be tested by the degree in which we feel it hopeless to 
convey the effect of a poem or passage in any form but its own.  Where the notion of 
doing so is simply ludicrous, you have quintessential poetry (1901: 22-23). 
 
                                               
45
 My brief example of poetic meaning has drawn on Richards’ total meaning, but other accounts could be 
employed to make the same point.  I indicated my preference for Ribeiro above.  Gibson’s account involves an 
application of his neo-cognitivist theory of literature, which I discussed in §1.4.3., to lyric poetry (2011b).  
Fishman advances John Crowe Ransom as providing a satisfactory account of the relationship between the 
phonetic and semantic components of poetic language by means of an organic model (1956: 460-461), which 
recalls Weitz’s organic unification, discussed in §2.1.2. 
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Richards restricts form-content inseparability to good poetry, implying that the relation will 
differ for mediocre or bad poetry.  Regarding metrical form, he writes:     
 But it cannot be judged apart from the sense and feeling of the words out of which it 
 is composed nor apart from the precise order in which that whole of sense and feeling 
 builds itself up.  The  movement or plot of the word-by-word development of the 
 poem, as a structure of the intellect and emotions, is always, in good poetry, in the 
 closest possible relation to the movement of the metre, not only giving it its tempo, 
 but even distorting it, sometimes violently.  Readers who take up a poem as though it 
 were a bicycle, spot its metre, and pedal off on it regardless of where it is going, will 
 naturally, if it is a good poem, get into trouble.  For only a due awareness of its sense 
 and feeling will bring its departures from the pattern metre into a coherent, satisfying 
 whole (1929: 230). 
A consequence of ascribed rhythm is thus that form is not something which can be 
experienced in isolation from content in a good poem.   
 
Lamarque offers insight into form-content inseparability as a poetic criterion, noting first that 
Bradley’s central concern is poetic value (2009b: 403), and then that:   
 Reading a poem as poetry demands the assumption of form-content unity.  The 
 indivisibility of form and content is not something that is discovered in works – more 
 in this, less in that, not in this one at all – it is something that the practice of reading 
 poetry imposes on a work (2009b: 411).  
Form-content inseparability is not therefore an objective feature of a text, but an imputed 
feature arising from a particular kind of attention paid to a work (2009b: 415-416).  
Lamarque’s emphasis recalls Frye on Blake: 
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 ‘Every poem must necessarily be a perfect unity,’ says Blake: this, as the wording 
 implies is not a statement of fact about all existing poems, but a statement of the 
 hypothesis which every reader adopts in first trying to comprehend even the most 
 chaotic poem ever written (1957: 77). 
 
The reconceptualisation of form-content inseparability as a demand imposed by the reader 
does not mean that every text or work will meet the demand.  Some works will reward this 
particular type of interest, others will not.  Whether one refers to the former category as true, 
quintessential, pure, or good poetry – or just poetry – will depend upon whether ‘poetry’ is 
used as a descriptive or evaluative term.  My preference is for the latter, in which case form-
content inseparability is a necessary condition for poetry simpliciter; if ‘poetry’ is employed 
as a descriptive term, then form-content inseparability will be a necessary condition for a sub-
category of paradigmatic poetry.  The terminology used is not particularly important; what is 
significant for my argument is: (i) Bradley’s identification of resonant meaning as a criterion 
of – or necessary condition for – poetry, and (ii) Lamarque’s emphasis on that criterion as a 
demand (which may or may not be met) rather than a discovery.  Henceforth, I shall combine 
the conceptions of Bradley, Richards, and Lamarque to argue for my own version of form-
content inseparability in poetry:       
POETIC THICKNESS: the inseparability of poetic form and poetic content in the 
experience of a work of poetry such that neither form nor content can be isolated.  
Poetic thickness is a demand which is satisfied by a  work rather than a property of a 
text, and is characteristic of poetry such that if a work is a work of poetry, it will 
reward the demand for poetic thickness.                   
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2.4. Objections 
 
2.4.1. Perfect Circularity 
Kivy has mounted the most sustained attack on form-content inseparability, arguing first 
against Bradley, and then against two defences of him, one by Kelly Dean Jolley (2008)46 and 
the other by Lamarque (2009b).  Kivy begins his critique of Bradley by noting that form-
content inseparability is meant to apply to all of the arts (1997: 85) and states his intention to 
demonstrate that the inseparability thesis is false for literature and the visual arts, because 
form can be separated from content; and for music, because absolute music has no content 
(1997: 86).  I shall consider only his argument against inseparability for poetry, and restrict 
my focus to his most telling criticisms, the first of which is that Bradley submits no evidence 
for form-content inseparability, merely defining poetry in terms of it, i.e. his argument for 
inseparability is circular.  
 
Kivy observes, with accuracy, that Bradley is making a normative claim about the correct 
manner in which to read poetry, and asks: 
How do we know when we are properly experiencing a poem, experiencing it ‘as 
poetically as we can’?  Why, when we are experiencing form and content as fused.  
And why should we think that is the only proper way of experiencing the poem, the 
way that is ‘as poetically as we can’?  Because, in a word, the form-content identity 
thesis is true – which is to say, we have moved in a perfect circle (1997: 109).   
According to Kivy, Bradley’s argument for form-content inseparability is: 
P1 The poem is the experience of the poem. 
                                               
46
 Kelly Dean Jolley, ‘(Kivy on) The Form-Content Identity Thesis,’ British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008), 
193-204. 
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P2  The experience of the poem is (properly) the experience form-content 
inseparability. 
C1 Therefore form and content are inseparable in a poem.   
The argument can be rearranged as follows to define a poem: 
P1* The poem is the experience of the poem. 
P2*  Form and content are inseparable in a (proper) poetic experience.  
C1* Therefore the poem is the experience of form-content inseparability.    
Kivy’s accusation of perfect circularity appears accurate.  Circularity aside, he is unimpressed 
with Bradley’s definition:  
 until someone comes along to convince me that any single way of reading poetry is 
 the only echt way of reading it, qua poetry, I will continue to take echt poetry reading 
 practice to be just those many ways in which competent readers do indeed read 
  poetry (2011b: 374). 
 
There is evidence to suggest that Bradley regards form-content inseparability as a necessary 
and sufficient condition for poetry, but I deliberately restricted poetic thickness to the former 
in §2.3.47  If one ignores Bradley’s apparent definition of poetry in terms of form-content 
inseparability, the following argument for form-content inseparability can be extracted from 
his lecture: 
 P1  The experience of a poem is an experience of form-content inseparability, i.e. 
  resonant meaning. 
P2 The isolation of the poem’s form or the poem’s content alters the resonant 
meaning (and therefore the experience of the poem).  
C1 Therefore form and content cannot be separated in a poem. 
                                               
47
 This is a third point of agreement with Thomson-Jones: we both present (i) a semantic account of (ii) form-
content inseparability (iii) as a necessary condition of a category of art.  I do not, however, endorse Thomson-
Jones’ claims about the cognitivist implications of form-content inseparability. 
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The problem with this argument is not that it is circular, but that it is largely unsubstantiated 
in the lecture.  Bradley provides evidence for P1 – I noted the smile analogy in §2.2.2. – but 
not P2.  If Bradley’s claim is to convince, it must be embellished, and this is precisely what I 
have done in §2.3., by recourse to Richards’ notion of ascribed rhythm, the example of On 
the Morning of Christ’s Nativity, and Heidegger’s distinction between sound and noise.  Kivy 
is correct to criticise Bradley’s argument, which is either circular or ambiguous, but his 
objection does not succeed against the above argument or against my account of poetic 
thickness.   
 
2.4.2. Ubiquitous Unity 
Following from the perfect circularity criticism, Kivy maintains that Bradley’s strong thesis 
of form-content unity fails to describe the actual experience of a poem, which is more 
accurately described by his own moderate thesis: 
Sometimes we experience the medium and the message as one rather than two objects 
of attention; sometimes we are not aware of the medium and the message but only the 
medium-and-message, undifferentiated.  But sometimes, too, our attention flits 
rapidly back and forth from one to the other or concentrates for a while on one rather 
than the other (1997: 110-111). 
Kivy holds that Bradley cannot accept this moderate thesis because it extends to all linguistic 
expression and thus fails to distinguish poetry.  He notes that when one reads a newspaper 
and textbook one must experience the message (content) through the medium (form).  There 
is, he claims, a better argument for form-content unity in these non-poetic and non-literary 
cases because one is concerned with the message to the extent that the form becomes 
transparent: this constitutes a perfect fusion of form and content, unlike poetry and literature 
where the medium and message both demand attention (1997: 111).  He concludes: 
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So it appears that, far from the experience of form-content fusion being exclusive to 
poetry, it is linguistically ubiquitous and more prevalent in nonpoetic forms to boot.  
The form-content identity thesis for poetry again comes to nought (1997: 111). 
 
Kivy has replaced Bradley’s thesis with his own because he believes that the former is 
inaccurate, but he leaves himself open to the following defence: Bradley would simply reject 
the moderate thesis and therefore the objection that form-content unity is ubiquitous.  A more 
telling objection to Bradley is to examine the linguistic ubiquity of the strong thesis in terms 
of Kivy’s perfect fusion of form and content.  Bradley offers (ii) as a paraphrase of (i): 
 (i) “‘To be or not to be, that is the question’” (1901: 20).  
(ii) “‘What is just now occupying my attention is the comparative disadvantages 
of continuing to live or putting an end to myself’” (1901: 20). 
When I read (i) I attend to both the content of the statement and its form; I take pleasure in 
the combination of what Hamlet says with how he says it.  When I read (ii) as a paraphrase I 
attend to content alone: Hamlet is contemplating suicide.  Kivy’s claim that the medium is 
transparent holds for (ii) but not (i), and his proposal that perfect fusion is more prevalent in 
non-poetic language appears to have some force.  
 
I have two objections to Kivy’s ubiquity claim; the first is a minor point, the second more 
serious.  In §2.4.1., I noted that Kivy rejects form-content unity across the arts due to absolute 
music, which he regards as having no content.48  Subsequently, he cites newspapers and 
textbooks as paradigmatic examples of form-content fusion because the form is transparent 
                                               
48
 Kivy makes no claims about literary works of art without content so I do not consider his statement about 
absolute music an objection to poetic thickness.  It is nonetheless worth noting Thomson-Jones’ argument that 
the existence of art without content – meaningless works in the semantic account – is insufficient to refute her 
thesis of form-content inseparability (2005: 378). 
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such that one penetrates straight to the message without attending to the medium.49  I think 
there is an inconsistency in the way in which these examples are used.  If one accepts that 
content-free absolute music is a counter-example to form-content unity, why should 
textbooks not be regarded in a similar manner, i.e. as texts which have content, but no form?  
The textbooks with which Kivy is concerned certainly lack artistic or literary form – that is 
why they are transparent.  In order to maintain consistency, Kivy should either accept that the 
absence of form (transparency) in textbooks and lack of content (‘reflectivity’, perhaps) in 
absolute music are both counter-examples to form-content unity, or take both textbooks and 
absolute music as examples of form-content fusion.  I concede that Kivy may be able to avoid 
this criticism by differentiating between absolute music artworks and non-artistic textbooks, 
but there remains an apparent contradiction in his approaches.   
 
The claim that a newspaper or textbook is a (perfect) fusion of form and content is deeply 
problematic.  The paraphrase of Shakespeare above is not an example of form-content fusion, 
but an employment of language which fails to reward attention to its form.50  The value of the 
paraphrase lies in its content.  The line from Shakespeare is an example of form-content unity 
because Hamlet’s soliloquy rewards attention to both the form and the content of the 
language employed.  In many linguistic expressions which are not literary, there is likely to 
be little reward in attending to the form of the utterance.  Kivy admits this when discussing 
newspapers and textbooks: 
 The medium is ‘transparent’ to me.  Of course, I must experience the medium to get 
 the message.  But just because I do not pay particular attention to it, it is perfectly 
                                               
49
 I do not actually approve of identifying the form-content distinction with the medium-message distinction as 
the latter oversimplifies the former, but I employ Kivy’s terminology in order to make my objection more 
pertinent. 
50
 Given the conception of poetic thickness I have advanced, the paraphrase is not an example of non-poetic 
language, but an example where the typical reader does not demand form-content inseparability.  I shall, 
however, continue to respond to Kivy on his own terms. 
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 fused with its meaning.  It is quite different with poetry, and literary language in 
 general, just because the medium is thick, interesting, and so, far more frequently, the 
 object of my attention: attention-getting in fact (1997: 111).51    
Kivy is associating unity with transparency instead of opacity.  In his own terms, thin media 
are non-literary and transparent, and thick media literary and opaque.  If thin media are 
transparent, there is nothing to unify – and this lends weight to my previous objection, 
because absolute music is not a perfect unity of form and content, it is an absence of 
content.52  Similarly, a thin medium is one where form is not attention-getting, such that there 
is no form to unify with content.  In contrast, Hamlet is instantiated in a thick medium, which 
is opaque, and this opacity is constituted by the combination of attention-getting form and 
attention-getting content.  Kivy’s claim that form-content inseparability is ubiquitous is 
therefore erroneous.   
 
2.4.3. The Sugar-Coated Pill Tradition 
One of Kivy’s objections to the ineffability of poetic meaning that Bradley (1901: 26-27) 
describes is to offer a pair of counter-examples in Lucretius’ De rerum natura and 
Parmenides’ Way of Truth.  He states of these two didactic works that: 
 for the Greeks and Romans it was as natural to convey philosophical and ‘scientific’ 
 results at the cutting edge in poetry as it is natural for us to convey the former in 
 learned journals and the latter in mathematics (1997: 87).  
Lucretius, Kivy claims, wrote his poem to communicate his philosophical and scientific 
doctrine, i.e. precisely for the purpose of having its didactic content separated from its poetic 
form.  Part of this content had already been expressed in non-poetic form by Lucretius (1997: 
88), and readers who learned from his work could paraphrase its content without alteration of 
                                               
51
 I have derived my description of form-content inseparability as ‘thickness’ from this passage in Kivy. 
52
 Assuming, of course, that one accepts that absolute music has no content.  
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meaning.  Kivy quotes Lucretius’ theory of poetry as explicated in the De rerum natura,53 
where the poet compares the presentation of his ‘harsh doctrine’ in poetic form to a doctor 
administering wormwood to a child by sweetening it with honey (1997: 89).  Kivy states: 
 Lucretius had a clear concept of what he was doing, shared by his contemporaries, 
 that was generalizable to at least a large part of the poetic enterprise and might justly 
 be termed the ‘sugar-coated pill’ theory (1997: 88). 
Kivy thus establishes De rerum natura as a counter-example to Bradley because the work is 
both: (i) a poem and (ii) a case where the content can be separated from form without the loss 
of identity.  The didactic nature of the poem is important for Kivy; as it was designed to 
convey philosophical and scientific knowledge, the propositional content which is extracted 
from the poem is the same content that appears in the poem.54   
 
Lamarque’s response to Kivy’s counter-examples is worth quoting in full:  
The reason that De rerum natura is not a counterexample to form-content unity is 
simply that our interest in that poem characteristically is not as a poem; the 
versification, as Lucretius himself admits, is extraneous to what is of interest in the 
work.  Were we to read the work as a poem we would indeed assume form-content 
indivisibility and seek out what Bradley calls the ‘poetic experience’.  Then it would 
not just be the subject – Epicureanism – that concerns us, even the subject-as-
conceived-by-Lucretius, which could no doubt be paraphrased or rewritten, but the-
subject-as-realised-in-the-poem, which rests on a unique ‘mode of realisation’ 
(2009b: 411). 
                                               
53
 Kivy quotes from Book I, lines 936-950 and notes that Lucretius repeats himself almost to the word in Book 
IV, lines 1-25. 
54
 It would be pointless to use poetic form to make philosophy and science more palatable if the paraphrased 
content differed from the poetic content. 
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He notes that one should not regard the verse form as an invitation to read the work as poetry.  
Supporting evidence is found in other sources, for example from Nigel Fabb, who explains 
that verse is simply the division of text into lines and has no necessary connection to poetry 
(2009: 52).  One may read Lucretius’ work qua philosophy or qua poetry; if the latter, then 
one demands form-content inseparability and attends to the experience of poetic thickness.  
Given Lucretius’ stated intent, it seems likely – for the very reasons Kivy describes – that 
reading De rerum natura as a poem will be less rewarding than attending to it as a 
philosophical treatise.   
 
2.4.4. The Defence from Tradition  
Kivy has a second point which is essential in his reply to Lamarque and related to the sugar-
coated pill tradition objection.  He maintains that Lamarque is mounting a defence of Bradley 
from tradition in this passage: 
Am I not defining the practice of reading poetry in terms of form-content unity and 
then saying that anything not conforming to the practice is not poetry, or not reading 
as poetry?  But the charge of arbitrariness or mere stipulation won’t stick.  I haven’t 
invented the practice of reading poetry – it is of ancient lineage (the inter-relation of 
‘thought’ and ‘diction’ in Aristotle’s account of tragedy is but one example) 
(Lamarque 2009b: 412).    
Kivy then identifies three types of tradition-defences explained in terms of the following 
practices (2011b: 368):  
(i) The tradition of serving bitter herbs at a Seder (2011b: 368-369). 
(ii) The tradition of driving on the left-hand side of the road in the UK (2011b: 
  369).      
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(iii) A Polynesian tradition of scattering lotus blossoms in the ocean at a particular 
  time of year to appease a particular deity (2011b: 369). 
Kivy claims that Lamarque cannot be referring to (i) because the tradition has an explanation 
(the bitter herbs are a reminder of the bitter suffering of the Israelites in Egypt) where 
Lamarque is using the tradition as an explanation.  Nor can he be referring to (ii) because the 
choice to drive on the left is arbitrary and, given that the rest of the world drives on the right, 
should perhaps be abandoned.  Lamarque’s tradition-defence is therefore of the third type, 
and (iii) “absolutely depends upon there being an unbroken tradition” (2011b: 369). 
 
Kivy believes that the historical evidence is contrary to any such unbroken tradition of 
experiencing poetry as a unity of form and content.  The evidence he offers includes Plato, 
Lucretius, Horace, and Pope, and he attributes Lamarque’s error to his Romantic sentiments 
(2011b: 370-371).  I do not have space to discuss all the poets he mentions, but his comments 
on Plato are instructive.  Kivy conceives of Plato’s antagonism towards tragic poetry in terms 
of a separation of form and content (1997: 89-91).  A convincing account can be constructed 
for both Plato’s moral and epistemic objections: poetry corrupts because its appealing form 
disguises its immoral content (Republic X: 595b3-6), and it misleads because its persuasive 
form leads audiences to believe that they are being addressed by experts in content (Apology 
22: b4-c6).  Both objections offer evidence against an unbroken tradition of reading poetry as 
unity of form and content because they focus on the interaction of two separate elements of 
the work.  Plato’s criticisms are consistent with Lucretius’ sugar-coated pill theory, although 
for Plato the pill is poisonous rather than curative.   
 
Kivy claims that the type of tradition to which Lamarque appeals to justify the practice of 
reading poetry as a unity of form and content requires complete continuity.  In his example, 
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he asks an anthropologist why the Polynesians can’t use apple blossoms instead of lotus 
blossoms in their ritual.  The reply is that the use of apple blossoms would constitute a 
different tradition (2011b: 369).  To be clear about the parallel Kivy is proposing: 
 (i) Q1: Why do Polynesians scatter lotus blossoms in the ocean? 
  A1: The practice is a tradition. 
  Q2: Why can’t they use apple blossoms instead? 
  A2: Because that is a different practice and would initiate a new tradition. 
 (ii) Q1*: Why do we demand form-content unity of poetry? 
  A1*: The practice is a tradition. 
  Q2*: Why can’t we read poetry as a sugar-coated pill? 
  A2*: Because that is a different practice and would initiate a new tradition.   
I simply fail to see why either practice requires the unbroken tradition upon which Kivy is so 
insistent.  If Polynesians in Pago Pago continued to use lotus blossoms, but those in Auckland 
switched to more readily-available apple blossoms, one might say either that the tradition had 
evolved in Auckland or that it had been replaced by a new tradition.  The choice of which of 
the two descriptions of the same event to employ does not appear to be especially important.  
If, after a hundred years of using apple blossoms, the New Zealanders switched back to lotus 
blossoms one might say that the tradition had either evolved again or that they had reverted 
back to an earlier tradition.  The dialogue I have set out in (i) above would be the same in 
Pago Pago or Auckland because the tradition explains the practice in both cases, even if it has 
been interrupted and renewed.   
 
The tradition-defence is invoked by Lamarque in order to escape the charge of arbitrariness, 
however, so the following pair of questions would be more pertinent: 
 (i) Why should Polynesians scatter lotus blossoms in the ocean? 
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 (ii) Why should we demand form-content unity of poetry?    
Lamarque’s answer to (ii) consists of two parts, one explicit and one implicit.  The explicit 
part is that the practice is, as he notes, of ancient lineage, stretching at least as far back as 
Aristotle.  The implicit part is that this practice has value – had value and continues to have 
value.  The value of the practice also shows why the Polynesian example is a poor one.  If I 
received A1 in response to Q1 my next question would probably be: But they are all atheists 
or Christians now, so why do they continue the pagan tradition?  The answer is likely to be 
something along the following lines: The original purpose of the ritual was to appease the 
Polynesian god, but it has persisted because it is now considered valuable in other ways.55  
The appeal to tradition in the Polynesian example implies that the practice has value.  
Practices which do not have value fall into Kivy’s second category of tradition, which are 
completely arbitrary, like the decision to drive on either the left or right side of the road.  
Lamarque appeals to the history of the tradition as evidence in support of its value, as a 
supplement to Bradley’s thesis, but the practice is not dependent upon either the length or 
continuity of the tradition – they are only relevant as an indication of its value.  If Kivy’s 
objection to Lamarque is to convince, he must show what is wrong with that tradition.  Kivy 
makes no such demonstration, nor is he likely to given his pluralistic approach to the practice 
of reading poetry, quoted in §2.4.1., as just those many ways in which competent readers do 
indeed read poetry.   
 
My conclusion is that while Bradley’s conception of form-content inseparability in poetry is 
correct, he fails to present a compelling argument in favour thereof.  I embellished Bradley’s 
resonant meaning with Richards’ notion of ascribed rhythm and Lamarque’s reconception of 
form-content inseparability as a demand rather than a discovery in order to advance poetic 
                                               
55
 Such as maintaining family and community relations or being recognised as finally valuable. 
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thickness as characteristic of poetic experience.  I then considered all four of the objections 
Kivy levels against Bradley and Lamarque as objections to my thesis of poetic thickness.  In 
each case I demonstrated that the objection failed.  Until a more convincing critique of form-
content inseparability is forthcoming, I therefore take poetic thickness to be both the 
experience of a poem qua poem and a necessary condition of poetry.  In the next chapter, I 
consider whether a similar thesis of form-content inseparability will hold for non-poetic 
literature.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
NARRATIVE THICKNESS 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the experience of a literary narrative qua 
literary narrative is an experience of narrative thickness, i.e. the inseparability of literary 
form and literary content.  I discuss the application of poetic thickness beyond poetry in 
§3.1., and explain why I have chosen to argue for a different – albeit related – instantiation of 
form-content inseparability in literary narratives.  §3.2. synthesises elements of Derek 
Attridge’s literary theory with Peter Lamarque’s theory of narrative opacity to advance 
narrative thickness as characteristic of literary narratives, understood as a demand made of a 
narrative rather than a property discovered therein.  In §3.3. I consider the sub-category of 
didactic literature, which appears to include examples of works which are both literary and do 
not reward the demand for narrative thickness.  I select J.M. Coetzee’s ‘The Lives of 
Animals’ as a potentially paradigmatic counter-example to my thesis and demonstrate that 
there are at least two ways of reading the work, qua philosophy and qua literature.  My 
conclusion is that narrative thickness is a necessary condition of literary narratives.       
 
3.1. Literary Narratives 
 
3.1.1. Non-Poetic Literature 
In §1.2.3. I distinguished three categories of literary artworks: poems, plays, and novels.  
Thus far, I have only demonstrated that form-content inseparability holds for the first of 
these.  Bradley twice extends his proposal to all art in his lecture: 
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(i) And this identity of content and form, you will say, is no accident; it is of the 
essence of poetry in so far as it is poetry, and of all art in so far as it is art 
(1901: 15).56 
(ii) Poetry in this matter is not, as good critics of painting and music often affirm, 
different from the other arts; in all of them the content is one thing with the 
form (1901: 25). 
My concern is restricted to literature, and Bradley does not comment on the extension of the 
particular version of form-content inseparability he articulates beyond poetry.  Clearly, poetic 
thickness as established in CHAPTER TWO cannot be employed to explain the relationship 
between form and content in painting, sculpture, music, dance, and architecture; the question 
is whether it can perform this function for plays and novels.   
 
There are certainly reasons to resist the move.  One is the greater emphasis on sound and non-
literal meaning in poetry.  Fabb states: 
 (i) Poetry is formally rich: it is associated with the regulation of many forms at 
  the same time – for example, not only metre, but also rhyme, and perhaps  
  optional alliteration, and a bit of parallelism (2009: 55-56). 
 (ii) Poetry is more difficult to interpret than prose, because it is more ambiguous, 
  less direct and more open to figurative language such as metaphor, or just less 
  easy to understand in general (2009: 56). 
Ribeiro reiterates these two characteristics as typically – but neither necessarily nor 
exclusively – distinctive of poetry (2009: 66).  Another reason is that the formal features of 
plays and novels typically differ from those of poems such that the form of the former pair 
cannot be explained in the same terms as the form of the latter.  These formal aspects are, I 
                                               
56
 Part of this quote appeared in my discussion of Weitz in §2.1.2. 
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propose, those in virtue of which plays and novels are narratives.  I shall therefore present a 
second argument for form-content inseparability in literature, which applies to the 
inseparability of narrative form and narrative content in literary narratives.      
 
I am not suggesting that poetry and narrative are two exclusive categories.  Narratives are 
found in the literary, visual, and musical arts, and within literature there are narrative plays, 
narrative novels, and narrative poems.  Ribeiro, for example, divides poems into three sub-
categories: lyric, dramatic, and epic (2009: 68).  Epic poems are distinguished by having a 
narrator, but dramatic poems – distinguished by characters having their own voices – are also 
likely to be narratives.  My aim in presenting an argument for form-content inseparability in 
poetry and an argument for form-content inseparability in narrative literature is to show that 
inseparability holds across the literary art form.  The majority of works of literature are either 
poems or narratives, and form-content inseparability is explained by poetic thickness in the 
former case and narrative thickness in the latter.  Narrative poems, such as Paradise Lost, 
may exhibit both types of inseparability, as may novels such as Ulysses, where the sound of 
the words is an integral element of narrative form.  One would expect examples of this nature 
to be rare – because of the exceptional skill required to sustain the formal intensity associated 
with poetry over the length required to depict the characters, settings, and action typical of 
narratives – and this appears to be the case.  It is, furthermore, a strength of my account of 
form-content inseparability that it draws attention to the greater intimacy of the relationship 
between literary form and literary content in the cases where these poetic and narrative 
elements are combined. 
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3.1.2. Narrative & Non-Narrative 
Drawing on the work of the Russian Formalists, Todorov differentiates fabula, real or 
imagined events, from sjužet, the way in which these events are presented (1966: 45).  Peter 
Brooks (1984: 326) notes that the translation of fabula as ‘story’ and sjužet as ‘plot’ has been 
subject to much criticism, and it does indeed misrepresent both his and Todorov’s 
discussions.  The distinction with which they are concerned is between a sequence of events 
and a story.  The distinction with which I am concerned, and which is crucial to 
understanding narrative, is between a representation of a sequence of events (real or 
imagined) and a story.  I shall employ narrative as synonymous with ‘story’ and address the 
question of whether every representation of a sequence of events is a narrative.  Hayden 
White identifies three types of historical representation – annals, chronicles, and histories – 
and claims that the first two are not narrative.  He maintains that non-narrative historians such 
as Alexis du Toqueville, Jacob Burckhardt, Johan Huizinga, and Fernand Braudel “did not 
impose upon it [the perceived reality] the form of a story” (1980: 6), and explains the 
distinctions between the three historiographies.  His discussion of histories and chronicles is 
not relevant to my inquiry, but the annal is a paradigmatic example of a non-narrative 
representation of a sequence of events.   
 
This is an extract from White’s translation of the Annals of Saint Gaul:  
 709. Hard winter.  Duke Gottfried died. 
 710. Hard year and deficient in crops. 
 711.  
 712. Flood everywhere. 
 713. 
 714. Pippin, Mayor of the Palace, died (1980: 11). 
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Two features of the annal are striking: the absence of entries for the years 711 and 713, and 
the absence of a connection between the represented events.  The gaps draw attention to a 
characteristic of both non-narrative and narrative representations of sequences of events, that 
they are selective.  According to White, 
 every narrative, however seemingly ‘full,’ is constructed on the basis of a set of 
 events which might have been included but were left out; and this is as true of 
 imaginary as it is of realistic narratives (1980: 14).    
The lack of connection between the events is indicative of one of the essential differences 
between non-narrative and narrative representations.  Not only is there no link between the 
events described in different years, but nothing connects the events described within each 
year.  Did the hard winter of 709 put paid to the duke, or was his death unrelated?  Was 710 a 
hard year because the crop yield was poor, or were there additional hardships?  Were some of 
these hardships a result of the duke’s death?  The text contains neither explicit nor implicit 
answers to these questions, and there is a complete absence of what Peter Goldie refers to as 
coherence, i.e. causal and other connections in the represented sequence of events (2012: 14).   
 
A third feature of the annal is revealed in White’s translation of the final entries:  
 1056.  The Emperor Henry died; and his son Henry succeeded to the rule.  
 1057.  1058.  1059.  1060.  1061.  1062.  1063.  1064.  
 1065.  1066.  1067.  1068.  1069.  1070.  1071.  1072 (1980: 13). 
The representation lacks closure, which White describes as “that summing up of the 
‘meaning’ of the chain of events with which it deals that we normally expect from the well-
made story” (1980: 20).  White’s description matches Goldie’s observations on the 
characteristic features of narratives that take human beings as their subject: they are not only 
coherent but meaningful, and have evaluative and emotional import, i.e. offer the narrator’s 
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judgement of – and emotional response to – the represented sequence of events (2012: 22-
25).  Both coherence and closure can be subsumed under the concept of plot, which is “a 
structure of relationships by which the events contained in the account are endowed with a 
meaning by being identified as parts of an integrated whole” (1980: 13) for White and “the 
active process of sjužet working on fabula, the dynamic of its interpretive ordering” for 
Brooks (1984: 25).  I shall designate plot as the feature which distinguishes narratives from 
non-narrative representations of sequences of events.57  My interest is in narratives which are 
works of literature.  In §1.2.1. I stated that the literary stance characteristically incorporates 
the fictive stance, and I take this to be true of the relationship between literary narratives and 
fictional narratives such that literary narratives are works of fiction, literature, and narrative.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall – unless otherwise specified – employ ‘narrative’ to 
mean ‘literary narrative’.     
    
3.2. Narrative Thickness  
 
3.2.1. Staging 
Attridge is explicitly sceptical of the “tradition of ‘organic form’”’ due to its reliance upon 
the combination of two separate elements (2004a: 108).  His alternative is a particularly 
intimate relationship between literary form and literary content, where content is constitutive 
of form:   
Meaning is not therefore something that appears in defining opposition or 
complementary apposition to form, but as something already taken up within form; 
forms are made out of meanings quite as much as they are made out of sounds and 
shapes (2004a: 114). 
                                               
57
 White actually maintains that an annal has a plot due to the structure provided by the listing of the years 
(1980: 13), but I consider both coherence and closure as necessary for plot.   
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One of Bradley’s claims is, as noted in §2.1.2., that: “This unity has, if you like, various 
‘aspects’ or ‘sides,’ but they are not factors or parts; if you try to examine one, you find it is 
also the other” (1901: 15).  This could be interpreted as a claim of constitution rather than 
inseparability, but neither Bradley nor Attridge appear to mean ‘constitution’ in the strict 
philosophical sense.  In David Wiggins’ classic example of the coincident objects explanation 
of material constitution, the tree T is constituted by W, the aggregate of its cellulose 
molecules at a particular time (1968: 90).58  T can change while W remains the same (if the 
tree is cut up in such a way so as not to damage any cells) and W can change while T remains 
the same (when the tree is pruned).  T and W thus co-exist spatially and temporally.  The 
relationship between T and W is clearly different from that between form and meaning 
because meaning cannot be altered without a corresponding change in form – a symmetry I 
discuss below.  One of Attridge’s main concerns is the relationship between the institution of 
literature (as opposed to individual literary works) and ethical responsibility.  This concern 
manifests itself in a defence of literary form against accusations of insignificance in 
comparison with ethics and his rejection of the form-content opposition is in service of this 
end (2004a: 108).  If one sets this issue aside, however, it is perfectly plausible to consider 
Attridge’s staging as a thesis of form-content inseparability in literary works, as I shall 
demonstrate. 
 
Attridge begins his re-elaboration of literary form by advancing the work as “an act-event” or 
“performance” (2004a: 108).  A performance should be understood as a particular reading of 
a particular work by a particular individual rather than a performance in terms of acting or 
                                               
58
 The coincident objects explanation of material constitution is considered to be the standard account in 
metaphysics and defences include: Saul Kripke, ‘Identity and Necessity,’ in Milton K. Munitz, ed., Identity and 
Individuation (New York: New York University Press, 1971),  83-94; Frederick Doepke, ‘Spatially Coinciding 
Objects,’ Ratio 24 (1982), 45-60;  E.J. Lowe, ‘Instantiation, identity, and constitution,’ Philosophical Studies 44 
(1983), 45-59; Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘Parthood and Identity Across Time,’ Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983), 
201-220; and Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Self, Body, and Coincidence,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 73 (1999), 287-306. 
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reading aloud, and is thus not dissimilar to Bradley’s focus on the experience of the poem.59  
The work (act-event) of literature is constituted by responsiveness to its singularity. 
Singularity “is a uniqueness derived from a capacity to be endlessly transformed while 
remaining identifiable – within the institutional norms – as what it is” (2004b: 9).  Singularity 
is based on the paradox Derrida (1975: 359-361) identifies in the signature: the signature is 
both unique (the legal system recognises an individual’s signature to represent that individual 
alone), but also repeated and – on each repetition – slightly different (no two signings will be 
exactly the same).  The signature thus represents not only an individual entity, but an act of 
signing by that individual which has a context (time and place).  Similarly, the literary work 
(as experience) is both the same (in its created uniqueness) and different (because no two 
readings – even by the same person – will be exactly the same).  Singularity also describes 
the way in which literary works are characterised by the potential for interpretation and 
reinterpretation (2004b: 10). 
 
Singularity is a necessary characteristic of literature and is linked to both literary form and 
literary value: 
Responding to the work as literary means responding to the singularity of its 
meaningful, affective moment, occurring in the renewable act of my performance; 
what it does not mean is carrying away from the text some conceptual substance for 
my further use or entertainment (2004a: 111).60 
                                               
59
 Attridge holds that a poem, play, or novel is a potential literary work which is only realised as a literary work 
in the act-event of reader or listener engagement with the poem, play, or novel.  There is thus a sense in which 
each reading generates a unique literary work, but there is also a sense in which the potential literary work 
places normative constraints on the act-event, i.e. the engagement must be appropriate in order for the 
realisation to take place (2004a:58-59).  Both Bradley and Attridge therefore identify the work with the 
experience of the work; Bradley’s emphasis is on the author’s creation and Attridge’s on the reader’s or 
listener’s response. 
60
 Part of this quote appeared in my characterisation of Attridge as an autonomist in §1.4.3. 
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Like Bradley, Attridge is distinguishing the value of literature qua literature from any 
instrumental value that a literary work may have.  This passage is an explicit statement of 
form-content inseparability as the substance cannot be removed from the work (the 
combination of substance and style).  Attridge also shares Bradley’s concern with resonant 
meaning, and claims that words are composed of sounds and shapes: 
these sounds and shapes are nexuses of meaning and feeling, and hence deeply rooted 
in culture, history, and the varieties of human experience.  The formal sequence 
therefore functions as a staging of meaning and feeling (2004a: 109). 
Staging is realised in “performative reading” (2004a: 109), an experience of the work which 
activates its linguistic power and involves the simultaneous experience of its conceptual, 
emotional, and physical qualities (2004a: 98-99).61  Staging is essential to appreciating 
literature and is in fact the source of the pleasure taken in literature qua literature (2004a: 
109).  Like form-content inseparability for Bradley, staging is the criterion for the literary, 
and a work is defined as literary if it is “open to such a staging of the primary functions of 
language and discourse” (2004a: 110).62 
 
Just as a director stages a play, so literary form stages literary content and staging is the 
means by which form is re-elaborated such that it is (partly) constituted by content.  While 
Attridge rejects the tradition of organic form in favour of constitution, the constitution 
relation is – unlike identity – asymmetrical, so if content constitutes form, form does not 
constitute content.  It is not only substance that cannot be removed from a work without loss 
                                               
61
 Staging has a similar function and significance to the dramatic in Gibson: “A literary narrative is in effect a 
sustained dramatic gesture, a way not only of presenting some content or material but of responding to it” (2007: 
117). 
62
 Like Bradley on the relationship between resonant meaning and poetry, as noted in §2.4.1., it is not clear 
whether Attridge is proposing staging is a sufficient condition or a necessary and sufficient condition for 
literature. 
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of identity for Attridge, however, as formal features are apprehended as “already meaningful” 
(2004a: 113).  He states: 
 The sounds and shapes of the text are always already meaningful sounds and shapes, 
 and there is no moment, not even a theoretical one, at which it is possible to isolate a 
 purely formal property – at least not without turning the literary work into something 
 else (2004a: 119). 
When one does isolate a formal property of the work, one therefore moves outside the literary 
act-event and is no longer discussing the work, in the same way that poetic form and poetic 
content in isolation are no longer the poetic work for Bradley.  The relationship proposed by 
both Attridge and Bradley is symmetrical – neither content nor form can be isolated without 
loss of identity – and thus more accurately characterised as inseparability than constitution. 
 
There is further evidence of staging as an inseparability relation in the claim that staging  
includes the mobilization of meanings, or rather of the events of meaning:  
their sequentiality, interplay, and changing intensity, their patterns of expectation and 
satisfaction or  tension and release, their precision or diffuseness.  It does not include 
any extractable sense, information, image, or referent that the work lays before the 
reader.  Through this mobilization of meanings, the work’s linguistic operations such 
as referentiality, metaphoricity, intentionality, and ethicity are staged (2004a: 109).63   
Staging as the mobilisation of meanings – or forming of content – matches Bradley’s resonant 
meaning very closely.  Attridge and Bradley are both concerned with the experience of the 
literary work, the close relation of sound and meaning in this experience, and its final value.  
I shall henceforth take staging to describe the relation of form-content inseparability in 
literary works, once again understood as a demand imposed upon a work rather than 
                                               
63
 Ethicity is the particular relationship between responsiveness and responsibility which Attridge envisages, 
mentioned in §1.4.3.  While staging is a necessary condition of ethicity the relation is not symmetrical and I 
shall not discuss ethicity in this thesis. 
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discovered therein.64  If staging functions as a necessary condition for literature in general, 
then Attridge’s theory indicates how Bradley’s thesis of form-content inseparability can be 
manipulated to extend beyond poetry.  I shall now explain the operation of staging in literary 
narratives in particular by means of Lamarque’s work on narrative opacity.   
 
3.2.2. Opacity 
Lamarque identifies the type of narratives which are opaque as follows:      
Only where the mode of narration is salient – in other words where the form in which 
a story is told matters in the appraisal of the narrative – will co-referential 
substitutions be blocked.  Those narratives primarily concerned with imparting 
information – from homely conversational narratives to those of history or biography 
– will normally invite a transparent construal of their proper names and other 
referential devices (2014: 146).65   
The mention of the salience of the mode of narration recalls Attridge’s argument that: “What 
we respond to in performing a literary work is evidently a complex involving both the formal 
and the semantic” (2004a: 108).  Narrative opacity is distinct from, but related to, W.V.O. 
Quine’s referential opacity.  Quine identifies several referentially opaque contexts, where the 
truth of a sentence depends upon something other than the referent such that truth is not 
preserved in co-referential substitutions.  For example, although ‘Tegucigalpa’ and ‘the 
capital of Honduras’ have the same referent, co-referential substitution transforms true 
statement (i) into false statement (ii): 
 (i) “Philip believes that Tegucigalpa is in Nicaragua” (1961: 141). 
                                               
64
 Attridge’s conception of staging is compatible with both: (i) the relation of inseparability rather than 
constitution, and (ii) this relation being a demand rather than a discovery, especially when one considers that 
staging is realised in performative reading. 
65
 The initial discussion of narrative opacity is by Lamarque and Olsen, who use the examples of ‘London’ in 
the Sherlock Holmes stories, Tom Jones, and Bleak House (1994: 80-82) and ‘Canterbury’ in The Canterbury 
Tales (1994: 126-128). 
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 (ii) “Philip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua” (1961: 141). 
Narrative opacity is not concerned with the preservation of truth, but with the preservation of 
the identity of the fictional work, specifically with the constraints it places on one’s 
imaginative engagement with that work.  Lamarque’s discussion of narrative opacity in terms 
of the relation between form and content focuses on the issue of paraphrase, about which I 
shall have more to say in §3.2.3., but he is explicit that “narrative opacity also shows how 
form helps determine content in prose narrative” (2014: 154).  Content is always shaped by 
form in a literary narrative such that the narrative is not transparent, i.e. one does not 
penetrate through the form straight to the content as one would in a philosophical or historical 
work.   
 
Narrative content is therefore “not merely loosely or contingently connected to its mode of 
presentation, but is partially constituted by it” (2014: 12).  People, places, and events thus 
appear under a description, which constitutes a perspective on them.  The perspectival 
description of a fictional setting such as Coketown in Dickens’ Hard Times is paradigmatic 
form-content unity because the content, the town, is shaped by the form, the point of view 
from which it is presented, such that the content is not separable from the form-content unity 
which constitutes the work.  This is true of all narratives where the mode of narration is 
salient, including those which employ real rather than fictional people, places, or events.  
Numerous parts of London, for example, are described in great detail in Oliver Twist; or, The 
Parish Boy’s Progress, but because the form in which the story is told matters in the 
appraisal of the narrative the geographical content is not presented transparently.66  The lack 
of transparency means one cannot invoke just any information about London in one’s 
imaginative engagement with the novel if the identity of the work is to be preserved.  Like 
                                               
66
 The lengthy description of Jacob’s Island, a rookery in Bermondsey, is paradigmatic in this respect.  See 
Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist; or, The Parish Boy’s Progress (London: Penguin, 1838 [994]), 468-469. 
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‘Gerontion,67 Oliver Twist does not authorise one to imagine ‘the city that hosted the 2012 
Summer Olympics’ when one reads ‘London’.  ‘London’ refers to London, but ‘London’ is 
presented under an aspect rather than in its full extension.  ‘London’ in Oliver Twist is not 
therefore London per se (i.e. ‘London’ in its fully extensional use), but London-in-Oliver-
Twist (i.e. London under the aspect Oliver Twist licences one to imagine).  Lamarque states 
that:     
the content of literary fictional narrative is infused with a kind of opacity.  The 
content is given and thus constituted, as we might say, ‘under a description’.  This is 
not true just for the fictional characters and fictional incidents described in the 
narrative, which acquire their nature and very existence from the modes of their 
presentation, but also for any real world setting, both material and moral, which itself 
is presented under a perspective (2014: 166). 
The relation in opaque narratives is one of inseparability, which Lamarque calls “form-
content indivisibility” (2014: 154) because the point of view (form) and the person, place, or 
event (content) cannot be separated: one cannot separate either Coketown or London from the 
point of view Dickens offers on each in the respective novels.  Narrative thickness and poetic 
thickness thus have an identical effect on the extension of proper names. 
 
In §3.2.1. I argued, contra Attridge, that staging was an instantiation of form-content 
inseparability.  Less controversially, I have interpreted narrative opacity as a function of 
form-content inseparability in this sub-section.  I regard staging as a development of 
Bradley’s resonant meaning which can be extended to all literary works, and opacity as the 
mechanism by which form-content inseparability operates in those literary works which are 
also narratives.  The respective conceptions of staging and opacity complement each other, 
                                               
67
 See §2.3.1. 
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and Attridge’s literary singularity matches Lamarque’s formal salience: where formal 
salience is absent or limited, a narrative will be transparent as one penetrates through the 
form to the content; transparent narratives, such as newspaper reports, will not be singular 
because each performance of the narrative will be much the same as the last and unlikely to 
be open to different interpretations.  I proposed staging as a necessary condition of literature 
in §3.2.1.  The notion that opacity is a necessary condition of literary narratives is implicit in 
Lamarque, a “standing assumption” (2014: 155).  The combination of the two concepts 
produces a version of poetic thickness which is applicable to literary narratives rather than 
poetry: 
NARRATIVE THICKNESS: the inseparability of literary form and literary content in 
the experience of a literary narrative such that neither form nor content can be 
isolated.  Narrative thickness is a demand which is satisfied by a work rather than a 
property of a text, and is characteristic of literary narratives such that if a work is a 
literary narrative, it will reward the demand for narrative thickness.68 
 
3.2.3. Work Identity 
In Lamarque’s discussion of paraphrase, he demonstrates the strength of the inseparability 
relation by questioning the restriction of the prohibition against the substitution of words with 
synonyms to poetry.  He maintains that the value of even novel-length literary narratives is 
likely to be affected by such changes:  
A Jane Austen or Charles Dickens novel, let’s say, gets its identity, and through that 
its literary value, in the precise words – give or take minor issues of textual corruption 
and so forth – written by the author.  Wilful changes, even preserving sense, would be 
unacceptable and undermine work identity.  Even more significantly it could never be 
                                               
68
 Narrative thickness should not be confused with Gibson’s thick narratives.  Thick narratives are narratives 
that provide an insight into ethical values without promoting a particular morality (2011a). 
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said with confidence than any given synonym substitution is ‘harmless’ to a literary 
narrative (2014: 154-155). 
The idea that the substitution of a single word alters work identity is relatively 
uncontroversial for poems, but not for novels, due to the typical differences mentioned in 
§3.1.1.  Lamarque wants to extend the resistance to paraphrase accepted for poetry to literary 
narratives and his strategy is reliant upon the similarity in the kind of attention paid to each 
by readers.  Lamarque quotes Ian Ousby on the use of the word ‘peep’ in Bleak House and 
concludes:   
A single word in so long a novel might seem of marginal significance – and thus 
easily substitutable – but the lesson from narrative opacity is that there is a standing 
assumption that form of narration counts in the characterisation of content (2014: 
155).69 
The content of a literary narrative is essentially – not merely loosely or contingently – 
constituted by the perspectival description and the narrative is therefore necessarily narrated 
in the particular mode of the author.  This necessary relation means that to realise the content 
of the novel in a different mode is to lose work identity.  If one is reading a poem or novel 
qua literature, then form counts.  Substitution with synonyms may preserve content in its 
entirety, but the form will differ, even if only to a small extent, and the alteration therefore 
results in a loss of work identity – when one is reading a work qua literature.   
 
I have proposed narrative thickness as a necessary condition of literary narratives and I am 
therefore committed to the view that work identity is lost if either content or form are altered.  
To adapt Dickie’s terminology from §1.2.2., a literary work is a text which has been 
presented to and accepted by the literary public for appreciation, and survives as a work in 
                                               
69
 Part of this quote appeared in my comparison of Lamarque and Attridge in §3.2.2. 
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virtue of being embedded in the institution of literature.  Olsen maintains that the “literary 
work is therefore logically tied to the author/reader relationship and can only be understood 
as a transaction between these institutional roles” (1987: 197).  A work is thus an abstract 
object, a type, which is constituted by – but not identical to – a text, which is itself a sequence 
of words.  A consequence of narrative thickness is that the alteration of, for example, one of 
the three hundred and fifty-five thousand-odd words of Bleak House alters work identity, 
producing another distinct type rather than a token of the type Bleak House.  A further 
consequence, which is more plausible but nonetheless counter-intuitive, is that all translations 
of literary works are also new types rather than tokens of the originals.  These apparently 
unpalatable consequences might be taken as a reductio ad absurdum against narrative 
thickness.      
 
In §1.1.3. I stated that I was a contextualist with regard to literature and that I therefore regard 
historical and cultural facts about literary works as relevant to both work identity and literary 
appreciation.  I mentioned Borges’ ‘Pierre Menard’ and acknowledged that two different 
works could be constituted by two identical texts.  Text identity is only a necessary condition 
for work identity.  A second necessary condition can be established by adapting Levinson’s 
(1980: 14) proposal for works of music to literature: 
Literary works must be such that authors writing in different literary-historical 
contexts (including a single author on separate occasions) who produce identical texts 
invariably create distinct literary works.  
I shall refer to this necessary condition, the identity of the literary-historical context70 in 
which a work is created, as ‘provenance identity’.  Text identity and provenance identity are 
jointly sufficient conditions for work identity.  Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin 
                                               
70
 Levinson provides a delineation of musico-historical context which is similarly adaptable to the literary case.  
See 1980: 10-11. 
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disagree, holding that text identity is a sufficient condition of work identity and that Menard 
is simply replicating Cervantes’ work such that both Cervantes’ manuscript and Menard’s 
manuscript are tokens of the type ‘Cervantes’ Don Quixote’ (1988: 61-63).  Despite this 
difference, Goodman and I are in agreement regarding the consequences of an alteration in 
the text for work identity: “Even replacement of a character in a text by another synonymous 
character (if any can be found in a discursive language) yields a different work” (1976: 209).  
The reason for this ostensibly extreme view can be found in Goodman’s discussion of music 
which, he characterises, like literature, as an allographic art form, i.e. an art form where exact 
duplications of artworks are regarded as genuine rather than forgeries (1976: 113).  He argues 
that complete compliance with the score is a necessary and sufficient condition for an 
instance of a work of music, with the result that “the most miserable performance without 
actual mistakes does count as such an instance, while the most brilliant performance with a 
single note wrong does not” (1976: 186).  Goodman notes that this consequence is both 
counter-intuitive and contrary to the ordinary employment of language, but warns against 
collapsing the distinction between ordinary and theoretical vocabulary. 
The innocent-seeming principle that performances differing by just one note are 
instances of the same work risks the consequence – in view of the transitivity of 
identity – that all performances whatsoever are of the same work.  If we allow the 
least deviation, all assurance of work-preservation and score-preservation is lost; for 
by a series of one-note errors of omission, addition, and modification, we can go all 
the way from Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony to Three Blind Mice (1976: 186-187). 
 
The same point about the transitivity of identity can be made for any work of literature: one 
could begin with the claim that Ulysses is identical to Ulysses-minus-one-word and end with 
the claim that Ulysses is identical to And Then There Were None.  Ulysses is a particularly 
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good example because of the numerous mistakes – up to five thousand71 – in its first 
publication, by Shakespeare and Company in 1922.  If the errors do indeed reach several 
thousand, then the claim that the 1922 and 1984 editions of the novel are different works is 
less controversial than it first appears, but the dispute over the number of errors draws 
attention to an important issue.  Goodman’s argument against work identity in the case of a 
single erroneous note can be regarded as a Sorites Paradox which is applicable to literary 
works: if one allows a single substitution, then one will either have to accept that two 
completely different works are identical or make what will inevitably be an arbitrary decision 
about the number of words which can be substituted before identity is lost.  It is no less 
implausible to claim that the substitution of a single word alters work identity than it is to 
claim that, for example, twenty-five words or one percent of the words can be substituted 
without loss of identity.  A boundary between identity and difference will have to be 
established at some point and, despite intuitions to the contrary, setting that boundary at a 
single difference is the least arbitrary point in the case of a literary work as it can be justified 
by recourse to authorial intention. 
 
My account of literary value is – as noted in §1.3.2. – experiential, i.e. the literary value of a 
literary work is the value of the experience afforded by the literary work.  While I am 
committed to the view that a single substitution or error produces a different work, my 
concern is with the experience afforded by that work.  The experience afforded by Ulysses 
and Ulysses-minus-one-word would be almost identical such that is difficult to imagine a 
context in which the difference is salient.  Furthermore, the value of the two experiences 
would be either identical or indistinguishable.  The experience afforded by the 1922 original 
and 1986 Bodley Head standard editions respectively is also similar – perhaps very similar – 
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 See: Edwin McDowell, ‘New Edition Fixes 5,000 Errors in “Ulysses”,’ New York Times, 7 June, 1984, 
accessed 28 February, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/01/09/specials/joyce-edition.html. 
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but it differs to the extent that critics and philosophers are careful to read the latter when 
writing about the work (unless they have a specific interest in the 1922 edition).  A 
translation is a particular type of paraphrase, one which aims at reproducing identical content 
in a completely different form, a form which is partly dictated by the syntax and tropes of the 
second language.  If one considers literary value in terms of the value of the experience 
afforded by the literary work, then it is evident that the experience of, for example, Joyce’s 
Ulysses will be significantly different to the experience of M. Auguste Morel’s Ulysse (1929) 
– when reading each qua literature.  A faithful and skilful translation may produce an 
experience which is similar and has equivalent value, but both the experience and the value 
will differ from that afforded by the original.  This distinction is, once again, reflected in 
critical and philosophical practice.  Counter-intuitive though it may be, Ulysse is therefore a 
different work of literary art and a type in itself rather than a token of Ulysses.                                              
       
3.3. Didactic Thinness 
 
3.3.1. Didactic Literature 
A decisive objection to narrative thickness as a necessary condition of a literary narrative 
would be an example of a work which was literary, but ‘thin’, i.e. did not satisfy the demand 
for form-content inseparability.  The category of didactic literature appears to offer many 
such counter-examples, works that contain a ‘message’ or ‘moral’ which is independent of 
the work, and is intended specifically for – in Attridge’s terms – carrying away from the text 
for further use.  Vladimir Nabokov is keen to distance himself from such works: “I am 
neither a reader nor a writer of didactic fiction, and, despite John Ray’s assertion, Lolita has 
no moral in tow” (1956: 313).  Bradley holds that in didactic poems “the poet had a truth or 
fact – philosophical, agricultural, social – before him, and then, as we say, clothed it in 
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metrical and coloured language” (1901: 23).  Didactic poems are not problematic for him as 
they are not ‘pure poems’ and there is thus no requirement that the demand for form-content 
inseparability be rewarded.  Hemingway offers a similar view in the claim that: “No good 
book has ever been written that has in it symbols arrived at beforehand and stuck in” (cited in 
Stolzfus 1999: 52), which recalls Cleanth Brooks’ warning against conceiving of form as a 
“beautified envelope” containing content (1947: 226).  Hemingway and Brooks’ observations 
are direct challenges to the notion that the demand for narrative thickness will be rewarded by 
didactic literary works.   
 
The adjective ‘didactic’ denotes the property of being characterised by instruction or having 
instruction as an aim.  Until recently, the instructive value of literature was simply assumed, 
but the historical weight of literary didacticism has occasionally been ignored in the twentieth 
century.  Beardsley, for example, mentions Plato, Arnold, Shelley, and others, but dismisses 
three thousand years of instruction as a literary value in two sentences: “Unfortunately, as far 
as I can see, nobody has ever given any plausible reasons for the Didactic Theory.  There is 
therefore nothing to refute” (1958: 427).  Didactic theory deserves more attention than he is 
prepared to grant, but ‘didactic’ is nonetheless a pejorative term, as Charles Repp points out: 
“it is generally understood that didacticism refers to some sort of defect in a work of literature 
as such” (2012: 271).  This defect cannot be a straightforward link to instruction because 
there are works which are not didactic – Repp cites Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment and George Eliot’s Middlemarch – despite having instruction as their purpose 
(2012: 272).   
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Sidney suggests how this negative connotation may have arisen.  Responding to accusations 
that poetry could not be both fictional and instructive,72 he maintains that poetry instructs by 
delighting.  Johnson subsequently picked up on this distinction: “The end of writing is to 
instruct; the end of poetry is to instruct by pleasing” (1765: 126).  As twentieth century 
scholars questioned instruction as a literary value, F.R. Leavis, D.H. Lawrence, and others 
prised appropriate moralism apart from disagreeable didacticism.73  Despite Leavis’ critique 
of Johnson’s alleged requirement that the morality of a work should be explicitly stated, he 
excused Johnson from “the most indefensible didacticism” (1967: 215).  Indefensible 
didacticism in literature is apparently pure instruction and defensible didacticism instruction 
by pleasing as recommended by Johnson and Sidney.  Repp follows Leavis in this respect as 
the instruction must not only be overt, but “too overt” in order to qualify as didactic (2012: 
272).   
 
Once these two categories of didacticism are differentiated, my response to the didactic 
thinness objection to narrative thickness becomes obvious.  Works which are too overt, i.e. 
messages which have – to employ the terms of Bradley, Brooks, and Nabokov – been 
clothed, enveloped, or towed by fiction, will not reward the demand for narrative thickness.  
In works which – to employ the terms of Sidney, Leavis, and Repp – didacticism is 
pleasurable, defensible, or not too overt – the demand for narrative thickness will be 
rewarded.  This defence is reliant on the incompatibility of overtly didactic narratives, where 
the author’s intention is to communicate a message, with narrative thickness, where the 
author’s intention is that the work be appreciated as literature.  Short of committing to a 
theory of literature which focused on characteristics such as complexity, ambiguity, and 
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 Which recalls Plato’s objections to poetry.  See, especially, Apology: 22b4-c6 & Laws II: 667d5-668a4. 
73
 See Leavis, The Common Pursuit (London: Chatto & Windus, 1952 [1958]), 110-111; 1967: 197-218 & D.H. 
Lawrence, ‘Morality and the Novel,’ in E.D. McDonald, ed., Phoenix I: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. 
Lawrence, (London: Heinemann, 1961), 527-532. 
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open-endedness as essential to literature,74 my position is fragile: any interpretation of an 
overtly didactic work which made a convincing case for the work as literary would prove 
fatal.  If one considers the canon of literature there are, however, very few works which pose 
this threat – with one notable exception.   
 
3.3.2. Costello’s Lessons 
J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello is a collection of seven short stories (one of which is in two 
parts) and a postscript, first published in 2003.  The full title of the collection is Elizabeth 
Costello: Eight Lessons, and lessons three and four share the same title, ‘The Lives of 
Animals’, with subtitles distinguishing part one from part two.  Although my discussion will 
focus on ‘The Lives of Animals’, I want to draw attention to four of the other titles: ‘Realism’ 
(lesson one), ‘The Novel in Africa’ (lesson two), ‘The Humanities in Africa’ (lesson five), 
and ‘The Problem of Evil’ (lesson six).  All four are closer to the titles of lectures or 
academic papers than short stories, especially the fourth, which identifies the philosophical 
paradox evinced by the co-existence of evil in the world and a creator who is both omnipotent 
and benevolent.  The combination of these titles with their presentation as lessons creates the 
expectation of ‘messages’, of content which will retain its identity independently of the 
context of the work, and will not thus reward the demand for narrative thickness.   
 
With regard to ‘The Lives of Animals’, this expectation is heightened because the same short 
story in two parts appeared in The Lives of Animals, a non-fiction collection of essays 
published in 1999, which combined Coetzee’s contribution with responses by Marjorie 
Garber, Peter Singer, Wendy Doniger, and Barbara Smuts.  The four replies are philosophical 
responses to ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’ (part one) and ‘The Poets and the Animals’ 
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 I am nonetheless sympathetic to the argument advanced by Richard Posner (1998) for these very traits as 
characteristic of literature. 
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(part two) read qua philosophy – as lessons or arguments.  The content of the narrative 
appears to meet this expectation as it is concerned with a lecture (part one) and a seminar and 
a debate (part two) at the fictional Appleton College by novelist Elizabeth Costello.  Part one 
is composed almost entirely of Costello’s lecture, a question from the audience, and a 
discussion of Costello’s position at a dinner held in her honour.  A significant proportion of 
part two consists of Costello’s seminar in the English department and her debate in the 
philosophy department.  Furthermore, ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’ includes explicit 
discussions of German war crimes in Poland (2003: 63-64), Thomas Nagel’s 1974 
philosophy paper ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat’ (2003: 75-78), and the practice of 
vegetarianism (2003: 87-90).  ‘The Poets and the Animals’ includes discussions of Plato and 
Aquinas (2003: 98-99), Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (2003: 100-105), and the philosophical 
tradition from Aristotle to Descartes (2003: 105-112).     
 
‘The Lives of Animals’ is therefore an apparently exemplary case of didactic literature.  
Whether the story appears in The Lives of Animals or Elizabeth Costello, it should be 
understood as a work of moral philosophy which – due to Coetzee’s inventiveness or his 
desire to contrast the literary approach with the philosophical – has been clothed with or 
embedded in a fictional narrative.  Indeed, in her introduction to The Lives of Animals, Amy 
Gutmann states: 
 In the frame of fiction, Coetzee’s story of Elizabeth Costello’s visit to Appleton 
 College contains empirical and philosophical arguments that are relevant to the ethical 
 issue of how human beings should treat animals (1999: 4). 
The embedding itself seems shallow, and the philosophical discussion dominates more usual 
narrative concerns like diegetic detail, character development, and resolution.  Further 
evidence can be found in the depiction of Costello in Slow Man, where she is presented as an 
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authorial intrusion into the novel.  The protagonist, Paul Rayment, suspects that Costello is 
writing a book about him, but Costello’s presence suggests to the reader that Rayment is 
nothing more than a character in the book Costello is writing (and Costello a character in the 
book Coetzee has written).  Costello may well simply be Coetzee’s alter ego, and David 
Lynn’s review of Elizabeth Costello is typical in expressing the critical concern with the 
relationship between Coetzee and Costello (2005: 125-126), whether Costello speaks directly 
for Coetzee, and whether she should always be regarded as an authorial intrusion of sorts, i.e. 
as a deliberately thinly-disguised characterisation of Coetzee himself.  If this is the case, there 
is even less reason to think that the demand for narrative thickness will be met because the 
eight lessons of Elizabeth Costello are literally Coetzee’s lessons, messages delivered in the 
medium of fictional tales. 
       
3.3.3. Coetzee’s Stories 
Coetzee has expressed his own view of the relationship between form and content:  
 a story is not a message with a covering, a rhetorical or aesthetic covering.  It is not 
 a message plus a residue, the residue, the art with which the message is coated with 
 the residue, forming the subject matter of rhetoric or aesthetics or literary 
 appreciation.  There is no addition in stories.  They are not made up of one thing plus 
 another thing, message plus vehicle, substructure plus superstructure.  On the  
 keyboard on which they are written, the plus key does not work.  There is always a 
 difference; and the difference is not a part, the part left behind after the subtraction.  
 The minus key does not work either: the difference is everything (1988: 4).75 
Coetzee is thus adamant that narrative form and narrative content cannot and should not be 
separated.  Given that he has written numerous essays, his decision to write about animal 
                                               
75
 The ‘difference’ to which he alludes is Aristotle’s difference between poetry and history (Poetics IX: 1451b4-
8), which I discuss in §4.2.3. 
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rights in a short story is clearly deliberate rather than imposed.  In which case, ‘The Lives of 
Animals’ is not intended as a message with an aesthetic covering and the informed reader 
should expect, and will indeed find, that the demand for form-content inseparability is 
rewarded in the work. 
 
The story is not only an example of Attridge’s staging, but what Derrida might have called 
staging of staging.  ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’, was the first of Coetzee’s Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Princeton University on 15th October 1997, and ‘The 
Poets and the Animals’ the second, which – like Costello’s seminar in the story – was 
delivered the next day.  Coetzee’s lecture was thus a performance of a short story in which a 
novelist gave a lecture on the relationship between humans and animals.  The apposition of 
Coetzee and Costello, reality and fiction, is reproduced in the appearance of the story and 
replies in The Lives of Animals, but an extra level of complexity attends the inclusion of the 
lectures in Elizabeth Costello, a collection of short stories which are linked only by the 
presence of the eponymous character.  Here, the reader is invited to read ‘The Lives of 
Animals’ qua literature despite knowing that Coetzee presented these stories as Tanner 
Lectures and published them as essays in The Lives of Animals.  One of the reasons for this 
self-reflexive staging becomes apparent when the thematic content of the story is scrutinised.  
Aside from the explicit concern with the relationship between human and animal, there is a 
more subtle exploration of the relationship between literature and philosophy, the contrasting 
ways in which they approach the subject of the moral status of animals, and the failure of the 
latter – which may explain why Coetzee avoided a straightforward lecture in moral 
philosophy. 
     
  
105 
 
My main concern is whether the didacticism in ‘The Lives of Animals’ is overt and 
identifying ‘the moral of the story’ is thus crucial for my inquiry.  The search for such a 
moral, however, reveals only its absence.  There is no immediately obvious, explicit, or 
readily-paraphrased message, despite the tale’s trappings as a ‘lesson’ or ‘lecture within a 
story within a lecture’ and despite the narrative including discussions of, and meditations on, 
questions of moral philosophy.  The tale is narrated by John, Costello’s son, and the reader 
sees her entirely from his point of view.  She is presented as an admirable individual – highly 
intelligent and fiercely principled – but not an attractive one.  Notwithstanding her finer 
qualities, Costello seems to fail in the most basic sense of what it means to be human, and has 
great difficulty maintaining relationships with people: her relationship with John is strained; 
her relationship with his wife (Norma) is antagonistic; she has no relationship with John’s 
father; the subsequent story, ‘The Humanities in Africa’, reveals an uncomfortable 
relationship with her sister; and her final engagement at the college ends with “acrimony, 
hostility, bitterness” (2003: 112).  What kind of person, one cannot help but ask, devotes so 
much time and energy to saving the lives of cattle and sheep, but not to their own family and 
cannot manage to get along with other human beings?   
 
The fact that the story is told from John’s point of view – rather than Costello’s or Norma’s – 
is highly significant.  The reader has access to John’s thoughts and he quickly emerges as a 
kind, reasonable, personable man.  Unlike his mother, he is not an exceptional individual 
devoted to a higher purpose, but a successful academic (in the department of physics and 
astronomy), and a caring husband, father, and son.  There is a juxtaposition of John’s virtues 
with those of his mother, but what is perhaps more important is that he has no obvious vices.  
In short, there is every reason to think that John will provide the reader with an informed and 
sympathetic perspective of his mother, and that if he has doubts about her or her views, these 
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should be taken seriously.  On a thematic – as well as personal – level John, who is a scientist 
(and therefore neutral in the conflict between literature and philosophy), is situated midway 
between his mother (a successful novelist, suggestive of the capabilities of literature in 
answering ethical questions) and Norma (an unsuccessful philosopher of mind, suggestive of 
a discipline which is severely limited, perhaps even defunct).         
 
The overall plot unfolds in the following scenes: John picks up Costello at the airport, 
Costello lectures, the lecture is discussed at dinner (in part one); John discusses his mother 
with Norma after dinner, Costello receives a letter objecting to her comparison of the 
slaughter of animals with the Holocaust, Costello leads a seminar in the English department, 
Costello debates with a philosopher, John discusses her with Norma again, John takes 
Costello back to the airport (in part two).  The notion that the story – Costello’s arrival, 
academic activities, and departure – is an aesthetic covering constructed in order to deliver 
the philosophical message, that the form is merely decorative, is completely unfounded as the 
absence of a message is made explicit at the end of the second part, when Costello is 
speaking to John.  This final scene provides both narrative closure and retrospectively infuses 
the story with new patterns of meaning.  The following two comments of Costello’s are 
particularly important:    
(i) ‘It’s that I no longer know where I am.  I seem to move around perfectly easily 
among people, to have perfectly normal relations with them.  Is it possible, I 
ask myself, that all of them are participating in a crime of stupefying 
proportions’ (2003: 114)? 
 (ii) ‘Yet I’m not dreaming.  I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the  
  children’s, and I see only kindness, human kindness.  Calm down, I tell  
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  myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill.  This is life.  Everyone 
  else comes to terms with it, why can’t you?  Why can’t you’ (2003: 115)?   
 
The reader suddenly sees not only Costello, but her philosophy, from a different perspective.  
In the discussion leading up to this point she has shown that she is not guilty of the vices 
which she admits often accompany animal rights advocates (snobbery, superficiality, 
naivety), she has engaged with opposing viewpoints in rational argument, even when 
practices discussed (like bullfighting) must physically repulse her, and she has accepted that 
her views (for example, the Holocaust comparison) are regarded as extreme and offensive.  
Here, in the last few lines of the tale, the reader realises that Costello is not a fanatic or even a 
crusader, that she simply possesses an enhanced sensitivity to animal suffering which – 
because she is morally motivated – she cannot help but act upon.  This sensitivity is presented 
as a burden, and the conclusion invites a reappraisal of both Costello and her philosophy: she 
becomes more sympathetic, but her views more questionable.  There are at least two features 
of the narrative which heighten this effect.  First, repetition: part one ends with Costello in 
apparent confusion, with doubt cast upon her intellectual capacities; in part two she rallies, 
negotiating a series of interrogations with skill and insight; now the doubt returns – this time 
self-doubt, not about her capacities, but about the value of the sensitivity to which she 
confesses.   
 
Second, all John can say in response is: “‘There, there.  It will soon be over’” (2003: 115).  
Bearing in mind that the reader has come to trust John by this point, to identify with him 
even, this is a shocking end to the story, a literary equivalent of the ‘twist in the tale’ common 
to short genre fiction.  The fact that Costello’s visit is at an end (and thus already over) and 
the repeated references to Costello as old and tired suggest that John is talking about nothing 
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other than her death, a merciful end to the suffering that is the result of her heightened 
sensitivity.  This interpretation is also supported by the content of the final story in the 
collection, ‘At the Gate’, which is reminiscent of Kafka’s ‘Before the Law’ (from The Trial), 
and appears to concern Costello’s death.  Instead of simply arguing – in summary of Costello 
– that owning a leather lamp is as morally repugnant as owning a lamp made from human 
skin, Coetzee seems to be suggesting that there are some people who see the world in this 
way, and questioning whether this sensitivity is desirable.  Despite her disingenuous 
comment in (i), Costello clearly has difficulty maintaining normal human relationships and 
one can see why she is estranged when the full impact of her sensitivity is revealed.  
Ultimately, there is indeterminacy rather than resolution.  Is it desirable to be a Costello in a 
world of Normas?  John, for one, thinks not, but Coetzee does not provide a straightforward 
answer.   
 
There is a great deal more that can be said about ‘The Lives of Animals’ which is relevant to 
my inquiry, but which I do not have space to discuss.  I selected Elizabeth Costello as a 
potential counter-example to my claim that narrative thickness is a necessary condition of 
literature because the collection is apparently an overtly didactic work of literature.  Focusing 
on ‘The Lives of Animals’, I showed that there are numerous reasons to expect a message 
with an aesthetic covering, i.e. content which is salient to the extent that the particular mode 
of narration is not necessary to the communication of that message.  In sitting down to a 
Tanner Lecture or picking up The Lives of Animals one might thus expect that one was about 
to hear or read a work whose essential content could have been expressed in another form.  
Subsequently, I offered evidence from Coetzee and the story to establish that this is not the 
case, that ‘The Lives of Animals’ does not admit of an alternate mode of presentation: the 
particular content is necessarily expressed in the particular form of the story.  The demand for 
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narrative thickness is thus rewarded and the didacticism is revealed to be of the pleasurable, 
defensible, or covert sort – if, indeed, it is correctly categorised as ‘didactic’ at all (my 
interpretation of the story is as a literary exploration of the relevant philosophical issues 
rather than an instruction therein).   
 
The example in fact seems to be a narrative equivalent to De rerum natura, and I think 
Lamarque’s response to Kivy (discussed in §2.4.3.) is appropriate here.  ‘The Lives of 
Animals’ can be read qua philosophy or qua literature, but the reader who reads it qua 
philosophy is likely to have an impoverished experience, because part of the work’s value is 
the way it engages with philosophical issues in a literary manner, demonstrating that 
literature qua literature can engage with ethical issues as well as – if not better than 
(according to Coetzee) – philosophy.  The form as well as the content of the two parts of the 
story offer contrasting approaches to the lives of animals: Costello’s lecture is the focus of 
‘The Philosophers and the Animals’, whereas ‘The Poets and the Animals’ is more of a 
traditional narrative.  Even though the inclusion of ‘The Lives of Animals’ in The Lives of 
Animals appears to be an invitation to read the short story qua philosophy, to read it qua 
philosophy – to extract Costello’s arguments and views – is to miss something significant 
about the way in which the short story, Elizabeth Costello, and literature in general can 
explore moral problems while being read qua literature.  Doniger admits a similar view when 
she begins her response with the statement: “It seems somehow reductionistic to respond to 
these deeply moving readings as if they had been dry academic arguments” (1999: 93).  
Having established narrative thickness as a necessary condition of literary narratives, I can 
now conclude the first part of my thesis by claiming that form-content inseparability – as 
instantiated in either poetic thickness, narrative thickness, or both – is a necessary condition 
of all literary works.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERARY THICKNESS 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to define literary thickness, the form-content 
inseparability which is characteristic of literature, and to argue that an aboutness relation 
holds between work and world as a consequence thereof.  In §4.1. I subsume poetic thickness 
and narrative thickness under the concept of literary thickness, which is understood as a 
demand made of a work rather than a property discovered therein and identified as a 
necessary condition of literature.  §4.2. explores the implications of literary thickness for 
reference and truth by analysing first Michael Riffaterre’s referential fallacy and then Richard 
Gaskin’s literary humanism.  I conclude that there are problems with both non-reference 
views of literature and literary cognitivism.  Drawing on the work of Riffaterre, Arthur 
Danto, and John Searle, I propose a substantive axis and a formal axis for every work (and 
text) in §4.3.  I show that these conflicting interests in literary works are reconciled in the 
integrative standpoint and that works which reward the demand for thickness are works 
which reward interest in this integration and for which an aboutness relation holds with the 
world.  My position on reference and truth in literature emerges as pro-reference but anti-
cognitivist.              
 
4.1. Literary Thickness 
  
4.1.1. Literary Use of Language 
In §2.4.2., I quoted Kivy’s description of literary language as a thick medium, as opposed to 
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non-literary language, which is a thin medium (and therefore transparent).  Subsequently, in 
 §2.4.3., I agreed with Lamarque that the practice of reading poetry is the practice of 
imposing poetic thickness on a work.  Poetic thickness is not an objective property which is 
discovered in a text, but a demand which is made of the work by the reader who appreciates 
the work qua poetry.  Poetic thickness is not entirely reliant upon the psychology of each 
reader either, however, and the demand is twofold.  Recall from §1.2.1. that the work of 
literature is identified by the author’s intention to invoke a literary response, i.e. appreciation.  
Malcolm Budd claims that “the experience a work offers is an experience of interacting with 
it in whatever way it demands if it is to be understood” (1995: 4).  The demand made by the 
work is determined by the intention and ability of the author such that not all works that are 
intended to be appreciated – intended to meet the demand for poetic thickness – will succeed 
in this aim.  A work that fails in this way is a work which merely aspires to be a poem.       
 
Understood in these terms, Kivy’s literary language is not a medium with essential features 
that ground the property of literariness, but a literary use of language, i.e. an employment of 
language which is characterised by a match between authorial intention on the one hand and 
reader appreciation on the other.  Similarly, non-literary language is not a medium that lacks 
a literary essence, but an employment of language which is not characterised by an authorial 
intention for appreciation or a reader demand for poetic or narrative thickness (or which is 
characterised by an authorial intention for appreciation, but fails to meet the demand for 
poetic or narrative thickness).  A newspaper is therefore an example of a non-literary use of 
language because reports are typically neither intended for the adoption of the literary stance 
nor read with a demand for poetic or narrative thickness.  To read a newspaper qua poetry or 
qua literary narrative would in most, if not all, instances be entirely unrewarding; one reads a 
report for its content – hence the transparency of the medium.  While I shall at times find it 
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expedient to write of the thickness of literary language, this is shorthand for the match 
between the intention behind and reception of the particular use of language, rather than an 
objective property of that language.   
            
4.1.2. Form-Content Inseparability Again 
Literary thickness should not be confused with thick concepts, although the ideas are related.  
Following Gilbert Ryle’s (1968) introduction of the thick/thin distinction into philosophy, 
Bernard Williams initiated the contemporary debate in moral philosophy by distinguishing 
thin concepts such as ‘good’, ‘right’, and ‘ought’ from thick concepts such as ‘brutality’, 
‘courage’, and ‘treachery’.  He defines the latter as concepts “which seem to express a union 
of fact and value” (1985: 143-144).  Both Ryle (1968: 481) and Williams (1985: 155-157) 
regard irreducibility as essential to their respective uses of ‘thick’.  For Williams, this means 
that thick concepts are not reducible to their descriptive and evaluative components.  
Although Simon Blackburn denies the existence of thick concepts, his characterisation of 
irreducible thickness is enlightening: 
 A thick concept might be thought of in chemical terms.  It is not that the two elements 
 of attitude and description cannot be understood as separate at some level (obviously, 
 in searching for thick concepts or terms, we know that we are looking for items with 
 implications of attitude on the one hand, and description on the other).  But the idea 
 must be that the two form a compound or an amalgam, rather than a mixture (1992: 
 298). 
A commitment to thickness means that one “loses the concept if a particular amalgam 
dissolves back into its elements” (1992: 299).  The pairing of attitude and description is 
reminiscent of the constitution of perspective by description in narrative thickness, explained 
in §3.2.3.  In fact, Blackburn’s description of thick concepts in chemical terms articulates 
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precisely the unity of form and content with which Bradley was concerned: two elements are 
fused by the author to create a new compound which cannot then be returned to the original 
elements without dissolving that compound.  If the compound is dissolved into the elements, 
identity is lost because those elements differ from the compound.     
 
I shall henceforth subsume both instantiations of form-content inseparability in literature, 
poetic thickness and narrative thickness, under a single concept: 
LITERARY THICKNESS: the inseparability of literary form and literary content in the 
experience of a literary work such that neither form nor content can be isolated.  
Literary thickness is a demand which is satisfied by a work rather than a property of a 
text, and is characteristic of literature such that if a work is a work of literature, it will 
reward the demand for literary thickness.  
Everything which is true of literary thickness will be true of both instantiations, which are – 
as noted in §3.1.2. – complementary rather than exclusive.  Literary thickness is a necessary 
rather than sufficient condition of literature.           
 
4.2. Reference & Truth 
 
4.2.1. The Referential Fallacy 
Lamarque and Olsen discuss three views on reference in literature: pro-reference, non-
reference, and anti-reference (1994: 107).  They identify aboutness as a “modest pro-
reference position”, note that a work’s referents are not identical with what it is about (1994: 
108), and conclude that aboutness “is a more fundamental relation than that of reference, 
which can largely be subsumed by it” (1994: 119).  The criterion of a work being about a real 
person, place, or event is that the reader is required to call upon information about the real 
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person, place, or event in order to understand the person, place, or event in the work (1994: 
121).  Oliver Twist and ‘Gerontion’ are thus clearly both about London.  Aboutness captures 
something of the particular effect of literary thickness with which I am concerned, which is 
not compatible with either a non-reference view, such as Michael Riffaterre’s referential 
fallacy, or a strong pro-reference view (where reference and/or truth play a role in 
determining literary value), such as Gaskin’s literary humanism.  It will be my claim that 
Lamarque and Olsen’s aboutness relation is a function of literary thickness, but I shall first 
identify problems with both the referential fallacy and literary humanism before proposing 
my account of aboutness as a solution.76  
   
In his defence of reference as a fallacy, Riffaterre states “that the representation of reality is a 
verbal construct in which meaning is achieved by reference from words to words, not to 
things” (1973: 230).  He claims that ‘Azincour’, ‘Crecy’, and ‘Poictiers’ in Wordsworth’s 
poem ‘Yew-Trees’ do not refer to the respective medieval battles of Agincourt, Crécy, and 
Poitiers.  I reproduce the first eight lines of the poem here:   
 There is a Yew-tree, pride of Lorton Vale, 
 Which to this day stands single, in the midst 
 Of its own darkness, as it stood of yore, 
 Not loth to furnish weapons for the Bands 
 Of Umfraville or Percy ere they marched 
 To Scotland’s Heaths; or Those that crossed the Sea    
 And drew their sounding bows at Azincour, 
                                               
76
 Lamarque and Olsen describe the anti-reference view as “being associated both with the pragmatist’s rejection 
of truth as correspondence and with the conception of language as a ‘game’ rather than a ‘picture’ of reality”, 
citing Richard Rorty and C.G. Prado as examples (1994: 107-108).  I shall not discuss anti-reference views.  
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 Perhaps at earlier Crecy, or Poictiers (Wordsworth 1815: 303).77 
Riffaterre maintains that:  
 History, and referentiality, are thus all at the verbal level.  Names anchor the 
 description solidly in time because of their metonymic function, their ability to stand 
 for a whole complex of representations.  Suggestiveness is circular: the descriptive 
 sentence finds its reference in a name whose referent need only be the preceding part 
 of the sentence leading up to it (1973: 233).       
The work not only fails to refer to the world, therefore, but is entirely self-referential.  A 
consequence of the referential fallacy is Riffaterre’s view that the poem will remain as 
evocative once the Battle of Agincourt is forgotten (1973:232).  In terms of Lamarque and 
Olsen’s aboutness criterion, Riffaterre is stating that ‘Yew-Trees’ is not about Agincourt: one 
is not required to call upon information about the battle because the absence of this 
information does not degrade the experience of the poem.  This is patently false.   
 
Knowledge of the three decisive victories by English archers over French heavy cavalry at 
the battles of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt may not be essential to the enjoyment of the 
work, but the information is required if the poem is to be understood and appreciated.  From 
the poem alone one learns that yew trees provided weapons for the bands of archers that 
fought in Scotland and France.  There is, however, a significant difference between 
understanding that English archers fought in foreign fields and understanding that they 
inflicted three great defeats on the French, defeats which had a major influence on military 
strategy and tactics at the time and upset the previously unrivalled dominance of the 
                                               
77
 ‘Yew-Trees’ was composed in 1807 and first published in Poems of the Imagination in 1815.  My quotation is 
from Poems of the Imagination as it appeared in Poems by William Wordsworth: Including Lyrical Ballads, and 
the Miscellaneous Pieces of the Author in 1815.  In the version Riffaterre employs the following words are not 
capitalised: ‘Bands’, ‘Heaths’, ‘Those’, and ‘Sea’.  There is also a colon rather than a comma at the end of line 
three (see Riffaterre 1973: 230-231).  The differences affect neither Riffaterre’s thesis nor my commentary 
thereon. 
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aristocracy in warfare.  That these momentous victories were achieved with the longbow, 
which was made from the yew, makes the tree all the more interesting and important, and 
offers insight into why the poet holds it in such awe.  I am not suggesting that the poem will 
cease to be evocative if the memory of these battles is lost, merely that it will not be as 
evocative.  The poetic experience will be impoverished, even if only to a small extent.   
 
The problem extends beyond the three battles: if ‘Yew-Trees’ is not about Agincourt, it is not 
about yew trees either.  Riffaterre suggests that the accuracy of Wordsworth’s descriptions of 
the trunk (1973: 237) and isolation (1973: 239) of the yew are of little significance to the 
appreciation of the poem.  Furthermore, one does not need to bring one’s knowledge of yew 
trees to the work because: 
 The yew is not described in relation to the tree of that name, but as an image of an 
 existence closer to Eternity than ours – or, in Wordsworth’s terms, more impervious 
 to ‘decay’ than ours.  It simply carries on in a new language the first part of the poem, 
 which stated this poetic vision in terms of human life transcended (1973: 237).              
Riffaterre’s identification of the yew as a symbol of a superior type of existence is 
compelling, but he errs in claiming that the description is not related to the tree of that name.  
If the description is unrelated then ‘Yew-Trees’ is not about yew trees, and – as Danto writes 
in his critique of Riffaterre – “it is difficult to locate literature in the plane of human concern 
at all” (1984: 61).  If the relation between work and world is severed, the satisfaction derived 
from the poem would be restricted to the sound of the words and the morphology of the work 
– which, again, seems to be an impoverished reward for appreciation.  The referential fallacy 
does not therefore provide a satisfactory account of reference in literature and I shall proceed 
to literary humanism, which appears more promising. 
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4.2.2. Literary Humanism 
In §1.3.3. I defined literary cognitivism as the thesis that truth is, or can be, a value of 
literature qua literature.  In Thomson-Jones’ terminology, the cognitivist answers the 
question of whether literature can provide knowledge in a manner which is relevant to its 
literary value in the affirmative.  Gaskin’s literary humanism constitutes a strong pro-
reference view of literature because he maintains that those works of literature which have 
cognitive value as part and parcel of their literary value have it in virtue of referring to, and 
making true statements about, the world.  Gaskin’s theory of the relationship between 
literature and truth emerges from his linguistic idealism, the claim that the world is 
propositionally structured:  
The world, we may say, is composed, in the first instance, of propositions, true and 
false; and then, in virtue of the fact that these propositions are themselves composed 
of objects and properties, the world comes, mediately, to be composed of these 
objects and properties too (2013:11).   
There is thus no reality outside of, or which cannot be expressed by, language (2013: 14).  
This is counter-intuitive in one respect, but intuitive in another because it appears that human 
beings are unable to conceive of that which cannot be exhaustively described in language.  
Gaskin is quick to distinguish his idealism from Richard Rorty’s pragmatism (2013: 7-11) 
and Derrida’s anti-realism (2013: 240-241) and realism is central to his distinction between 
text and work: the former is an abstract possibility, the latter a realisation of that possibility 
by a particular author at a particular time and a particular place.  Once this realisation occurs, 
the work’s “literary qualities remain fixed across all possible worlds in which it exists”, as 
well as over time (2013: 75).     
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With linguistic idealism as a premise, Gaskin maintains that fiction is not only inessential to 
literature, but that literature is characteristically factualist, i.e. aims at truth (2013: 38).  This 
is understood in terms of the relevance of historicity, the use of the names of real people and 
places, the use of general terms which refer to universals, and the status of works as 
incomplete structures which must be completed by the reader (2013: 39-51).  In literary 
fictions, the author makes assertions, but the reader is invited to adopt the fictive stance, i.e. 
to preface the assertions which appear in the content of the work with ‘it is fictionally the 
case that’.  These assertions will, of course, be true (2013: 52-53).  For most works of 
literature the cognitive value of the work resides in reference to universals, which are 
“genuine components of the real world” (2013: 60).  Gaskin’s conclusion is that “all works of 
literature bear on the world by virtue of making, or implying, true statements about the 
world” (2013: 65).  He sums up his position on the relationship between truth value and 
literary value as:  
Falsity can thus make a difference to the value of a work, but it is not necessarily a 
decisive factor in determining overall aesthetic worth; it may be outweighed, or 
compensated for, by other factors (2013: 153).  
Truth is a pro tanto literary merit for Gaskin.  Returning to Wordsworth’s ‘Yew-Trees’, the 
accuracies which I noted Riffaterre as mentioning in §4.3.1. – the description of the trunk and 
the tree’s isolation – make the poem better qua poem.  Inaccuracies, such as describing the 
trunk as thin or the tree as growing in groves, would apparently not matter at all to Riffaterre 
as long as they maintained the vision of the first part of the poem in new language, but they 
would lower the poetic value of the poem for Gaskin.  Questions of truth and falsity are not 
restricted to factual details in a work, but include its themes, such as whether yew trees 
actually are closer to eternity than human beings in the manner Wordsworth suggests.  The 
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plausibility of this claim – the extent to which Wordsworth’s ‘poetic argument’ convinces – 
contributes to the poetic value of the poem for Gaskin.   
 
Gaskin’s humanism is a particularly strong cognitivist thesis and his argument for the 
unpopular position that literature provides propositional knowledge is reliant upon his 
linguistic idealism.  What I want to make clear is that even weaker cognitivist theses – such 
as Carroll’s, which I discuss in CHAPTER SIX – entail that truth is a pro tanto literary merit 
and falsehood a pro tanto literary defect.  If a work’s cognitive value is part and parcel of its 
literary value, then literary value is partly constituted by cognitive value.  Cognitive value is 
understood in a variety of terms, for example truth (Gaskin), clarification (Carroll), and 
knowledge (Wilson).  As I noted in §1.3.3., knowledge is standardly accepted as justified true 
belief (or justified true belief plus something), i.e. directly linked to truth.  This 
correspondence with the world applies to both Ryle’s knowing-that and knowing-how 
distinctions in knowledge (1949: 14-48) as well as Dorothy Walsh’s third category, which 
Wilson describes as knowing-what (1983: 491-492).78  In Gaskin, Carroll, and Wilson – as 
well as the vast majority of cases where literature is claimed to provide knowledge – truth is a 
pro tanto literary merit and falsehood a pro tanto literary defect.79  With regard to the 
institutional practice of literature, which I discussed in §1.2.2., Lamarque and Olsen are 
adamant that:        
Literary criticism is not defined by a series of speculative issues (of psychological, 
sociological, philosophical, or historical nature) which are debated with reference to 
                                               
78
 See: Dorothy Walsh, Literature and Knowledge (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969).  Walsh 
describes the correspondence with which I am concerned as authenticity. 
79
 I have qualified this claim as a result of the very few exceptions, which include Gibson (whom I discussed in 
§1.4.3.) and Tzachi Zamir.  Zamir argues that literature provides justified beliefs which constitute moral 
knowledge because truth is a “redundant” notion in ethics (Double Vision: Moral Philosophy and 
Shakespearean Drama [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007], 15).  This is, of course, a controversial 
claim which I do not have space to discuss here. 
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canonical standards of truth and reference.  Nor is there a part of criticism which deals 
with the truth or falsity of works (1994: 332). 
The cognitivist notion that falsehood is a pro tanto literary defect is revealed as problematic 
by a consideration of the brief but instructive debate about errors in literature. 
 
4.2.3. Evidence of Errors 
If falsehood is a pro tanto literary defect then errors – i.e., unintended departures from fact – 
will be paradigmatic pro tanto literary defects.  In his lecture on ‘Literature and the matter of 
fact’, Christopher Ricks maintains that accuracy is always critically relevant (1996: 283) and 
always pertinent to literary value, but not always equally pertinent due to considerations such 
as genre and kind (1996: 303).80  Ricks’ most interesting example is the apparently crucial 
flaw in Golding’s Lord of the Flies, pointed out by T. Hampton (1965) eleven years after the 
novel’s publication in 1954: Piggy’s glasses would have had diverging not converging lenses 
and he would not therefore have been able to light fires with them (1996: 306).  What makes 
this error so significant is that both Piggy’s myopia and his ability to light fires are essential 
to his role in the narrative.  If Piggy is long-sighted rather than short-sighted, then he loses his 
physical vulnerability; if he is short-sighted, then he cannot also light fires, and is no longer 
the bringer of fire.  M.W. Rowe joined the debate with his critique of Lamarque and Olsen’s 
no-truth theory of literature, and his explicit position is:  
 In fiction, truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for literary merit, since our interest 
 can always be sustained by a work’s wit, energy, epic sweep, pathos or humour, etc., 
 but truth is always a virtue and falsehood always a vice (1997: 335).        
Rowe reiterates the significance of literary genre and adds another interesting example.  The 
poem ‘Absences’ by Philip Larkin contains the line: “A wave drops like a wall: another 
                                               
80
 Ricks does not actually specify unintended factual inaccuracies, but his numerous examples demonstrate that 
these are his concern. 
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follows” (1955: 40).  Larkin is explicitly describing waves at sea not on the shore and in 1961 
an oceanographer informed him that only waves breaking against the shore drop in the 
manner indicated.  Larkin was upset by the error, expressed his hope that his work was not 
read by many oceanographers, and added an apologetic note to a later edition to the effect 
that his error seriously marred the poem, but that he was unable to correct it (Rowe 1997: 
334-335).  Rowe identifies such errors as literary defects because “while we read, we have to 
make a conscious effort to suppress the knowledge that what they describe is impossible” 
(1997: 335).  He refers to errors as evidence for his conclusion about the relationship between 
truth and literary value and shares Ricks’ view that an error is a pro tanto literary defect.   
   
The most recent contributor to the debate is Christopher Mole, who proposes four ways in 
which inaccuracy can reduce literary value: distraction, authority, hypocrisy, and ignorance.  
I shall confine my commentary to his two most convincing reasons, distraction and 
authority.81  Errors can distract readers from a work by impeding the suspension of disbelief.  
Mole (2009: 499) comments on Ricks’ example of Pushkin describing the clink of cavalry 
spurs in a crowded ballroom in Eugene Onegin.  Ricks claims that the description is not 
merely inaccurate, but “absurd”, due to the damage the spurs would have done to the ladies’ 
dresses (1996: 302).  Either during or shortly after writing the poem, Pushkin became aware 
of his error, but decided not to change it.  Mole echoes Rowe: “We cannot compensate for the 
inaccuracy without that compensation itself being an impediment to what the poem might 
achieve” (2009: 499).  The consequence of Pushkin’s error is that to imagine the scene as he 
intended one must restrict one’s imaginative engagement with the poem (2009: 500).  Mole 
notes that errors of this sort vary greatly in the extent to which they distract readers.  The 
second category is errors which undermine the authority of the author.  Mole maintains that 
                                               
81
 Aside from considerations of space, Mole deals with hypocrisy and ignorance together, briefly, and both are 
reducible to the problem with authorial authority. 
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this matters because the appreciation of a work of literature requires trust, as “we subject 
ourselves to another’s sensibility” (2009: 502).  Imaginative engagement involves trusting the 
author and errors undermine the authority of the author and make readers less likely to trust 
him or her and therefore less likely to appreciate the work.  Mole’s conclusion is that if an 
error is not problematic in one of the ways he has indicated, it will not matter to the value of 
the work qua literature, i.e. an error is not a pro tanto literary defect.  
 
Mole’s two reasons for errors being problematic in literature – distraction and authority – are 
ultimately reducible to distraction.  Errors that matter in literature matter because they 
interfere with the reader’s imaginative engagement with the work.  The direction of causation 
is that the distracting error comes first – the interference with what Mole calls “imaginative 
realization” (2009: 501) – and this distraction may or may not result in the further distraction 
of the questioning of authorial authority.  He states that it is not just the magnitude of the 
error, but the likelihood of discovery which matters (2009: 501), but obfuscates the essential 
issue: some errors matter to some readers.  A more enlightening observation is that some 
errors distract some readers.  Due to the different knowledge of the world different readers 
bring to works, their imaginative experiences of the same works is characterised by varying 
grains of detail.  One would expect, for example, that John Bright and Chloé Obolensky – the 
costume designers for Martha Fiennes’ 1999 film, Onegin – would have experienced richer 
and more specific imaginings of the crowded ballroom than most contemporary readers.  And 
the more detail one imagines, the more likely the spurs are to distract.  There will be some 
readers for whom neither Pushkin’s spurs nor Larkin’s wave are distracting, some who find 
one but not the other distracting, and others who find neither distracting.  Larkin recognised 
this diversity in responses when he expressed his desire that few oceanographers had read his 
poem.  Errors matter because they distract readers and some errors are likely to distract more 
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readers than others because of the knowledge those readers bring to the appreciation of 
literature.  No general principles can be established for identifying which types of error are 
likely to be defective because each reader’s imaginative engagement will be determined in 
part by the individual’s psychology. 
 
If this seems implausible, consider the magnitude of Golding’s error.  A large minority – if 
not the vast majority – of his readers would have been familiar with the various ways in 
which lenses are employed to assist vision.  If ever there was an example upon which to 
construct a general principle for what type of error is a literary defect, this seems to be it: the 
error is not only crucial to the plot, but reliant upon exactly the opposite of what is true in the 
world, and furthermore likely to be discovered by a substantial proportion of readers.  As 
deserving of his Nobel Prize in Literature as Golding was, this is a very silly mistake for an 
author to make.  And yet what proportion of the millions of readers of Lord of the Flies since 
1954 (i) realised the error and (ii) having realised the error, found it an impediment to their 
imaginative engagement with the work?  The literary and popular success of the novel speaks 
for itself.  Similarly, the fact that one can become a Nobel literature laureate despite making a 
juvenile error in one of one’s major works, says something about literature and literary value 
that Ricks, Rowe, and Gaskin fail to grasp.  If only some errors matter, and these to only 
some people, then errors cannot be pro tanto literary defects.  According to the cognitivist, 
however, errors should be paradigmatic literary defects because – as unintended departures 
from fact – they do not serve a purpose within the work and are therefore, in Gaskin’s terms, 
less likely to be outweighed or compensated for by literary merits.  If errors are not pro tanto 
literary defects, then falsity is not a pro tanto literary defect and truth is not a pro tanto 
literary merit.  This is not, as Olsen notes, to deny that verisimilitude is ever relevant to 
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literary appreciation (1987: 74), only that truth is always (even if only to a pro tanto extent) a 
literary merit.                 
 
4.2.4. Enacting Falsehood 
I take the evidence of errors to be a decisive objection to literary humanism, which is explicit 
that truth is a pro tanto literary merit at both the factual and thematic levels.  If this is the 
case, then I have demonstrated why Gaskin does not offer a satisfactory account of the 
relationship between literature and truth.  Other literary cognitivists could, however, accept 
the evidence of §4.3.3. but restrict their respective claims about literary knowledge to the 
thematic level, i.e. claim that truth is only a pro tanto literary merit at the thematic level.  
Where the empirical evidence seems to favour the view that falsity is not a pro tanto defect at 
the factual level, it seems to favour the converse at the thematic level.  While there are 
numerous canonical works that embody obvious truths, there are very few that embody 
obvious falsehoods.  Rowe employs the example of a hypothetical novel with the theme that 
treating children cruelly benefits them: 
How could we possibly be interested in seeing such ideas enacted, explored, 
developed and imaginatively entertained?  We shall not find such controversies about 
literary works, not because truth is irrelevant to literary evaluation, but because truth 
is so important that obviously idiotic ideas automatically debar the books which 
express them from the category of literature (1997: 337). 
Cognitive value is part and parcel of literary value for Rowe and a work with a theme that is 
so obviously false cannot be valuable qua literature.  Rowe’s point could also be made about 
moral as opposed to cognitive value.  When one considers the literary canon, there is a 
paucity of works that embody a morally reprehensible perspective.  Recall my claim in §1.3.3 
that neither Lolita nor Paradise Lost offer immoral perspectives on their respective subjects.  
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Similarly, if one considers many of the themes of canonical works, it seems highly unlikely 
that a work of equivalent literary value could embody a contradictory theme: for example, 
civil wars are not characterised by hatred and savagery (For Whom the Bell Tolls) or animal 
suffering on a grand scale is morally insignificant (‘The Lives of Animals’). 
 
I have two responses to Rowe, both of which explain why the overwhelming empirical 
evidence for the truth and virtue of literary themes does not provide evidence that truth is a 
pro tanto literary merit at the thematic level.  The first response is taken from Lamarque’s 
reply to Rowe’s inquiry into whether a literary work could sustain the theme human hopes 
are never thwarted.  He claims that Rowe’s question is “spurious on many counts” (2006: 
138), three of which are relevant to my analysis: 
(i) to start with a statement and ask what kind of work it might characterize and 
what value such a work might have distorts the whole process of literary 
interpretation, which always begins with a specific work and reaches a 
judgment of value, if at all, on a plurality of measures (2006: 138).   
(ii) it is common for different works to develop diametrically opposed thematic 
visions.  Love destroys, love liberates; hope springs eternal, hopelessness 
prevails (2006: 138). 
(iii) the themes explored in the great literary works (of all cultures) are drawn from 
a relatively small pool of concerns that are of perennial interest to reflective 
human beings […].  Literary works seldom add to this pool, though they can 
provide fresh perspectives on each item (2006: 139). 
The fact that there appear to be no canonical literary works that embody a “glaring 
falsehood” at the thematic level (Rowe 1997: 338) must indeed be explained by the anti-
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cognitivist and Lamarque provides the explanation in (iii).  Olsen offers support for (iii) when 
he states of literary interpretation that the  
interpretative terms on the high levels […] belong to a fairly limited class of terms 
which cluster around a set of ‘interesting’ concepts concerning ‘eternal human 
problems’ (1978: 114). 
 
It should also be noted that while there seem to be no uncontested examples of canonical 
works embodying glaring thematic falsehoods, there are at least some works for which such 
interpretations are not only plausible, but compelling.  I mentioned the amoral perspectives of 
a number of surrealist and existentialist works in §1.3.3., but Lamarque points to what may 
be a less controversial case: 
Martha Nussbaum characterizes a theme of Euripedes’s Hecuba as ‘nothing human is 
ever worthy of trust: there are no guarantees at all, short of revenge or death.’  As a 
thematic statement this captures well an implicit motif in this dark and troubling play.  
But as a generalization about human nature its truth is highly dubious (2009a: 237). 
Lamarque asks whether this falsity affects the play’s literary value and claims that it does not, 
because pessimists and optimists alike can value the work for its dark vision of the human 
condition.  He concludes: 
The example shows that a thematic statement might be true about a work but broadly 
false about the world at large.  It also shows that worldly truth is not always relevant 
to literary value (2009a: 237).  
(ii) above fails to answer Rowe’s critique in full, but it suggests that the direct relationship 
between truth and literary merit which he, Ricks, and Gaskin hold is at least not as 
straightforward as any of them maintain.  Employing hypothetical novels with themes that 
directly oppose the classics is indeed disingenuous, for the reason Lamarque states in (i), but 
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if such examples are permitted, then Rowe would have to consider the possibility I sketch 
below, which constitutes my second response. 
 
The True Knights is a hypothetical novel that enacts a glaring falsehood which is also 
extremely morally reprehensible: the Klu Klux Klan were heroic defenders of liberty.  
Imagine that this novel closely parallels the narrative of D.W. Griffith’s The Birth of a 
Nation82 and was published in the same year as the film was released (1915).  Unlike the 
film, the novel is not overtly didactic and is frequently compared to contemporaries such as 
Joseph Conrad’s Under Western Eyes and Booth Tarkington’s The Magnificent Ambersons.  
Like the film, the novel presents the following view of the reconstruction of the Confederacy: 
that the Union government punished the Confederates for the assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln by garrisoning the southern states with black soldiers; that these soldiers treated the 
white population harshly in reprisal for slavery; and that the only way for the Confederates to 
protect their human rights was to form a defence league.  The novel thus justifies the 
formation of the KKK and advocates the retention of white supremacist practices.  Could a 
novel enacting such falsehoods have literary value?  I think it could.  For all its obvious 
failings, The True Knights deals with a subject of human interest, the treatment of the 
defeated by the victors in the aftermath of a war, a subject which is all the more poignant in 
the aftermath of a civil war.  At the very least, the novel raises an important issue: given the 
circumstances of the reconstruction of the Confederacy, there was a tension between uniting 
the American states and ensuring the citizens of the new nation accepted that their former 
practices had to change.  The True Knights makes one realise why, for example, well-
motivated steps towards achieving racial equality and integration may have caused racial 
                                               
82
 The Birth of a Nation is in fact based on a novel, The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan, 
which author Thomas F. Dixon, Jr. adapted into a play entitled The Clansman (both published in 1905).  In 
contrast to the film, neither the novel nor the play has entered the artistic canon, which is why I employ an 
invention. 
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violence and the creation of extremist organisations such as the KKK.  There are close 
parallels with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa, but 
the subject extends beyond particular times and places to universal questions of transitional 
justice, post-war reconstruction, and the ethical question of how to treat one’s former 
enemies, especially when those enemies are fellow citizens of the same nation state.  The 
problem with The True Knights is, of course, that it gives the wrong – false and morally 
wrong – solutions to the dilemmas it raises.  One would be saddened that such a talented 
author lacked a moral compass, but there is no reason to prevent the handling of the dilemma 
being serious and mature, explored in a rich and subtle moral pattern,83 and deserving of 
praise qua literature (in a similar manner to that in which the film is praised qua cinema).  
My conclusion is that truth is not a pro tanto literary merit at either the factual or thematic 
levels and that literary cognitivism is therefore flawed.  In the final section of this chapter, I 
offer my own account of the relationship between work and world, which is pro-reference but 
anti-cognitivist.         
 
4.3. The Integrative Standpoint 
 
4.3.1. Substantive & Formal Axes 
My quote from Danto in §4.2.1. follows his claim that philosophers appear to be solely 
concerned with vertical references and literary theorists horizontal references (1984: 61).  
This is a response to Riffaterre, who maintains: 
 In cognitive language, a ‘vertical’ semantic axis supports every word and links it to 
 things or to commonplace concepts about things.  The truth test of a cognitive 
 message is whether or not it conforms to these commonplaces.  In a poem, the 
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 The critical terminology I have employed here is from Leavis, 1948: 191-195 & The Critic as Anti-
Philosopher (London: Chatto & Windus, 1982), 57. 
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 descriptive sentence is a chain of derivations.  Each word is generated by positive or 
 negative conformity with the preceding one – that is, either by synonymy or by 
 antonymy – and the sequence is thus tautological or oxymoric [sic].  [...]  The truth 
 test of  such a sequence cannot be whether or not each component corresponds to a 
 referent, but whether or not the sequence is well constructed, that is, exemplary in 
 establishing word-to-word relationships of similarity or dissimilarity, duplicating the 
 grammatical sequence with a string of semantic associations.  The description has 
 verisimilitude because it in fact confirms again and again the same statement in 
 various codes.  The relation of literary description to its subject matter is not the 
 relation of language to its nonverbal context, but that of meta-language to language 
 (1973: 235-236). 
Riffaterre does not mention a horizontal axis, but the concept is implicit: in cognitive 
language, the vertical axis links word to world by means of reference; in poetic language, the 
horizontal axis links word to word by means of cross-reference and meaning-relations.  If 
these ‘languages’ are understood as different types of interest taken by a reader in a text or 
work (types which may or may not be rewarded), as proposed in §4.1.1., then these axes are 
measures of the different demands made by readers.  If I am reading Oliver Twist qua guide 
to Victorian London, I am concerned with the vertical axis, but if I am reading Oliver Twist 
qua literature then – according to Riffaterre – I am concerned with the horizontal axis, i.e. 
solely with the relations among the words in the work.  
 
Riffaterre’s axis – or axes in my interpretation – recalls John Searle on “parasitic forms of 
discourse” (1969: 79).  Searle argues that parasitic discourses, a category that includes 
fictional utterances, refer.  A fictional entity exists in the fiction, but the self-referentiality of 
fictional discourse does not alter meaning:    
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 If we think of the meaning conventions of linguistic elements as being (at least in 
 part) vertical conventions, tying sentences to the world, then it is best to think of the 
 tacit conventions of fictional discourse as being lateral or horizontal conventions 
 lifting, as it were, the discourse away from the world.  But it is essential to realize that 
 even in ‘Little Red Riding Hood’, ‘red’ means red (1969: 79). 
Searle’s concern in this passage is with pretended illocutionary acts, and his interest in the 
way in which words relate to the world differs from mine.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely 
that Riffaterre would deny that ‘tree’ means tree in ‘Yew-Trees’ (despite the fact that ‘Yew-
Trees’ is not about yew trees).  What I want to appropriate from Searle is the notion of a 
horizontal axis that lifts language away from the world.   
 
The idea is that focus on the horizontal axis of a work – its internal relations, including 
structure, morphology, syntax, metre, and tropes – lifts the work away from the world.  The 
reason for the opening of this distance is that the types of interest represented by each axis 
not only differ, but conflict: reference is directed towards external relations with the world 
and cross-reference towards internal relations within the work.  An analysis of the 
juxtaposition of the two central plots of Oliver Twist – Oliver’s escape from poverty and his 
reclamation of his birthright – which are both consecutive and simultaneous, involves 
attending to the horizontal axis to an extent that would detract from mapping the geography 
of Dickens’ London.  In contrast, attending to the metre and tropes in a newspaper report 
would detract from attending to the content of the report, its substantive salience regarding 
people, places, and events in the world.  The point is that one cannot perform a formal 
analysis of Oliver Twist and engage with the novel qua guide to Victorian London in a single 
reading.  The two types of interest one brings to the work, an interest in plot structure and an 
interest in historical geography, are entirely different. 
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One might object to the definition of the vertical axis in terms of the relation between word 
and world; in Riffaterre’s terms, the link between words and either things or concepts about 
things.  Despite his adventures in London, Oliver Twist is a fictional character and there are 
works – such as J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit and Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale – 
where there is very little, if any, obvious resemblance between the world of the work and the 
real world.  In §1.2.1. I accepted that literature was characteristically fictional and I 
understand the relation between fictional people, places, and events and the world in terms of 
reference to universals, in a similar manner to Gaskin (2013: 60).  The notion is from 
Aristotle’s famous observation on the superiority of poetry over history:  
 The difference between the historian and the poet is not that the one writes in prose 
 and the other in verse; the work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and in this 
 metrical form it would be no less a kind of history than it is without metre.  The 
 difference is that the one tells of what has happened, the other of the kinds of things 
 that might happen.  For this reason poetry is something more philosophical and more 
 worthy of serious attention than history; for poetry speaks more of universals, history 
 of particulars.  By ‘universals’ I mean the kinds of thing a certain type of person will 
 probably or necessarily say or do in a given situation; and this is the aim of poetry, 
 although it gives individual names to its characters.  ‘Particulars’ are what, say, 
 Alcibiades did, or what happened to him (Poetics IX: 1451a42-b12). 
The relation between the words ‘Oliver Twist’ in Dickens’ work and the real world is 
therefore between the fictional particular, the character, and the universal that the particular 
instantiates, for example ‘an orphan in Victorian England’ or just ‘an orphan’.84  This relation 
is not restricted to proper names as general terms also refer to universals.  The relation of 
particular to universal applies not only to words and their various combinations within the 
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 Gaskin’s discussion of the character of Hamlet as a universal is enlightening in this regard (2013: 6
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work, but to the work as a whole considered in terms of its theme.  Oliver Twist, ‘The Lives 
of Animals’, Hard Times, and the Iliad thus instantiate universals such as ‘the inhumanity of 
human beings towards each other’, ‘the inhumanity of human beings towards animals’, ‘the 
dehumanising effect of industrialisation’, and ‘the fragility of human existence’.  These 
universals are, as noted in §4.3.4., typically concerns that are of perennial interest or eternal 
human problems, i.e. have significance for human beings.  Literature, like all art, is not only 
by people for people, but also about people and things that are important to people.   
 
4.3.2. Aboutness 
The two axes I have identified can be defined as follows: 
 SUBSTANTIVE AXIS: a measure of the extent to which the interest a reader brings 
 to a work or text is concerned with the relations between the words in the work or text 
 and what those words represent in the world.  This interest will focus on the content 
 of a work or text – the what that is represented.    
 FORMAL AXIS: a measure of the extent to which the interest a reader brings to a 
 work or text is concerned with the relations among the words in the work or text, 
 including the relations of parts of the work or text to other parts and to the unified 
 whole.  This interest will focus on the form of a work or text – the how of 
 representation. 
If the demand for literary thickness is necessarily satisfied by literary works – as I maintained 
in §4.1.2. – then both the substantive and formal axes are salient.  When one demands literary 
thickness one is not concerned with the formal axis alone, but with both the formal and 
substantive axes.  These axes represent two different types of interest in a work, however, a 
conflict in which the formal axis lifts the substantive axis away from the world, drawing 
focus away from the external relations of reference to the internal relations of cross-
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reference; and in which the substantive axis lowers the formal axis towards the world, 
drawing focus away from the internal relations of cross-reference to the external relations of 
reference.  This conflict suggests that one of the axes will have to be of primary significance 
and the other of secondary; for example one would expect the formal axis to be of primary 
importance in reading Oliver Twist, but of secondary importance in reading a newspaper 
report.  But this dichotomy is very similar to Riffaterre’s distinction between cognitive 
language and poetic language, and is precisely a thin interest in literature because it separates 
form and content.  Literary thickness should therefore be understood as an interest in the 
integration of the two axes, i.e. an interest in formed content.  Works which reward the 
demand for thickness are works which reward interest in this integration and for which an 
aboutness relation holds with the world.  I shall term the particular type of interest in a work 
that is characteristic of literary thickness the adoption of the integrative standpoint.             
 
Recall from §4.2.1. that Lamarque and Olsen identify aboutness as a pro-reference position.  
Literary works refer by means of both particulars and universals and the salience of this 
reference is reflected in the substantive axis.  Aboutness is also, however, a modest pro-
reference position.  In literary works, the internal relations among the words and parts are 
also salient and this salience is reflected in the formal axis, an interest which is in conflict 
with the (external) referential relations.  The integration of these two axes involved in the 
adoption of the integrative standpoint produces an aboutness relation with the world where 
works refer, but where the accuracy of their reference is not part and parcel of their value qua 
literature.  The criterion for a work being about a real person, place, or event is the 
substantive link requiring the employment of information about the real person, place, or 
event in order to understand the person, place, or event in the work.  ‘Gerontion’ and Oliver 
Twist are therefore, as noted in §4.1.2., both about London, but ‘London’ is not used in its 
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full extension in either case.  There may be disparities between Eliot’s London and interwar 
London or between Dickens’ London and Victorian London, but these substantive 
inaccuracies are not pro tanto literary defects and may even be literary merits.  This is why 
aboutness understood in terms of literary thickness and the integrative standpoint entails 
literary anti-cognitivism.85  To adopt the integrative standpoint is to attend to formed content 
and formed content is content – particulars or universals – which has been shaped so as to 
serve a specific role within the literary work such that it may no longer accurately represent 
the particular or universal.  In summary, aboutness is explained by literary thickness because 
of the effect of the reciprocal relationship of form and content.  Aboutness in turn explains 
the relationship between work and world which holds for literature.  Aboutness retains the 
link between work and world which Riffaterre’s account severs, but does not require 
Gaskin’s problematic commitment to truth as a pro tanto literary merit.  I shall have more to 
say about the anti-cognitvist commitment of literary thickness in my discussion of the 
relationship between the two axes and the integrative standpoint on the one hand and final 
and instrumental value on the other, in §5.3.  CHAPTER FIVE begins, however, with a 
detailed explanation of the integrative standpoint, followed by an argument that the 
integrative standpoint is characteristic of literary appreciation.       
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 My conception of aboutness as a product of literary thickness is neither identical with Lamarque and Olsen’s 
original nor sufficiently different to justify a neologism.  The reconception is also compatible with their theory 
of literature, which is a no-truth theory and therefore also anti-cognitivist. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LITERARY AUTONOMY 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present my completed argument for the autonomy of 
literature.  In §5.1. I develop the conception of the integrative standpoint, introduced in 
CHAPTER FOUR, and argue that it is characteristic of literary appreciation.  §5.2. advances 
an account of literary value which is based on Malcolm Budd’s experiential theory, 
characterising literary value in terms of a particular kind of satisfaction that the literary 
experience affords.  Drawing on Derek Attridge, I identify literary satisfaction as arising from 
the interplay of at least four aspects of the experience of the work – the sensory, the 
imaginative, the affective, and the intellective – and discuss the plausibility of a type of value 
which is both experiential and final.  I consider the relation between the three different types 
of interests in literary works articulated thus far (substantive, integrative, and formal) with the 
two types of value defined in CHAPTER ONE (instrumental and final) in §5.3, 
demonstrating the following pair of necessary relations: the substantive axis and instrumental 
value and the formal axis/integrative standpoint and final value.  I set out, in §5.4., the 
premises and conclusion of my argument for the final value of literature, the argument from 
literary thickness, which establishes the autonomy of literature.   
 
5.1. Literary Appreciation 
 
5.1.1. Substantive, Integrative & Formal 
I concluded CHAPTER FOUR on the promissory note of explaining the integrative 
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standpoint in detail and I shall do so by contrasting it with the substantive and formal axes 
discussed in §4.4.  My comparison will focus on two descriptions of André Marty, a man 
who was born in Perpignan in 1886, died in a village near Toulouse in 1956, and is best 
known for the role he played in the Spanish Civil War.  The first passage is from Antony 
Beevor’s historical work, The Spanish Civil War, and the second from Hemingway’s For 
Whom the Bell Tolls.  Beevor describes the arrival of volunteers for the International 
Brigades at Albacete late in 1936: 
 The recruits were lined up on the parade ground for an address by André Marty, the 
 Brigades’ controller who had earlier brought the French volunteers over the border 
 during the fighting at Irún.  Marty, a squat man, with a white moustache, drooping 
 jowl and outsized beret, had made his name as a signals operator in the 1919 mutiny 
 of the French Black Sea Fleet.  The heroic legend woven around him in Party 
 mythology made him one of the most powerful figures in the Comintern.  Almost 
 nobody dared challenge his authority.  At that time he was starting to develop a 
 conspiracy complex that rivalled Stalin’s.  Influenced by the show trials in Moscow, 
 he became convinced that ‘Fascist-Trotskyist’ spies were everywhere, and that it was 
 his duty to exterminate them.  Marty later admitted that he had ordered the shooting of 
 about 500 Brigaders, nearly one-tenth of the total killed in the war.  Many claim that 
 Marty’s figure is modest (1982: 184).   
The interest in the work is typically thin because form and content can be separated.  The 
content – information about people, places, and events – can be separated from the form – the 
way in which Beevor presents them.  The information in the text could be communicated in a 
different way without loss of identity.  ‘Marty’, ‘the parade ground’, and ‘the show trials in 
Moscow’ are not presented under an aspect, but transparently.  ‘Marty’ is Marty (i.e., ‘Marty’ 
in its fully extensional use), not Marty-in-Beevor’s-The-Spanish-Civil-War (i.e., Marty under 
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the aspect Beevor’s The Spanish Civil War licenses one to imagine).  The people, places, and 
events can be described exhaustively without recourse to aspect.  The Spanish Civil War is 
not intended for literary appreciation and my primary interest as a reader is with the 
substantive axis: I want to know if Marty really looked and acted as Beevor states, and 
because Beevor is a reputable historian I accept his description as true.   
 
Beevor’s description of Marty contrasts with the character who makes a brief and sinister 
appearance in For Whom the Bell Tolls, even though it appears that Hemingway’s portrayal 
of Marty is factually accurate:   
 He recognized his bushy eyebrows, his watery eyes, his chin and the double  
 chin under it, and he knew him for one of France’s great revolutionary figures  
 who had led the mutiny of the French Navy in the Black Sea.  Gomez knew  
 this man’s high political place in the  International Brigades and he knew this  
 man would know where Golz’s headquarters were and be able to direct him  
 there.  He did not know what this man had become with time, disappointment, 
 bitterness both domestic and political, and thwarted ambition and that to question him 
 was one of the most dangerous things that any man could do.  Knowing nothing of 
 this he stepped forward into the path of this man, saluted with his clenched fist and 
 said, ‘Comrade Marty, we are the bearers of a dispatch for General Golz.  Can you 
 direct us to his headquarters?  It is urgent.’  
 The tall, heavy old man looked at Gomez with his out-thrust head and considered him 
 carefully with his watery eyes.  Even here at the front in the light of a bare electric 
 bulb, he having just come in from driving in an open car on a brisk night, his gray 
 face had a look of decay.  His face looked as though it were modelled from the waste 
 material you find under the claws of a very old lion (1940: 364-365).   
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For Whom the Bell Tolls does not authorise one to imagine ‘the man at the centre of l'affaire 
Marty-Tillon’86 when one reads ‘Marty’.  ‘Marty’ in Beevor is Marty; ‘Marty’ in Hemingway 
is Marty-in-For-Whom-the-Bell-Tolls.  Descriptions of real people, places, and events do not 
license one to invoke just any information about those people, places, and events in one’s 
imaginative engagement with the novel because one’s interest in the work is typically qua 
literature, i.e. recognises the salience of both the substantive and formal axes and requires the 
adoption of the integrative standpoint.87  It would, however, be an error to state that For 
Whom the Bell Tolls is not about Marty.  If one was concerned only with the formal axis, as 
Riffaterre seems to be, then one could indeed claim that the novel was not about Marty.  A 
defender of Riffaterre might even argue that knowledge of the real Marty adds nothing to the 
experience of the work, which is self-sufficient to the extent that the wonderful description of 
his face as modelled from the waste material you find under the claws of a very old lion 
provides one with all the information one requires to appreciate the character.   
 
While this is certainly an evocative employment of language, which not only describes 
Marty’s appearance, but also offers an insight into his personality, the reader’s experience of 
the novel is augmented by knowledge of the real Marty.  The information from Beevor – an 
interest in the substantive axis – enhances the aspect under which Marty appears in For 
Whom the Bell Tolls.  Hemingway offers a sketch of the relevant historical information, but 
the additional facts one finds in Beevor flesh out this representation and provide the informed 
reader with a richer and more rewarding experience.  The words he stepped forward into the 
path of this man are that much more chilling with Beevor’s facts to hand than they are 
without, relying only upon Hemingway’s brief biographical description.  Furthermore, the 
situation directly parallels the problem I identified with the referential fallacy in §4.2.1.: if 
                                               
86
 The scandal which resulted in Marty being expelled from the Parti communiste français in 1952. 
87
 Lamarque provides a useful guide when he states that one is licensed to invoke information which is “roughly 
speaking […] contemporaneous” with the work itself (2014: 145-146). 
  
140 
 
For Whom The Bell Tolls is not about Marty, then it is not about the Spanish Civil War either.  
But being about the Spanish Civil War in particular, with themes and conceptions which 
extend beyond that conflict to civil wars in general, seems precisely part of what makes the 
novel valuable qua novel.  My primary interest in For Whom the Bell Tolls is not therefore in 
the formal axis, but in the integration of the two axes, i.e. in Marty as a character in the novel, 
or Marty-in-For-Whom-the-Bell-Tolls.   
 
5.1.2. Principle of Functionality 
Fundamental to the author’s intention – and therefore the literary stance – is the idea that the 
appearance of a person, place, or event in a literary work serves a function within that work.  
It is not only the appearance of a person, place, or event that has one or more purposes, 
however, but also the way in which the person, place, or event is presented.  The question of 
why thus applies to both the what and the how.  The content of a work is formed just so for a 
reason; the specific integration of form and content is in each case deliberate.  In §3.1.2., I 
mentioned that selectivity is a feature of all representations of sequences of events, both 
narrative and non-narrative.  In narratives where the form is salient in addition to the content, 
this selectivity takes on an additional significance.  Aristotle comments on the relationship 
between selectivity and function when he praises Homer for his unity of plot in the Odyssey:  
 the plot of a play, being the representation of an action, must present it as a unified 
 whole; and its various incidents must be so arranged that if any one of them is 
 differently placed or taken away the effect of wholeness will be seriously disrupted 
 (Poetics VIII: 1451a33-36).  
If Homer could not present all of Odysseus’ story, why did he select the parts of that story 
which appear in the Odyssey?  Aristotle’s answer is that he selected the parts which are 
  
141 
 
essential to the plot or structure of the work, those which serve a particular function (or more 
likely functions) within the work as a unified whole. 
 
The significance of the relationship between selectivity and function in narrative has resulted 
in the mystery novel being singled out as paradigmatic of all novels.  In his deconstructed 
detective story, City of Glass, Paul Auster begins (or perhaps concludes) a line of thought that 
leads back to Todorov’s comments on narrative, mentioned in §3.1.2.:       
 Even before he became William Wilson, Quinn had been a devoted reader of mystery 
 novels.  He knew that most of them were poorly written, that most could not stand up 
 to even the vaguest sort of examination, but still, it was the form that appealed to 
 him, and it was the rare, unspeakably bad mystery that he would refuse to read.  
 Whereas his taste in other books was rigorous, demanding to the point of narrow-
 mindedness, with these works he showed almost no discrimination whatsoever.  
 When he was in the right mood, he had little trouble reading ten or twelve of them in 
 a row.  It was a kind of hunger that took hold of him, a craving for a special food, and 
 he would not stop until he had eaten his fill.   
What he liked about these books was their sense of plenitude and economy.  In the 
 good mystery there is nothing wasted, no sentence, no word that is not significant.  
 And even if it is not significant, it has the potential to be so – which amounts to the 
 same thing.  The world of the book comes to life, seething with possibilities, with 
 secrets and contradictions.  Since everything seen or said, even the slightest, most 
 trivial thing, can bear a connection to the outcome of the story, nothing must be 
 overlooked.  Everything becomes essence, the centre of the book shifts with each 
 event that propels it forward.  The centre, then, is everywhere, and no circumference 
 can be drawn until the book has come to its end (1987: 7-8). 
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Quinn’s peculiar hunger is explained by the fact that he is a writer (using William Wilson as 
his pen name) and is therefore particularly sensitive to the plenitude and economy described.   
 
William Lavender regards Auster as responding to Peter Brooks’ discussion of the Sherlock 
Holmes tale, ‘The Adventure of the Musgrave Ritual’,88 as paradigmatic of the mystery 
genre.  In the short story, Holmes regales Watson with one of his early cases, where he had to 
reconstruct and repeat the movements of a criminal who was searching for treasure.89  Brooks 
holds that Holmes’ method exemplifies an essential feature of detective fiction, “that the 
detective repeat, go over again, the ground that has been covered by his predecessor, the 
criminal” (1984: 24).  He refers to Todorov’s discussion of detective stories in terms of 
fabula as “the story of the crime” and sjužet as “the story of the investigation” (Todorov 
1966: 45), and maintains that Todorov “thus makes the detective story the narrative of 
narratives” (Brooks 1984: 24-25).  The detective story stages the structure of all narratives, 
the relationship between the sequence of events and the mode of presentation of those events.  
If Lavender is correct, then Auster is making a similar claim about detective novels, that they 
stage the relationship between selectivity and function in all novels, where there is nothing 
wasted, no sentence, no word that is not significant.90 
 
Lamarque states that narratives not only list facts, but shape them into a “kind of ‘gestalt’ of 
impressions and attitudes” (2014: 160).  The narrative presents its content from a point of 
view and its particular integration of form and content will contribute to the gestalt which 
                                               
88
 Arthur Conan Doyle, ‘The Adventure of the Musgrave Ritual,’ The Strand Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly 
V (1893), 479-490.  
89
 Holmes’ story is an embedded narrative, which offers further evidence for Lavender’s claim about Auster 
drawing on Brooks. 
90
 Interestingly, Alan Goldman makes an unrelated argument for the unique significance of the mystery novel in 
literature.  See 2013: 82-106. 
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constitutes the work.  Referring to Olsen,91 Lamarque calls this the principle of functionality: 
“broadly the idea that what is there (in the poem) is there for a purpose, things are not just 
accidentally as they are” (2009b: 412).  The principle applies to both poetic and narrative 
thickness, but is more prominent in the former:  
 Reading poetry demands a sharper attention to detail than is characteristic of other 
 kinds of reading, not surprisingly as the form of expression – the actual choice of 
 words – is assigned unusual salience; that follows from the Principle of 
 Functionality (2009b: 412).92 
I shall make a slight amendment to the principle as follows: 
PRINCIPLE OF FUNCTIONALITY: the idea that what is in the work is there for a 
purpose, i.e. things are not just accidentally as they are.  The principle holds for all 
works of literature.  Every sentence, arguably every word, is assumed to have a 
function in the work as a unified whole, within the interplay of themes and the 
developing picture of people, places, and events that comprise the work’s content.   
 
To adopt the integrative standpoint is to attend to the operation of this principle in the text, to 
the combination of the what and the how of the work in terms of the why.  In appreciating For 
Whom the Bell Tolls, therefore, one understands that Hemingway made a decision to include 
Marty as a character in his novel.  He also decided that Marty would be presented in a 
particular way.  The complexity of these choices is revealed in what is perhaps the simplest 
part of this process, Hemingway’s decision to offer a brief physical description of Marty.  
Given a desire for verisimilitude, the options seem fairly limited, and yet contrast 
Hemingway’s description with Beevor’s.  Hemingway mentions Marty’s eyebrows, eyes, and 
chin while Beevor mentions his physique, moustache, cheeks, and headgear.  The 
                                               
91
 Olsen introduced the term in 1978: 94-95. 
92
 I suggested several relevant differences between poetry and narrative literature in §3.1.1. 
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descriptions are both entirely different and completely compatible.  This array of choices 
would have increased exponentially when Hemingway decided which parts of Marty’s 
biography and which aspects of his personality to include in the narrative.  Had Hemingway 
the information to hand at the time of writing, for example, would he have mentioned that 
Marty was the cause of ten percent of the casualties suffered by his own troops?  I suspect 
not, because the phrase to question him was one of the most dangerous things that any man 
could do is more expressive than pure statistics – although, as noted in §5.1.1., the possession 
of the statistics augments the description in the novel in this instance.  All these decisions 
about the what (or the who in this case) and the how are guided by the why.  
 
Hemingway’s presentation of Marty under a particular aspect at a particular point in the 
narrative is designed to achieve a particular purpose – or purposes, in this case: at the level of 
the novel’s plot, Marty frustrates the delivery of Robert Jordan’s message, which is aimed at 
preventing the Republicans from launching an offensive for which the Nationalists are 
prepared; at the dramatic level, Marty’s appearance and intervention heightens the tension in 
the novel, the suspense as to whether the doomed offensive will or will not take place; at the 
thematic level, Marty heightens the sense of danger and distrust which permeates the entire 
novel, of people turning against their own in a civil conflict and betrayal by allies being as 
likely a cause of harm as enemy action.  There are thus at least three answers to the why, and 
to appreciate literature is to be concerned with the relationships between not only form and 
content, but form, content, and function.  Both the author’s intention and the reader’s 
response – where that response is appreciation – are thus guided by the principle of 
functionality. 
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It is difficult to deny the role of this principle without threatening the very concept of 
literature.  In fact, the principle of functionality appears to hold not only for literature, but all 
art forms and artworks, and seems to have a necessary rather than contingent relation to art.  
The reason for this is the link to intentionality, as identified by Scruton:   
 Art provides a medium transparent to human intention, a medium for which the 
 question, Why? can be asked of every observable feature, even if it may sometimes 
 prove impossible to answer (1981: 593). 
Even in non-essentialist theories of art, there is an assumption that the work is an intentional 
creation.  In the case of readymades like Duchamp’s Fountain, the urinal was – in Dickie’s 
terminology93 – intentionally presented to an artworld public and the same applies to 
readymades appropriated from nature.  Intentionality explains why the drawings of 
chimpanzees are not art and why a painted canvas which was indistinguishable from 
Pollock’s Autumn Rhythm would not be considered a work of art if it was the result of canvas 
and paint falling from a truck.  Art is bound up with the intention of an artist (or appropriator 
of readymades) and intentionality is bound up with the idea that every element of a work 
serves a function.94   
 
The principle of functionality is crucial to both authorial intention and literary appreciation 
and the integrative standpoint constitutes the match between the intended and recognised 
functions of the elements in the work, i.e. not just the what and the how, but why the content 
is formed in a particular way in the work.  The integrative standpoint therefore unites the 
author’s intention with the reader’s response by means of the principle of functionality.  
Given that literary thickness has been established as a necessary condition of literature in 
§4.1., and that the demand for literary thickness is most clearly explained in terms of the 
                                               
93
 See §1.2.2. 
94
 Note that in appreciating a work one can assume that every element has a function without assuming that the 
artist had an explicit intention regarding that function. 
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adoption of the integrative standpoint, the integrative standpoint should be understood as 
characteristic of literary appreciation. 
INTEGRATIVE STANDPOINT: an interest in a literary work which focuses on the 
integration of the substantive and formal axes, i.e. the forming of content and the 
function of that formed content.  The integrative standpoint involves attending to the 
combination of form and content in terms of function, and is characteristic of literary 
appreciation. 
 
5.2. Experiential Value 
 
5.2.1. Literary Experience 
In §1.1.3. I defined final value in terms of non-derivative value such that ϕ is finally valuable 
if and only if ϕ is valuable in a way that is non-derivative.  I noted in §1.3.2. that my account 
of the value of a literary work qua literature is that it is both final and experiential.  I have 
emphasised the importance of the experience of the literary work throughout my argument, 
discussing the experience of a poem in §2.3.1. and the experience of a literary narrative in 
§3.2.1.  My conception of literary value is based on Budd’s account, but two points should be 
noted at the outset.  First, Budd uses the term ‘artistic value’ for the value of a work of art 
qua art (1995: 4), i.e. the literary value of literary works.  Second, Budd specifies that he does 
not employ ‘intrinsic’ to mean internal or non-relational, but the opposite of instrumental 
(1995: 5), i.e. “for its own sake” (2008: 46) or final (non-derivative) in my terms.   
   
Budd states: 
 My claim is that the value of a work of art as a work of art is intrinsic to the work in 
 the sense that it is (determined by) the intrinsic value of the experience the work 
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 offers (so that if it offers more than one experience, it has more than one artistic value 
 or an artistic value composed of these different artistic values).  It should be 
 remembered that the experience a work of art offers is an experience of the work 
 itself, and the valuable qualities of a work are qualities of the work, not of the 
 experience it offers.  It is the nature of the work that endows the work with whatever 
 artistic value it possesses; this nature is what is experienced in undergoing the 
 experience the work offers; and the work’s artistic value is the intrinsic value of this 
 experience.  So a work of art is valuable as art if it is such that the experience it offers 
 is intrinsically valuable; and it is valuable to the degree that this experience is 
 intrinsically valuable (1995: 4-5). 
Budd is explicit that offering an experience which is finally valuable is a sufficient condition 
for a work having artistic value, but his discussion implies that a finally valuable experience 
is a sufficient and necessary condition for artistic value.  I shall adopt this stronger line and 
claim: a work of literature has literary value if and only if the experience it offers is finally 
valuable, and is valuable to the degree that this experience is finally valuable.  Offering a 
finally valuable literary experience is therefore a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
work’s having literary value.      
 
Budd stipulates that the work of art must be experienced with understanding (1995: 11-12) 
and that the experience of the work is a type rather than any person’s actual experience 
(1995: 4).  He then summarises artistic value as: 
(i) intrinsic,  
(ii) sentiment-dependent,  
(iii) intersubjective,  
(iv)  anthropocentric, and  
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(v)  incommensurable (1995: 43).   
Given that ‘intrinsic’ means final, I agree with (i).  Budd takes ‘sentiment-dependent’ to 
“include all the ways in which something can be found intrinsically rewarding” (1995: 38-
39).  I do not wish to commit to this view, but I am committed to the view that literary value 
is response-dependent, because it is the value of the literary experience of a work.  Despite 
my adoption of Lamarque’s reconceptualisation of form-content inseparability as an imposed 
demand rather than an objective property, I emphasised that the respective demands for 
poetic (§2.3.3.), narrative (§3.3.2.), and literary thickness (§4.1.1.) are not rewarded by all 
works intended to invoke a literary response.  As such, literary judgement is not based 
entirely upon the preference of the judge and is objective rather than subjective because one 
evaluation may be more or less appropriate than another.  This particular combination of 
objectivity and response-dependence is neatly formulated in Budd’s characterisation of 
artistic value as inter-subjective.  I shall therefore accept (iii) but not (ii).    
 
I also agree that literary value is anthropocentric, and I shall demonstrate that literature is 
profoundly concerned with human values in CHAPTER SIX.  Regarding 
incommensurability, Budd states that artistic value “is not a measurable quality” (1995: 42), 
by which he means that when one work is evaluated as better than another the difference 
cannot be measured on a quantitative scale.  Budd’s account of value does not therefore 
authorise me to claim that For Whom the Bell Tolls has five percent more literary value than 
Oliver Twist or assign the former 3.9 out of 5 stars (its current rating at goodreads.com).  I 
agree with Budd, but ‘incommensurable’ is misleading as it denotes the absence of a standard 
for comparison in addition to the absence of a common measure.  The literary value of 
different works can be compared, but not quantified, and I shall employ the term 
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unquantifiable instead of ‘incommensurable’.  My characterisation of literary value is 
therefore that it is: (i) final, (ii) inter-subjective, (iii) anthropocentric, and (iv) unquantifiable. 
 
5.2.2. Literary Satisfaction 
Thus far I have identified literary value with the value of the experience of a literary work 
and enumerated four characteristics of the experiential value.  I have not, however, provided 
an indication of what the experience is like or suggested why such experiences are worth 
having.  In §1.3.2. I stated my intention to restrict final as opposed to instrumental value to 
pleasure and to present my own account of the particular pleasure associated with literature.  
Gaskin is sceptical about precisely this possibility.  Although he holds what I regard as an 
instrumental view of literary value, he defines a literary work in terms of literary pleasure and 
then states that the “appeal to ‘literary’ pleasure indeed imports a circularity, but there is no 
independent way of specifying the peculiar pleasure that literature provides for consumers” 
(2013: 33).  Gaskin is overly pessimistic, however, as at least some light can be thrown on 
literary pleasure.            
 
Alan Goldman provides a useful starting point for this illumination.  He maintains that the 
type of pleasure peculiar to reading novels is 
 the satisfaction that John Rawls subsumed under what he called the Aristotelian 
 Principle, although Aristotle never described it explicitly, the satisfaction derived 
 from the full and vigorous exercise of our human faculties or capacities.  The physical 
 equivalent is intense exertion in a competitive sport, but here we are speaking of the 
 full and interactive exercise of our mental capacities: perceptual, imaginative, 
 emotional, and cognitive.  For a work of art to engage these capacities simultaneously 
 and interactively is the mark of aesthetic value, as I argued in an earlier book with that 
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 title.95  Pleasure here lies in appreciating aesthetic value.  Aesthetic value lies in the 
 capacity of a work to engage us in this broad and full way, not simply in the more 
 superficial pleasure derived immediately from its surface sensuous or formal qualities.  
 I take it that literary value is simply the value of literary works of art as such, the 
 aesthetic or artistic value of works of literature.  It therefore demands the same broad 
 analysis in terms of full engagement (2013: 3).  
There are three points which I want to adopt and two with which I disagree. 
 
First, I shall retain Goldman’s initial description of ‘satisfaction’ rather than ‘pleasure’.  
There is very little difference in the extension of the two terms, but the difference in 
connotation (pleasure as enjoyment, satisfaction as complete fulfilment), however minor, is 
important if some type of gratification is to be defended as the characteristically literary 
value.  Second, the mental capacities identified by Goldman are broadly correct.  Perceptual 
engagement with a literary work may appear erroneous, but Goldman refers to the “rhythms 
and textures of the language” and “grasp of the larger structural patterns” in novels (2013: 5), 
in addition to the more obvious sensuous and musical qualities of poetry.  I shall take the 
experience of a literary work to include a perceptual aspect, but shall call this ‘sensory’ in 
order to avoid the ambiguity of ‘perception’, which denotes both sensory awareness and 
reflective understanding.  Third, what is also important about Goldman’s account is the 
emphasis he lays on the simultaneity and interactivity of the mental capacities when 
experiencing a literary work.  The simultaneity and interactivity are both part of what makes 
literary satisfaction so rewarding and part of what makes literary satisfaction so difficult to 
specify.  Like Gaskin’s literary value, Goldman’s account of the value of the literary novel is 
instrumental, as he advances a version of literary cognitivism where some novels are valuable 
                                               
95
 Aesthetic Value (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).  More recently, Goldman has defended aesthetic value 
as experiential in: ‘The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value,’ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
64 (2006), 333-342. 
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as novels in virtue of the truth value of their philosophical theses.  I noted in §5.1.2. that my 
account of literary appreciation (as characterised by the adoption of the integrative 
standpoint) is incompatible with literary cognitivism and Goldman’s cognitive value is 
similarly incompatible with my claim that literary value is final.  I shall therefore drop 
‘cognitive’ in favour of ‘intellective’ to describe the relevant mental capacity, which I explain 
below.96  Finally, Goldman is also emphatic about the ability of the literary experience to 
engage all the mental capacities.  I do not want to claim that sensory perception, imagination, 
emotion, and the intellect exhaust human mental capacity,97 nor that the literary experience 
does not involve the engagement of any other proposed capacities.  My claim is simply that 
literary experience consists of at least the four aspects identified, that these aspects occur 
simultaneously, and that they interact with each other.                        
 
Attridge describes the significance of pleasure to the experience of literature as follows: 
 The literary work thus has available to it all the resources of meaningful language – it 
 can describe, prove, evoke, cajole, warn, persuade, promise, or narrate in the most 
 concrete and convincing manner – without suffering the limitations imposed on 
 purely instrumental language by the purposes which it must serve.  (The one 
 requirement that remains, perhaps, is the need to produce pleasure, and this pleasure, 
 in so far as it is literary is brought about precisely by the performative, or more 
 accurately the performing and performed, dimension of literature) (2004a: 119).            
                                               
96
 I shall not discuss either the imaginative or affective aspects of literary satisfaction as neither are 
controversial.  The imagination has been explicitly linked to art since Hutcheson’s prototype aesthetic theory 
and the connection was explored by both Hume and Kant later in the eighteenth century.  The expression of 
emotion has been linked to art since the Sturm und Drang movement in the mid-eighteenth century, and was 
explicated by Friedrich Schlegel, Goethe, G.E. Lessing, and J.G. Herder – and later Wordsworth and Coleridge.  
For contemporary treatments of the respective subjects, see: Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination: A Study in the 
Philosophy of Mind (London: Methuen, 1974); and Derek Matravers, Art and Emotion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
97
 James Grant, for example, lists the following kinds of responses as appropriate to appreciation: perceptual, 
cognitive, cogitative, affective, and conative (The Critical Imagination [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013], 
31-33). 
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In discussing staging in §3.2.1., I identified a performative reading as an experience of a 
literary work which activates its linguistic power by involving the simultaneous experience of 
its conceptual, emotional, and physical qualities.98  A performative reading is the experience 
of a literary work as a literary work, an experience which produces the pleasure Attridge 
describes above.  This pleasure      
 derives, in part, from this experience of new possibilities opening up, and from the 
 revelation of language’s hitherto unsuspected power to produce this effect.  Hence the 
 importance of what we inadequately call form: the writer’s skilful handling of the 
 properties of language to make possible the literary event (2010: 83). 
Attridge thus links literary pleasure with authorial creativity. 
 
Despite the link between performance and pleasure, however, the satisfaction produced by 
the literary experience is not always pleasing or joyful.  Aaron Smuts subsumes both the 
paradoxes of tragedy and horror under the title of “the ‘paradox of painful art’”, which is the 
apparent contradiction inherent in the desire to experience works of art that arouse painful 
emotions (2007: 60).  The paradox has a lengthy history, from Aristotle’s brief mention of 
“catharsis” (Poetics VI: 1449b26-30) to David Hume’s discussion of the pleasure taken in 
“sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions” (1757: 216), and I make no attempt to offer a 
solution here.  It is not just tragic or horrific works which produce a tension in the reader, but 
potentially all literature, as Attridge suggests when he states that the literary experience 
                                               
98
 Attridge’s performative reading recalls J.L. Austin’s performative utterances.  Austin states: “The term 
‘performative’ will be used in a variety of cognate ways and constructions, much as the term ‘imperative’ is.  
The name is derived, of course, from ‘perform,’ the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something 
(How to do things with Words [London: Oxford University Press, 1962], 6-7).  The extent to which Attridge has 
drawn on Austin is not entirely clear as although he mentions the significance of Austin to both the analytic and 
continental approaches to literature (2010: 81), Austin’s name appears only once in The Singularity of 
Literature, in the bibliography (2004a: 164).  In the absence of an explicit connection, I shall continue to employ 
‘performative reading’ without recourse to Austin. 
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 involves the emergence within the reader’s set of assumptions, routines, and 
 expectations of an element of foreignness, something unanticipated, not immediately 
 graspable, at a tangent to ingrained habits of thought and feeling (2010: 83). 
The experience of the foreign, the unanticipated, and the ungraspable can be a source of 
confusion or irritation rather than joy and the literary experience is often simultaneously 
pleasing and discomforting.99  
 
In §1.3.2. I stated that literary satisfaction is an essentially intellectual pleasure.  Since 
Kant’s initial identification of the source of the particular pleasure associated with the 
perception of beauty as the harmonious free play of the cognitive faculties, the particular 
pleasure associated with the appreciation of art has been characterised as cognitive.  It is, 
indeed, difficult to deny Olsen’s claim that literary works demand intelligence, intellectual 
rigour, self-discipline, and sensitivity both to detail and to language.  With regard to the 
cognitive engagement with literature, Attridge adopts a position that comments on what I 
called the substantive axis in §4.3.1. 
 Take the referential properties of a text: I may enjoy and learn from my encounter 
 with the concepts, feelings, historical or imagined entities, and so on, to be found in 
 any text, including a literary text (which always functions in ways other than the 
 literary).  But when, in conjunction with other modalities of reading, I respond to a 
 text as literature (and it may or may not impose this choice upon me), my pleasure 
 and profit come from the experience of an event of referring, from a staging of 
 referentiality, not from any knowledge I acquire (2004a: 95-96). 
The event of referring and staging of referentiality indicate that what is important in the 
experience of ‘Yew-Trees’ and For Whom the Bell Tolls as literature is not the historical 
                                               
99
 I reiterate this point in my brief discussion of Lolita in §6.4. 
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accuracy, but the function of the history in the works, the way in which the historical 
information and the manner in which it is presented contribute to the work as a unified whole.  
This is what I wish to convey with the intellective aspect of the literary experience, which 
involves exploring, interpreting, and comprehending the work itself rather than focusing on 
what can be learnt about the particulars or universals to which the work refers.  
Understanding the numerous elements of form and content in literary works, the manner in 
which they interact, and the role they play in the unity of the work, is – in the experience of a 
work with literary value – a sophisticated intellectual exercise, one which is often more 
difficult than extracting facts about the world from the work.  I have employed the term 
‘intellective’ in order to avoid confusion with the cognitive aspect of literary experience – the 
learning about particulars and universals – which is usually part of literary experience, but is 
always contingent rather than necessary.   
 
Thus far I have had very little to say about literary interpretation.  I shall neither offer a 
theory of interpretation nor engage with the numerous critical and philosophical debates 
concerned with the practice,100 but I must clarify the role interpretation plays in my 
conception of literary value.  I defined ‘appreciation’ as the grasping of the literary value of a 
literary work in §1.1.1. and argued for the integrative standpoint as characteristic thereof in 
§5.1.  ‘Interpretation’ is the means by which literary value is identified, recognised, or 
grasped.  Goldman notes that interpretation combines description and evaluation and 
distinguishes between the interpretation of an element of an artwork and the interpretation of 
the whole artwork.  In the former, the focus is on understanding meaning and in the latter, on 
recognising artistic value (2013: 29).  My interest in literary interpretation is in the latter, the 
description and evaluation of the work as a whole, as the way in which works are appreciated.  
                                               
100
 Beardsley’s discussion of the role of authorial intention in interpretation is just one such example.  For a 
comprehensive overview of the intentionalist debate and the other debates relevant to literary interpretation, see 
Lamarque 2009a: 115-131 & 148-168. 
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I think that the combination of interpretation and appreciation is precisely what Attridge 
means when he writes of a performative reading.  It is significant that he discusses neither 
interpretation nor appreciation explicitly in The Singularity of Literature and the event of 
literature – the ‘literary experience’ in my account – is the reader’s performance of 
interpretation, the means by which he or she appreciates the work.  As noted in §3.2.1.,101 I 
do not endorse Attridge’s conception of the reader as having a role in the creation of the 
literary work, but the notion of a performative reading is useful in conveying that both 
interpretation and appreciation are active rather than passive processes.  The activation of the 
linguistic power of the work involving the simultaneous experience of its sensory, 
imaginative, affective, and intellective qualities requires intense concentration on the part of 
the reader.  The extent of this concentration also distinguishes literary satisfaction from the 
kind of entertainment value usually (but not always) associated with works of genre fiction.     
 
In summary, the value of a work of literature is: (i) experiential, (ii) final, (iii) inter-
subjective, (iv) anthropocentric, and (v) unquantifiable.  Literature is valuable as the source 
of literary satisfaction, which is the satisfaction taken in the simultaneity and interactivity of 
the sensory, imaginative, affective, and intellective aspects of the literary experience.  This 
satisfaction is partly derived from the revelation of the creative power of language.  The 
appreciation of a literary work is the identification, exploration, and comprehension of the 
value of the work as literature and appreciation is grounded in and promoted by the adoption 
of the integrative standpoint, which unites the authorial intention with the reader’s response 
by means of the principle of functionality.  Before I can proceed to my argument for the 
autonomy of literature, I must deal with an immediate and obvious objection to this account 
of literary value. 
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 See fn.59. 
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5.2.3. Paradigmatically Instrumental 
Budd’s location of artistic value in artistic experience has resulted in numerous objections, 
beginning with the three Levinson offered in his critical notice of Values of Art: Pictures, 
Poetry and Music.102  Carroll’s critique has been the most incisive, however, and his 
‘Aesthetic Experience: A Question of Content’ – originally published in 2004 and reprinted 
in Art in Three Dimensions (2010) – presents a critique of the axiological approach to 
aesthetic experience, which distinguishes the experience “in terms of the kind of value it is 
thought to secure, typically intrinsic value or value for its own sake” (2010: 90).  Although 
Budd characterises artistic value in terms of artistic experience – rather than experience in 
terms of value – Carroll’s objection is pertinent because it poses a problem for the 
relationship between final and experiential value:   
 if one values the artwork because it affords an experience valued for its own sake, 
 then, without further qualification, the artwork would not appear to be valued for its 
 own sake, but rather to be valued instrumentally as something that makes an 
 intrinsically valuable experience available to the percipient (2010: 91). 
The idea is that valuing an object for the experience it produces is a paradigmatic instance of 
instrumental value, like valuing an analgesic pill for the experience of pain-relief it produces.  
Carroll does not develop the point, so I shall augment his objection with a complementary 
argument from Stang.    
 
Stang describes Budd’s final value thesis as an “experiential view” and defines artistic value 
as “the value that works of art as such have” (2012: 271), i.e. the literary value with which I 
am concerned.  He accepts that a pleasurable experience is finally valuable, notes the 
difference between the final/instrumental and intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions, and maintains 
                                               
102
 ‘Art, Value, and Philosophy,’ Mind 105 (1996), 667-682. 
  
157 
 
that the extrinsic character of the property of having artistic value does not preclude artistic 
value itself from being final (2012: 272-273).  Stang’s claim is that the experiential account 
of value falsifies the final value thesis and his argument is: 
 (i)  If an object possesses a value in virtue of its contribution to a finally valuable 
  whole, then the former object is not valuable for its own sake in virtue of its 
  contribution to the finally valuable whole.  The object may be finally valuable, 
  but not in virtue of its contributing to the finally valuable whole.   
 (ii)  If experiential theories of artistic value are correct, then a work possesses  
  artistic  value in virtue of its contribution to a finally valuable experience of 
  that work. 
 (iii)  ∴ If experiential theories of artistic value are correct, works are not valuable 
  for their own sake in virtue of their contribution to the value of experiences of 
  them. 
 (iv)  ∴ If experiential theories of artistic value are correct, works of art are not  
  valuable for their own sake in virtue of their artistic value.  In other words, 
  artistic value is not valuable for its own sake (2012: 273). 
The key term is contribution and Stang uses the example of the contribution a dramatic rest 
makes to a Beethoven sonata.  While the experience of the work is finally valuable, the rest is 
only valuable in terms of its contribution to the work (2012: 273).  Stang makes no 
commitment to the value of the rest being characterised as instrumental, as he refuses to 
assume that an object which is not finally valuable is necessarily instrumentally valuable 
(2012: 272).  His conclusion is that in Budd’s account, artistic value is not final, and his 
argument therefore applies to my account of literary value.   
 
  
158 
 
While Budd does not explicitly acknowledge the point that Carroll raises, there is indeed a 
tension between the finality of artistic value and its location in the experience of the work.  In 
the passage quoted in §5.2.1., Budd states that “the [artistically] valuable qualities of a work 
are qualities of the work, not of the experience it offers” (1995: 5), and that this value is 
“intrinsic [final] to the work in the sense that it is (determined by) the intrinsic [final] value of 
the experience the work offers” (1995: 4).  Literary value is thus both the value of the work 
and the value of the experience of the work – and there seems little difficulty in prising the 
two apart.  Carroll does not distinguish between intrinsic value and final value,103 and if Budd 
were employing ‘intrinsic’ in contrast to ‘extrinsic’ then Carroll’s objection would be fatal: a 
value cannot be both non-relational and experiential.104  Budd is, however, clear that he is not 
employing ‘intrinsic’ in this manner: 
 By the intrinsic value of an item I do not mean a value that depends solely on the 
 intrinsic nature of the item – a value that depends solely on its internal properties (its 
 qualities and inner relations) – as contrasted with an extrinsic value – a value that 
 depends, wholly or in part, on its external properties (its relations to other things).  My 
 conception of intrinsic value opposes it, not to extrinsic value, but to instrumental 
 value, and I do not assume that something’s intrinsic value is dependent solely on its 
 intrinsic nature (1995: 5).     
If literary satisfaction is a final value – and even critics of the final value thesis like Carroll 
and Stang accept pleasure as finally valuable – then Carroll’s objection collapses.  The value 
of satisfaction is identical with the value of the experience of satisfaction.  If there is no one 
currently experiencing the work, its final value is the power to produce satisfaction in a 
reader.  Literary value is response – and therefore experience – dependent and thus both 
relational and final. 
                                               
103
 In Carroll, “value for its own sake” (2010: 90). 
104
 See my discussion in §1.1.2. 
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Stang’s argument against the final value thesis is also flawed.  A condensed version of his 
first two premises reads: 
 (i) If an object possesses a value in virtue of its contribution to a finally valuable 
  whole, then the former object is not valuable for its own sake.     
 (ii) If experiential theories of artistic value are correct, then a work possesses  
  artistic  value in virtue of its contribution to a finally valuable experience of 
  that work. 
There is a conflation between whole in (i) and experience in (ii).  Budd is clear that the 
artistic value of the work is the value of the artistic experience of the work.  The experience is 
not the experience of the work plus something; it is simply identical with the experience of 
the work.  A work does not therefore possess literary value in virtue of its contribution to a 
finally valuable experience, it possesses literary value by providing a finally valuable 
experience.  The work is not part of the experience – it is all there is to experience.  In §1.1.1. 
I employed the example of an analgesic pill and identified two potential types of pleasure, 
taste and pain-relief, characterising the former as final (non-derivative) and the latter as 
instrumental (derivative).  The objection raised by Carroll and Stang can be understood as 
claiming that the value of the experience of a literary work is akin to the value of the 
experience of pain-relief produced by the pill or valuing the pill for its contribution to pain-
relief.  My argument is that the value of the experience of a literary work is akin to the value 
of the experience of the taste of the pill, which is all there is to experience initially.  In these 
terms, the cognitive and moral values of a literary experience are akin to the pain relief 
because the literary work can make a contribution to knowledge.    
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5.3. Integration & Value 
 
5.3.1. Substantive & Instrumental 
Thus far, I have argued that literary thickness is necessarily rewarded by literary works and 
identified three different types of interest which can be taken in a literary work: the 
substantive axis, the formal axis, and the integrative standpoint.  I characterised literary 
appreciation in terms of the integrative standpoint and literary satisfaction in terms of the 
sensory, imaginative, affective, and intellective aspects of the literary experience.  There is 
one more step to take before setting out my argument for the autonomy of literature and that 
is to clarify the relations between the different interests in literary works and the different 
types of value.  After defining final value as non-derivative in §1.1.3., I restricted final value 
to pleasure in §1.3., the literary satisfaction explained in §5.2.2.  I noted the consequences of 
this restriction, that the cognitive values of a literary work (whether understood in terms of 
truth, clarification, or knowledge) and the moral values of a literary work (whether 
understood in terms of truth or not) are both instrumental – i.e., derivative – values of 
literature.  In this section I shall offer further reasons for restricting the final value of 
literature to literary satisfaction. 
 
The substantive axis is an interest in the relations between work and world in which the 
accuracy of representation at both the factual and thematic levels is of primary significance. 
As such, the substantive axis will be adopted in the judgement of the instrumental values I 
identified as being of interest to philosophers in §1.3.3.: cognitive, religious, moral, and 
political.  I defined literary cognitivism as the thesis that truth is, or can be, a value of 
literature qua literature.  To judge For Whom the Bell Tolls for its cognitive value at the 
factual level is to evaluate the historical characters (such as Marty) appearing in the novel in 
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terms of their resemblance to reality and the fictional characters (such as Jordan, the 
protagonist) for the veracity of the universals that they instantiate.  One might, for example, 
compare Jordan to one or more of the actual American volunteers for the Republican cause – 
perhaps Robert Hale Merriman, who was also an academic and also killed in action.  If 
Hemingway’s Jordan is sufficiently like the real volunteers such that he would not seem out 
of place in Beevor’s history, then the novel can be judged as factually accurate.  At the 
thematic level, one could compare the hatred and savagery Hemingway depicts with the 
actual conduct of the war, for example Marty’s penchant for executing his own men.  If 
Hemingway’s representation is authentic, then the novel can be judged as embodying a true 
theme.  In each case one is comparing the literary fiction with the reality and judging the 
fiction exclusively in terms of the reality.     
 
Although moral irrealists and non-cognitivists eschew truth as their criterion of moral 
evaluation, their substantive interest in the moral value of a literary work is nonetheless an 
interest in the relation between work and world which is focused on accuracy.  In my 
example of The True Knights in §4.3.4., I stated that the hypothetical novel offers false and 
morally reprehensible answers to the questions it raises, but even if one considers the 
immoral answers neither false nor true they are still judged against a moral standard that  they 
fail to meet.  Significantly, that standard is set in the world rather than in the novel and the 
fiction is judged entirely in terms of the reality.  The difference between a moral 
realist/cognitivist and an irrealist/non-cognitivist judging the moral value of ‘The Lives of 
Animals’ is that the former pair regard the theme as truth evaluable and the latter pair as non-
truth evaluable.  Notwithstanding, both pairs rely upon veracity, accuracy, or correspondence 
with the world.  Whether one considers the cognitive or moral value of a work, therefore, the 
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value is judged in terms of the accuracy of representation.105  In other words, the cognitive 
and moral values of a literary work are derived from the work’s correspondence with the 
world.  There is thus a necessary relation between the substantive axis, which includes 
cognitive and moral evaluations of works, and derivative (instrumental) value.   
 
5.3.2. Integrative, Formal & Final 
In contrast, the integrative standpoint recognises the salience of both the substantive and 
formal axes, i.e. the relation between work and world and the relations within the work.  As 
explained in §4.3., interest in the relation between work and world is integrated with interest 
in internal coherence and power of presentation – an integration which often demands a 
balance between factual accuracy and imaginative inventiveness.  The literary value of For 
Whom the Bell Tolls is not thus measured in terms of, for example, the accuracy of the 
representation of Marty, but – as noted §5.1.2. – on the function of Marty in the work and the 
way in which the historical information and its mode of presentation contribute to the work as 
a unified whole.  The historical verisimilitude is not, however, irrelevant to the appreciation 
of the novel and the realistic presentation of Marty as powerful, bitter, and irrational is vital 
to the role he serves in the novel.  An inaccurate description of Marty as tall and emaciated 
would not necessarily be a literary defect, although a description of him as amiable and eager 
to assist would, because the character would no longer serve the narrative, dramatic, and 
thematic functions identified in §5.1.2.  Substantive inaccuracies may detract from literary 
value, but are not pro tanto literary defects, which is why aboutness is incompatible with 
literary cognitivism (as noted in §4.3.2.).  Truth, whether understood in propositional or non-
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 Understood in these terms, the cognitive and moral values of a literary work could conflict.  For example, 
Hemingway could have deliberately misrepresented facts about the Spanish Civil War for the purpose of 
developing the theme of hatred and savagery.  The reader with a substantive interest in the work might judge the 
factual inaccuracies as reducing the work’s cognitive value and the greater thematic richness as increasing the 
work’s moral value. 
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propositional terms, is not part and parcel of the literary value realised by the integrative 
standpoint.   
 
A similar point can be made regarding moral value, whether or not one regards virtue and 
vice as truth evaluable.  If one is appreciating ‘The Lives of Animals’ qua literature one’s 
primary concern is with the function of animal suffering in the work and the way in which the 
philosophical content and its mode of presentation contribute to the work as a whole.  In 
§3.3.3. I quoted Doniger’s claim that it is reductionistic to respond to Coetzee’s work as a 
philosophical argument.  One could analyse the narrative, reconstruct the premises and 
conclusion Coetzee presents, and then assess the argument for soundness, but in doing so one 
would no longer be appreciating the work as literature.  One could also isolate the theme – 
animal suffering on a grand scale is morally significant – assess it in terms of one’s preferred 
moral theory, and judge the short story in terms of the extent to which the theme meets the 
demands of that theory.  This may be more appropriate than reducing the work to a 
philosophical argument, but nonetheless constitutes a failure to appreciate the work as 
literature.  If ‘The Lives of Animals’ invites one to view the human treatment of animals as a 
holocaust106 and if this is immoral in minimising the suffering of the victims of the 
Holocaust, then the immorality is not a pro tanto literary defect.  Moral mismatches are also – 
like historical mismatches – substantive inaccuracies and, as noted above, substantive 
inaccuracies are not pro tanto defects.  The portrayal of animal suffering as trivial would 
detract from the value of the work because the theme would no longer unite elements such as 
those I described in §3.3.3.: (absent) message, point of view, and narrative closure.  The 
substantive axis matters, but it is tempered by the formal axis in the adoption of the 
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 As, for example, Derrida does in: The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham 
University Press 1997 [2008]), 25-26. 
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integrative standpoint.  As such, the integrative standpoint is incompatible with moral value 
being part and parcel of the work’s literary value.         
 
The literary satisfaction I described in §5.2.2. does not have either cognitive or moral value as 
a constituent part, but is entirely reliant upon the non-derivative value of the particular type of 
pleasure that accompanies the experience of reading a literary work qua literature.  The 
integrative standpoint therefore has a necessary relation to final value.  This relation to final 
value is also shared by the formal axis, which is an interest in the relations within the work in 
which the coherence of the various linguistic elements in the work’s design or structure into a 
satisfying whole is of primary significance.  An evaluation of a literary work in terms of form 
alone will judge the accuracy of the factual and thematic representations in the work as either 
irrelevant or of minimal relevance to the value of the work qua work.  A consequence of this 
view is that it severs the literary work and literary appreciation from the world, which was 
my primary objection to Riffaterre’s referential fallacy in §4.2.1.  Aside from this objection, I 
have emphasised from my initial discussion of formalism in §1.4.2. that I consider both 
literary form and literary content as salient and cannot therefore accept literary formalism.  
Both the integrative standpoint and the formal axis have a necessary relation to final value, 
but only the integrative standpoint is characteristic of literary appreciation.       
 
5.4. The Argument from Literary Thickness 
 
I began my thesis by arguing for two conceptions of form-content inseparability, poetic 
thickness and narrative thickness.  I then showed that the two conceptions could be subsumed 
under the concept of literary thickness, which I identified as a necessary condition of 
literature.  I proposed that literary thickness, understood as a demand made of the work rather 
  
165 
 
than a property discovered therein, combined two conflicting interests that can be taken in a 
work, the substantive axis and the formal axis.  I demonstrated that the conflict could be 
reconciled by adopting the integrative standpoint to the work and that the integrative 
standpoint was characteristic of literary appreciation.  I then explained literary value in terms 
of the non-derivative value of the experience of a literary work, i.e. literary satisfaction.  I 
have established a relation between literary thickness and literary satisfaction and argued that 
the literary value of a literary work is independent of the work’s cognitive, moral, and other 
instrumental values, and that literature is therefore autonomous.  The argument has proceeded 
as follows: 
 
(1) Literary works are thick, i.e. to read a work as literature demands that form 
and content in the work be taken as inseparable. 
 (2) If a work is thick, then both the substantive and formal axes are salient. 
 (3) If both the substantive and formal axes are salient, then literary appreciation 
  requires the adoption of the integrative standpoint. 
 (4) Therefore the appreciation of literary works requires the adoption of the  
  integrative standpoint. 
 (5) Literary value is the value of the experience of literary appreciation. 
 (6) If the experience of literary appreciation requires the adoption of the  
  integrative standpoint, then literary value is final. 
 (7) Therefore literary value is final.  
 
(1) is based on arguments in CHAPTERS TWO, THREE, and the first section of CHAPTER 
FOUR.  I set out (2) in CHAPTER FOUR, defining the substantive axis and formal axes.  I 
argued that the integrative standpoint reconciled the substantive and formal axes in 
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CHAPTER FIVE, and thus for (3).  I demonstrated (5), that literary value is experiential, in 
CHAPTER FIVE.  CHAPTERS FOUR and FIVE offered evidence for the necessary 
relations between instrumental value and the substantive axis on the one hand and final value 
and the integrative standpoint/formal axis on the other.  In the same chapters, I showed that 
the formal axis was not characteristic of literary appreciation and therefore (6).  In the terms 
which I set out in §1.4.1., the argument establishes the autonomy of literature: the value of a 
work of literature qua literature is the value of the experience afforded by the work and the 
experience afforded by the work is valuable to the degree that this experience is finally 
valuable, i.e. produces literary satisfaction.   
 
By way of concluding the second part of my thesis, I shall offer a brief comment on the 
significance of the autonomy of literature.  In §5.2.2. I quoted Attridge as stating: 
The literary work thus has available to it all the resources of meaningful language […] 
without suffering the limitations imposed on purely instrumental language by the 
purposes which it must serve (2004a: 119).  
Gibson expresses a similar view: 
Of all the uses of language we have developed, the literary has some claim to being 
the most liberated.  It speaks in freedom from the truth and the facts, and it is largely 
unconstrained by the very world that our other, less elevated uses of language struggle 
to represent (2007: 50). 
So does Belsey: 
As one instance of culture, one form of representation, fiction sets the signifier free of 
any supposed moorings in reality or utility.  It has no obligation to refer to the world 
or to obey any laws but its own, and even those laws, it appears, are there to be 
broken (2011: 126).  
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Contra Belsey (and Gibson, as noted in §1.4.3.), the relation between work and world is 
referential and literature is to that extent (at least) moored in reality.  All three quotes 
nonetheless identify what I believe is the most important feature of literature: the literary use 
of language is free from limitation, from the truth and the facts, and from any laws but its 
own.  This freedom is neither a sufficient condition of literature nor is there any method of 
demonstrating that it is a necessary condition other than to point to the thousands of examples 
provided by the canon.  I have argued that the literary value of a literary work is independent 
of the work’s cognitive, moral, and other instrumental values and literary autonomy thus 
conceived acknowledges the freedom which is both essential to the institution of literature 
and to the cultural value of that institution.  In the third and final part of my thesis I pick up 
where I left off in §1.4.4., bringing the resources developed in the second part to bear on the 
objections from Carroll and Nussbaum. 
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PART III: 
OBJECTIONS 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LITERATURE IN THREE DIMENSIONS 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why my autonomy thesis is preferable to Noël 
Carroll’s theory of artistic – and therefore literary – value, which he calls ‘art in three 
dimensions’.  I provide a summary of Carroll’s position in §6.1., explaining why he regards 
cognitive and moral value as contributing to artistic value and the cognitive dimension of 
artistic experience as its primary locus of value.  §6.2. isolates two specific objections to the 
autonomy of literature: Carroll’s theory of clarificationism, where moral understanding is part 
and parcel of the literary value of narratives; and the claim that the autonomy thesis cannot 
account for realist novels because they serve as a counter-example to the autonomist’s 
separation of art from life.  In §6.3. I respond to both objections, first demonstrating that the 
virtue wheels which Carroll regards as exemplifying clarificationism can both clarify and 
obscure moral concepts, and then that the close relation he proposes between realist novels 
and mimetic value is flawed.  My conclusion, upon which I expand in §6.4., is that Carroll 
fails to establish cognitive value as partly constitutive of literary value and that he 
furthermore sets up a false dichotomy between literary formalism and literary 
instrumentalism.     
 
6.1. Art in Three Dimensions 
 
6.1.1. Art in One Dimension 
Art in Three Dimensions (2010) is an impressive achievement.  In twenty-five self-contained 
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 papers prefaced by a detailed introduction, Carroll offers an always coherent and often 
compelling account of many of the central concerns of philosophy of art and analytic 
aesthetics.  At the end of the introduction, he states his goal with typical clarity:  
 If Clive Bell, that arch-aesthetic theorist, advocated art as a means to escape the 
 stream of life, it is the ambition of this book to plunge it once again back into the flow 
 of our vital personal and cultural concerns (2010: 16). 
There can be no doubt that Carroll succeeds, demonstrating several times over why Bell’s 
formalism or “art in one dimension” (2010: 1) fails.107  Carroll’s target extends beyond 
formalism, however, and includes “art for art’s sake and artistic autonomy” (2010: 1) and 
aesthetic theories of art, all of which he regards as one-dimensional.  He accounts for the 
popularity of this flawed approach to art in terms of analytic philosophy being suited to a 
search for essences (2010: 29-30, 460-461 & 512), with the autonomy thesis and artistic 
essentialism having “a natural affinity” (2010: 155).  Carroll identifies the aesthetic theory of 
art as having begun with Hutcheson and Kant in the eighteenth century, both of whom argued 
that aesthetic judgements – judgements of beauty – were characterised by disinterested 
pleasure (2010: 10).108  Disinterest was associated with attending to an object as an end rather 
than a means, and pleasure with the value of attending to the object in such a manner.  For 
Hutcheson and Kant, beauty was thus finally valuable.  Carroll notes that it was a small step, 
which may have been taken by Constant, from the theory of final value to a theory of art, a 
theory which posits this final value as the essence of art: 
  For Constant, this appears to signify that art is not useful and that it has no purpose 
 other than to be beautiful.  Art is, so to speak, for its own sake and not for the sake of 
 something else, like moral education or edification (2010: 11). 
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 I discuss Bell in §1.4.2. 
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 I discuss Hutcheson and Kant in §1.3.2. 
  
171 
 
Carroll explains the endurance of aesthetic theory by its concurrence with the “The Modern 
System of the Arts” or “‘Art’ with a capital ‘A’” (2010: 2), the origin of which he attributes 
to Charles Batteux’s The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle (1747).  Carroll notes that 
the idea of poetry, painting, sculpture, music, and dance belonging to the same ontological 
kind was not widely accepted before Batteux’s proposal (2010: 4), and wishes to replace Art 
the ontological kind with art, a widespread practice aimed at both the transmission of a 
culture’s ethos and the promotion of aesthetic experience (2010: 160-162 & 172).  Regardless 
of one’s view of Batteux’s system, it is clear that the separation of art from other spheres of 
human interest is a relatively recent historical development.  Carroll is not only critical of 
what he regards as a disproportionate emphasis on these Enlightenment theories in art 
criticism and aesthetics, but further maintains that the Modern System of the Arts failed very 
quickly: Batteux’s conception of the fine arts was based on their shared commitment to 
revealing reality through representation, and the popularisation of absolute music soon 
presented a counter-example.  Thus, if the system did enjoy any initial coherence, it did not 
last long (2010: 8 & 132).   
 
Carroll agrees with aesthetic theorists that aesthetic experience is central to understanding art, 
but differs on two points: first, as noted above, aesthetic experience is one of two artistic 
functions; and second, aesthetic experience is not only characterised in terms of pleasure, but 
also involves the identification of expressive properties (2010: 94).  Similarly, Carroll agrees 
with the view of literary or artistic satisfaction that I proposed in §5.2.2., the interactive and 
simultaneous experience of sensory, imaginative, affective, and intellective109 pleasure but 
maintains that such experiences  
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 Carroll also uses the term intellective; see 2010: 94. 
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redundantly encode useful cultural knowledge about conspecifics and the 
environment across several faculties, thereby rendering it both more entrenched in 
memory and easier to access than it might otherwise be (2010: 94). 
The primary purpose of art is thus to transmit the ethos of a culture and this transmission is 
achieved by means of aesthetic experiences, which are primarily valued for their cognitive 
dimension.  In the terms I set out in §1.3.3., Carroll is a paradigmatic aesthetic cognitivist: 
works of art provide knowledge (of the cultural ethos) in a manner which is aesthetically 
relevant (by means of aesthetic experiences).  Aesthetic experience is therefore a means to 
the cognitive end of art and Carroll agrees with the classification I established in §1.3.2., 
embracing the instrumentalist label: “The instrumental value of aesthetic experience alone, it 
would appear, gives us what we need – our simplest explanation” (2010: 95).  Carroll’s 
concordance with my classification is in fact complete as he also considers the moral and 
political values of art as instrumental.110  He provides the following account of aesthetic 
experience:  
 a specimen of experience is aesthetic if it involves the apprehension/comprehension 
 by an informed subject in the ways mandated (by the tradition, the object, and/or the 
 artist) of the formal structures, aesthetic and/or expressive properties of the object, 
 and/or the emergence of those features from the base properties of the work, and/or of 
 the manner in which those features interact with each other and/or address the 
 cognitive, perceptual, emotive, and/or imaginative powers of the subject (2010: 
 101-102). 
In contrast, the explanations of aesthetic experience offered by aesthetic theorists and artistic 
autonomists are lacking in content and they are therefore better served by associating the 
aesthetic with the formal (2010: 193-194).  Carroll claims that, historically, autonomists have 
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 Carroll’s instrumentalism is evident throughout Art in Three Dimensions and is explicit in chapter 5 (2010: 
77-108) and chapter  7 (2010: 119-139).  For his classification of moral value and political value, see: chapter 8 
(2010: 143-162), chapter 12 (2010: 235-271), and chapter 13 (2010: 272-279). 
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kept on returning to “form valued for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else” 
(2010: 155), the most extreme of the one-dimensional views. 
 
6.1.2. Art History 
Carroll maintains that “art seems to have sprung up independently in different locales and at 
different times, often apart from outside influences” (2010: 283).  His conception of the 
origin of art is compatible with Dickie’s account of the evolution of art from certain features 
of religious worship and the practice of magic:                
With the passage of time the techniques would have become more polished and 
specialists have come to exist and their products would have come to have 
characteristics of some interest (to their creators and others) over and above the 
interest they had as elements in the religious or whatever other kind of activity in 
which they were embedded.  At about this point it becomes meaningful to say that 
primitive art had begun to exist, although the people who had the art might not yet 
have had a word for it as art (1984: 56). 
Carroll notes that premodern arts – ars in Latin and techne in Greek – were skills which 
required training to master, and included practices such as medicine and archery (2010: 3).  
The development of those arts identified by Batteux was – because of their origin – thus 
intimately associated with instrumental values.  Carroll continues: 
 Premodern art, in short, functioned as one of the – if not the most – powerful 
 disseminators of the ethos of a people and it was widely recognized to possess this 
 capacity.  Art was a comprehensive source of enculturation in the sense that it very 
  
174 
 
 frequently engaged the whole person – simultaneously setting in motion one’s mind 
 and one’s body (one’s senses, emotions, desires, and pleasures) (2010: 143).111 
 
With evident exasperation, Carroll wonders why the instrumental role of art – which has 
persisted to the present day and was not questioned for two millennia – is now regarded as 
controversial (2010: 144).  He makes several interesting claims about the modernist-inspired 
alienation of the artworld from society (2010: 145-153) and the concomitant alienation of 
aesthetics from the other branches of philosophical inquiry (2010: 153-161), and offers the 
following remedy: 
 The antidote, broadly stated, is that artists once again have to become involved in the 
 life of the culture, taking up many of the responsibilities that modern art has shed 
 under the sign of the autonomy of art.  This includes re-entering the ethical realm, not 
 only, I stress, in the role of social critic, but also as transmitter and shaper of that 
 which is positive in the ethos of their audience (2010: 162). 
Carroll claims that “given the long history of art, the burden of proof belongs to the 
autonomy theorist” (2010: 161).  The notion of artistic autonomy is a recent one, which goes 
against the grain of the practice of art through history and across cultures, and it is the final 
rather than instrumental value of art which must be proved.         
 
As noted in §6.1.1., the instrumental values include moral value and “one of the primary 
functions of art through the ages has been the presentation and exploration of morality” 
(2010: 175).  Carroll makes an accurate summary of the autonomist’s position, that works 
with moral content are subject to moral evaluation but that evaluation qua art is independent 
thereof: “That is, an artwork may be evil, but that evil need not figure at all in the question of 
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whether it is aesthetically good or bad” (2010: 178).  The only way that the moral content can 
be relevant to the autonomist’s artistic evaluation is if the content impacts upon the unity or 
coherence of the work and the autonomist must once again therefore rely on form to maintain 
the independence from moral value which he seeks.  The result is that the autonomist can 
claim that a moral defect/merit in an artwork is never a formal defect/merit.  But this recourse 
to formalism is readily refuted by Carroll:      
It would be an error in the design, ceteris paribus, in an artwork predicated on raising 
a sense of injustice in normal audiences, were it to represent as utterly saintly the 
commandant of a heinous slave camp.  That is, it would be a formal error insofar as 
the way in which the commandant has been designed impedes the work’s functioning 
as intended (2010: 195). 
Carroll holds that the restriction of the value of art qua art to sui generic value which forms 
the basis of the one-dimensional views of art separates art from life and that this separation is 
not only fallacious, but undesirable (2010: 461). 
 
6.2. Contra Literary Autonomy 
 
6.2.1. Clarificationism 
Several of Carroll’s objections to my position will be evident from my summary of his, but I 
am going to focus on the two strongest, which I shall present as explicit challenges to my 
thesis unless quoting directly.  Crucial to my argument is the proposal that the value of 
literature qua literature, literary value, is the value of the experience afforded by the work, the 
literary experience.  Where I refer to literary experience Carroll refers to aesthetic experience 
and he claims that the primary value of this experience is its cognitive dimension: the 
experience is a literary means to achieve a cognitive end.  Literary works are thus valued 
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primarily – although not exclusively – for their cognitive value, for the conceptual 
clarification that they provide.  Carroll has labelled this approach clarificationism and he 
offers a paradigmatic example in the moral clarification literary narratives provide by means 
of virtue wheels.112  Clarificationism challenges my thesis because it offers evidence that 
literary value is – in my terminology as well as Carroll’s – instrumental. 
 
Carroll maintains that some works of literature can function as philosophical thought 
experiments or counter-examples.  Analytic philosophers make frequent use of thought 
experiments as tools of clarification in conceptual analysis and thought experiments are both 
fictional narratives and enthymematic arguments (2010: 209).  Literary narratives are also, by 
my definition in §1.2.1., fictional so the question is whether literary narratives are sufficiently 
analogous to thought experiments to be considered enthymematic.  If so, then it seems that 
the cognitive value of literary narratives can no more be rejected than the cognitive value of 
thought experiments, regarding which there is no doubt.  Carroll does not discuss this 
similarity at length, but there appears to be little need because extracts or paraphrases from 
literary narratives are often employed as thought experiments (or counter-examples) in 
philosophy.  He states: 
It is my contention that conceptual discrimination occurs in art, especially in 
literature, quite frequently, or, at least, much more than heretofore suspected, and that 
this justifies our speaking of certain literary thought experiments as analogous […] to 
philosophical thought experiments” (2010: 215).   
Literary narratives can thus function as a type of thought experiment and “engender the sort 
of reflection that yields propositional knowledge about the conditions of application of our 
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concepts” (2010: 189).  In such works, the truth value of the propositional knowledge is not 
only part and parcel of the literary value, but its primary value. 
 
Clarificationism is particularly evident in the relation between literary narratives and moral 
understanding (2010: 252).  Carroll is careful to ward off the objection that the knowledge 
yielded by literary narratives is banal or platitudinous, maintaining that the refinement of 
virtue concepts is cognitively valuable (2010: 233-234):  
For, though literary thought experiments of this variety tread conceptual terrain that in 
some sense we already inhabit, they cultivate our grasp of what is known with finer 
distinctions (2010: 216). 
Carroll demonstrates the value of this refinement in his description of the means by which 
clarificationism operates, the deployment of a structure called a virtue wheel: 
A virtue wheel or virtue tableau comprises a studied array of characters who both 
correspond and contrast with each other along the dimension of a certain virtue or 
package of virtues – where some of the characters possess the virtue in question, or 
nearly so, or part of it, while others possess the virtue, but only defectively, or not at 
all, even to such an extent that their lack of the virtue in question amounts to the vice 
that corresponds to the virtue (2010: 217). 
 
One of the examples he employs is Great Expectations, where the following characters are 
compared in terms of their virtues as parents (or guardians): Joe Gargery, Abel Magwitch, 
Miss Havisham, and Mrs Gargery (2010: 217).  To this list, one could add a similar array of 
minor characters as smaller spokes in the wheel, which would include: John Wemmick, 
Matthew Pocket, and Molly.  The novel is structured so as to juxtapose these characters, 
situating each at a different position on the virtue wheel.  The correspondence and contrast 
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between the virtues and vices displayed by these characters in their respective roles as parents 
or guardians in the novel provides a sustained exploration of the concept of parenting by the 
studious variation of similarity and difference.  Readers are prompted to respond to the 
characters in terms of their respective virtues and vices and the practice serves to sharpen 
reader recognition ability and make explicit the criteria for the application of the relevant 
concepts (2010: 220).  The virtue wheel provides a conceptual clarification that is of 
particular use in moral cases, where concepts are typically vague or abstract.  “In this, such 
virtue wheels serve the purpose of moral education” (2010: 220). 
 
Virtue wheels in works such as Antigone, the mystery play Mankind, Great Expectations, and 
Howards End share the function of conceptual clarification with thought experiments and 
thus demonstrate that literary works are sufficiently like thought experiments to be 
considered enthymematic.  As such, both literary narratives and thought experiments are 
valuable as means to a cognitive end.  Carroll offers evidence for virtue wheels in his 
interpretations of Great Expectations and Howards End and is quick to address the charge 
that they serve as nothing more than organisational devices aimed at preserving the coherence 
and unity of the work.  Virtue wheels do indeed serve this purpose, but they also prompt self-
reflection on the part of readers:  
Once the reader has begun to contemplate the pertinent virtues and their putative 
status in a given literary work, it is natural for her or him to reflect on how the 
characterizations implied by the text apply outside the text.  How are we to determine 
which virtues are true and which are false without considering the application of the 
relevant concepts outside the text (2010: 233)?   
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The evidence Carroll offers for virtue wheels thus combines the theoretical, a rewarding 
interpretation of the respective works, with the empirical, the actual audience appreciation.  
Carroll maintains that audiences typically discuss the virtues and vices of the fictional 
characters after attending a play (or film) and that these discussions are indicative of the 
nature of solitary reflections on the work (2010: 225).  Drawing on his analysis of art history, 
Carroll offers further evidence that art has served a didactic purpose across not only time but 
space:  
unquestionably, in many of the artistic traditions of Asia, Africa, and Europe, art from 
time immemorial has served as a means for teaching about and meditating upon virtue 
and vice, often by example (2010: 225). 
This long didactic tradition justifies the practice of responding to virtue wheels in this way 
such that the autonomist cannot claim that attending to literary narratives as means to the end 
of moral education is unwarranted.113  Clarificationism thus establishes literary value as 
essentially instrumental rather than final. 
    
6.2.2. Literary Realism 
Carroll’s second challenge to my thesis is derived from his view that one-dimensional 
approaches to art, which include artistic autonomy and therefore literary autonomy, sustain 
the separation of art from life which was caused by the combination of Enlightenment 
aesthetics and art theory and has resulted in the isolation of the artworld from society and 
aesthetics from philosophy.  One-dimensional theories focus entirely on one or more of form, 
final value, or aesthetic value in art.  This flawed over-emphasis not only has undesirable 
consequences for the institution of art, but is fallacious in producing specious appreciations of 
individual works of art.  One-dimensional approaches frequently ignore what is most 
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important about the value of a work qua art; this failure is most clearly demonstrated in the 
case of realist art, with literary realism serving as the paradigm.  The one-dimensional critic 
or philosopher cannot appreciate a realist novel or play because he does not accept the 
cognitive and moral values essential to realist works as relevant to their literary value (2010: 
466).  The communication of knowledge is a necessary condition for realist literature such 
that realist literary works recall art to life and culture and away from the aesthetic realm 
(2010: 471).  Clarificationism and realism thus both present arguments for cognitive value as 
partly constitutive of literary value.  While the appreciation of an individual literary work by 
means of a virtue wheel might be contested, the significance of psychological and social 
insights to realist literary works appears indisputable.   
     
Prior to his discussion of literature, Carroll defines realist artworks as: 
artworks that represent the social and psychological dimensions of human affairs in 
such a way that the works are intended to impart knowledge or understanding, among 
other things, to viewers and readers (2010: 458). 
The truth value of the representational content of realist literary works is crucial to their 
literary value because if the representation is inaccurate then the author’s intention to impart 
knowledge will fail, and if the work does not impart knowledge then it is precluded from 
classification as realist.  Carroll employs Honoré de Balzac’s Comédie humaine and Arthur 
Miller’s Death of a Salesman as examples.  In Balzac’s series of novels and Miller’s play the 
authentic representation of society is crucial to the value of the respective works qua 
literature, i.e. the cognitive value is part and parcel of the literary value (2010: 468).  This is 
to some extent true for all literature in Carroll’s account, but the relation is particularly strong 
in realist works, such that the cognitive merits (the degree to which the psychological and 
social representations are accurate) are literary merits and the cognitive defects (the degree to 
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which the psychological and social representations are inaccurate) are literary defects.  The 
strength of the relation between work and world in literary realism is further demonstrated by 
the fact that realist authors are expected to be expert observers of humanity and to represent 
their observations faithfully: “The talent for comprehending social conditions is not a 
dispensable responsibility for the realist novelist” (2010: 468).   
 
Carroll notes that it is not open to the advocate of one-dimensional approaches to literature to 
claim that the revelation of social facts is mere journalism while the unity of character and 
event under an overarching theme constitutes the literariness of the work (2010: 469).  He can 
thus be seen as claiming that I cannot answer the literary realism challenge by adopting a 
similar strategy to that which I adopted to ‘The Lives of Animals’ in CHAPTER THREE.  
Recall that I stated ‘The Lives of Animals’ could be read qua literature or qua philosophy and 
attempted to demonstrate that on the former reading the short story rewarded the demand for 
narrative thickness.  Reading the Death of a Salesman qua literature would, according to 
Carroll, involve consideration of the accuracy of the psychological and social representations, 
i.e. the cognitive value of the work.  I think that a subtle – and potentially fatal – challenge to 
the central argument of my thesis arises at this point.  Realist works of literature appear to be 
a counter-example to my claim, in CHAPTER FOUR, that the aboutness relation between 
work and world which is consequent upon the adoption of the integrative standpoint is 
necessarily anti-cognitivst.  Why, in other words, does the formed content of literary 
thickness entail that truth is not a literary value?  If one adopts the integrative standpoint to 
Death of a Salesman, regarding both the formal and substantive axes as salient, then there 
seems no reason that the accuracy of the psychological and social representations should not 
play a role in appreciation.  I defined the substantive axis in terms of representational content 
and an interest in representation involves comparison of the representation with that which it 
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represents.  It therefore seems plausible that the accuracy of the representational content in 
the formed content should be (at least) a pro tanto merit in the integrative standpoint.  In 
other words, the category of realist literature appears to present numerous examples of works 
which reward the demand for literary thickness, but where literary value is instrumental 
rather than final.  Literary realism thus contradicts premise (6) of my argument for autonomy: 
if the experience of literary appreciation requires the adoption of the integrative standpoint, 
then literary value is final. 
 
6.3. Responses 
 
6.3.1. Vice Wheels 
In §6.2.1. I identified clarificationism as an objection to my thesis on the basis that the 
primary – but not the only – value of literary works qua literature is the conceptual 
clarification they provide, i.e. their cognitive value.  The virtue wheels deployed in works 
such as Great Expectations and Howards End are paradigmatic examples of clarificationism 
because they refine the virtue concepts of readers in terms of parenting in the former and 
imaginativeness in the latter.  Before responding to the challenge presented by virtue wheels, 
I want to note two of Carroll’s claims with which I disagree but which I am not going to 
dispute here.  The first is that literary narratives are sufficiently like thought experiments to 
be regarded as enthymematic arguments.  My view on the type of interest one brings to a 
literary narrative qua literary narrative, set out in CHAPTERS THREE and FIVE, precludes 
me from accepting this claim.  The second is the empirical evidence which Carroll mentions, 
the discussion of the components of virtue wheels by actual audiences.  Carroll’s failure to 
refer to any studies aside, this discussion – should its existence be established – would offer 
as much evidence for my response as for Carroll’s position. 
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I defined literary cognitivism in terms of truth in §1.3.3. and then argued that truth is a pro 
tanto literary merit for Carroll and Wilson as well as Gaskin in §4.2.2.  In §1.3.3. I also 
identified my concern with virtue and vice in literature as with the vision or perspective 
embodied by the work noting that different works embody pro- or anti- attitudes towards the 
same subject.  With regard to Carroll’s virtue wheels, a single work clarifies a virtue concept 
by including a range of characters who instantiate the virtue and its corresponding vice to 
different extents.  Carroll’s examples follow a predictable course, works in which one is 
invited to adopt a pro-attitude towards characters in whom the virtue is instantiated and an 
anti-attitude towards characters who lack the virtue or in whom the vice is instantiated.  The 
attitudes one is invited to adopt reflect the virtue wheel itself, varying from strong approval of 
the most virtuous characters to strong disapproval of the most vicious characters.  Great 
Expectations thus invites approval of Joe and Matthew Pocket, disapproval of Mrs Gargery 
and Miss Havisham, and something in between for Magwitch and Molly.  This is how readers 
acquire clarification of their virtue concepts, by responding to the characters in the manner 
endorsed by Dickens’ narrative, and refining their understanding such that they have a better 
– i.e., more accurate – grasp of the concept in question.  In summary, one’s capacity to 
recognise virtuous parents and vicious parents is enhanced by the engagement with Great 
Expectations because the narrative invites one to regard Joe’s virtue with admiration and his 
wife’s vice with contempt. 
 
In §4.3.4. I was critical of Rowe’s strategy of employing contradictory literary themes, so I 
shall avoid using it here, i.e. asking what if Great Expectations invited admiration for Mrs 
Gargery’s parenting and contempt for Joe’s parenting?  In the same section, I used the 
example of a hypothetical novel, The True Knights, whose narrative runs parallel to The Birth 
of a Nation.  If the novel made use of the same characters as the film, it might easily deploy a 
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virtue wheel of its own with regard to the concept of racial equality (or, more simply, 
‘egalitarianism’).  The novel could present a particularly complex virtue wheel because of the 
salience of racial identity to the instantiation of the virtue and vice in individuals, a 
complexity which is enhanced by the presence of mixed race characters.  The virtue wheel for 
the concept of racial equality would include: Ben Cameron (white, opposes), Flora Cameron 
(white, opposes), Mammy (black, opposes), Austin Stoneman (white, supports), Silas Lynch 
(mixed race, supports), and Gus (black, supports).  There are various other characters, such as 
Elsie Stoneman and Lydia Brown, whose attitudes lie in between support and opposition, 
which is to be expected from a nuanced treatment of a virtue concept.  The problem with The 
True Knights was, as I noted, that it provides the wrong answers to the serious and interesting 
questions it raises.  Similarly, the virtue wheel described above invites admiration for the 
Camerons and their loyal black servants and contempt for white abolitionists and non-whites 
who wish to assert their equality.  The virtue wheel in The True Knights would not therefore 
be an example of clarificationism for Carroll because the presentation of racial equality as a 
vice works so as to obscure the virtue concept rather than clarify and refine it.  The vice 
wheel is thus a cognitive – and therefore, according to Carroll, a literary – defect in the work. 
 
Thus far I have not stated anything with which Carroll would disagree.  The problem I 
envisage for him is not that his conception of virtue wheels fails, but that it is so successful.  
In his attempt to address a potential objection from Lamarque and Olsen, Carroll makes a 
compelling argument for virtue wheels as a “formal or organizational” merit of a literary or 
cinematic work (2010: 232).  I agree that the virtue wheels in Great Expectations and 
Howards End are devices that enhance the literary value of the works.  Carroll is, however, 
committed to maintaining that the vice wheel of The True Knights is not a literary merit 
because whatever role it plays in structuring the novel, it obscures the virtue concept and is 
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thus a cognitive and literary defect.  Carroll’s presentation of virtue wheels is nonetheless so 
compelling that it is difficult to see how the vice wheel fails to improve the work in some 
way, providing as it does a studied array of characters who both correspond and contrast 
with each other along the dimension of a certain virtue or package of virtues.  The novel is 
flawed in presenting racial equality as a vice, but the way in which it communicates this 
cognitive and moral defect appears to have merit.  If the novel were well-written enough, 
there is no reason it should not deploy an even more effective vice wheel than the virtue 
wheels in Great Expectations and Howards End.  Carroll’s detailed analysis of virtue wheels 
has shown that there is more to the wheel than the accuracy of the representation of the virtue 
concept, i.e. it is not just the (true) content, but also the (intricate) form which constitutes the 
literary merit.  What he cannot account for is vice wheels, i.e. cases where the virtue wheel is 
both a literary merit and cognitive defect.     
  
If my counter-example seems implausible, based on a hypothetical novel which is in turn 
based on a film that is now considered overtly didactic among its many other flaws, there are 
numerous examples which could be drawn from works whose literary merit is exemplary.  In 
§1.3.3. I mentioned surrealist and existentialist works as embodying nihilist or amoral 
perspectives.  In Miller’s surrealist autobiography, Tropic of Cancer, the supporting cast of 
male characters are not fully developed and function to some extent as mirrors reflecting 
various aspects of, and possibilities for, the protagonist.  The Miller-character, Van Norden, 
Boris, Collins, Carl, and Fillmore constitute a vice wheel with regard to misogyny.  The 
novel can readily be interpreted as inviting one to regard Van Norden, who continually refers 
to women synecdochically (by their genitals), as amusing; Fillmore, who marries a woman he 
has impregnated, as pathetic; and Collins, the only homosexual character, as living a carefree 
and happy existence free from the problems women create.  Vice wheels are not, however, 
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restricted to high modernist literature.  Consider James Ellroy’s L.A. Quartet, comprising   
The Black Dahlia, The Big Nowhere, L.A. Confidential, and White Jazz.  In each of these 
novels, the subject of the virtue wheel is virtue itself, specifically the question of how to 
retain one’s virtue as a law enforcement officer in a society that is oppressive, corrupt, racist, 
and homophobic (Los Angeles in the 1950s).  Ellroy deploys virtue wheels in each novel – 
particularly the final three, which share several characters – contrasting two to three 
protagonists and several minor characters in terms of their virtues and vices as law 
enforcement officers.  The virtue wheel in White Jazz is especially rich and the attitudes one 
is invited to adopt towards the three main characters who survive the rigours of the narrative 
– David Klein, Edmund Exley, and Dudley Smith – are sophisticated and subtle.  All three 
are marred with flaws and vices too numerous to catalogue and yet some degree of 
admiration is plainly prescribed for Klein.  Ellroy’s series may not disguise vice as virtue, but 
it complicates rather than clarifies the concept in question.      
 
Vice wheels – understood as virtue wheels that obscure rather than clarify the moral concepts 
with which they are concerned – are thus a feature of several (if not many) works of 
literature.  In both of the examples briefly discussed above – Tropic of Cancer and White Jazz 
– the structure provided by the vice wheel is an unlikely candidate for a literary defect.  In 
fact, the formal device appears to make the respective works better novels and is thus a merit 
(of some sort).  In each case, the vice wheel increases the value of the work in one way, but 
decreases it in another.  My theory of literary autonomy can account for this dichotomy, 
because literary value is regarded as independent of cognitive and moral value.  Where 
cleverly executed, vice wheels therefore increase a work’s literary value, but decrease its 
cognitive and moral values.  In contrast, Carroll’s clarificationism cannot account for works 
which are both vicious and valued qua literature because the immorality they endorse is a 
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cognitive, literary, and moral defect in the work.114  Vice wheels thus expose clarificationism 
as fallacious.   
                         
6.3.2. Realism Reconsidered 
In §6.2.2. I interpreted Carroll’s discussion of realist novels as a direct objection to my 
argument for autonomy in the following terms: realist novels are a category of literary works 
for which (i) the accuracy of psychological and social representation is part and parcel of 
literary value, but which also (ii) reward the demand for literary thickness.  I have been clear 
throughout my thesis that both form and content are salient in literary works.  When I set out 
the respective interests in form and content in terms of the formal and substantive axes in 
§4.3.2., I was similarly clear that both axes are relevant to the value of a work qua literature.  
In the same section I introduced the integrative standpoint as reconciling the opposing axes 
and constituting a pro-reference, but anti-cognitivist position.  The pro-reference position 
follows straightforwardly from the salience of the substantive axis: reference links word and 
work to world.  The anti-cognitivism is a result of the significance I ascribed to the principle 
of functionality in §5.1.2.  In literary appreciation is not only the how (form) and the what 
(content) which is important, but the why, i.e. the function the formed content serves in the 
work.  In order to grasp the literary value of a work on my account one must therefore attend 
primarily to the function of the person, place, or event in the work with the result that 
inaccurate reference is not a pro tanto literary defect.  To employ alternative terms, the 
integrative standpoint combines the coherence and correspondence values of a work, but 
prioritises the former over the latter.  This priority is why I adopted Lamarque and Olsen’s 
aboutness terminology to describe the relation between work and world.  Carroll’s objection 
can be re-stated as: in realist novels (at least), psychological and social inaccuracies are (at 
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 Daniel Jacobson and Matthew Kieran have both made similar criticisms of literary moralism.  See, for 
example: Jacobson, ‘In Praise of Immoral Art,’ Philosophical Topics 25 (1997), 155-199; and Kieran 2003. 
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least) pro tanto literary defects.  The relation between work and world is thus stronger than I 
have maintained and if I retain the integrative standpoint as characteristic of appreciation it 
should be as a pro-reference cognitive position, i.e. recognise that cognitive value 
(understood in terms of psychological and social knowledge) is partly constitutive of literary 
value.   
 
In the context of what I called the value interaction debate in §1.3.2., Matthew Kieran has 
expressed concern about the worth of counter-examples and his scepticism is worth quoting 
in full: 
However, counter-examples as such cannot do the work of philosophical argument.  
One of the problems with the current debate is that too often the appeal to examples is 
relied on in place of argument.  Yet competing characterisations and explanations can 
be offered.  The trouble with over-reliance on examples is that they can be cut 
different ways to suit distinct positions (2003: 60).  
Counter-examples cannot perform the work of philosophical arguments and I am therefore 
reluctant to load my responses with them.  I have, however, provided arguments for literary 
thickness as a necessary condition of literary works, for the integrative standpoint as 
characteristic of literary appreciation, and for the autonomy of literature in the first two parts 
of my thesis.  The counter-examples I employ should therefore be seen as offering evidence 
for the arguments already provided rather than being presented in lieu of philosophical 
argument.  I noted that Carroll defined realist artworks as artworks that represent the social 
and psychological dimensions of human affairs in such a way that the works are intended to 
impart knowledge or understanding.  If cognitive value really is part and parcel of literary 
value in this straightforward manner, then a lack of realism or mimesis would be a literary 
defect in realist narratives.   
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Dickens is a paradigmatic realist novelist yet his oeuvre provides numerous counter-examples 
to Carroll’s thesis.  In fact, the very basis of his realism – the extent to which Victorian 
society was accurately represented in his novels – is contested.115  Given Carroll’s definition 
of a realist artwork in terms of being intended to impart knowledge, D.W. Jefferson’s 
commentary on Hard Times is revealing: 
It is certainly written with great vigour and economy, the discipline of the weekly 
instalments being evident in the sharp decisive handling of episodes, but the central 
contentions so confidently urged will not bear critical inspection, and it must be 
condemned for its distortion of truth (1985: 210-211). 
The subject of Jefferson’s critical interest is stated in the first sentence of his essay, “Hard 
Times has the air initially of being a novel of precise social relevance” (1985: 197), and he is 
not explicit as to whether he regards the imprecision he exposes as a defect qua literature.  If 
Jefferson’s claim is correct, however, then Carroll is committed to the view that Hard Times 
fails qua realist novel because the distortion of truth is incompatible with the imparting of 
knowledge.116  The commitment extends beyond a particular interpretation of Hard Times 
because if, as various critics suggest, Dickens exaggerated the harsh treatment of orphans in 
Oliver Twist or the Byzantine machinations of the Court of Chancery in Bleak House, then 
the lack of accuracy in his novels may be extensive, if not ubiquitous.   
 
Malcolm Pittock maintains that there is a second problem with Dickens’ realism: 
It is, moreover, arguable that the Grundyish inhibitions of the early and mid-Victorian 
period were inimical to the creation of the greatest fiction anyway; but Dickens made 
matters worse by being more inhibited than he needed to be.  Aunt Esther in Mary 
                                               
115
 See, for example: John Gross & Gabriel Pearson (eds.), Dickens and the Twentieth Century (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1962); Philip Collins (ed.), Charles Dickens: The Critical Heritage (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1997) and Michael Wheeler, English Fiction of the Victorian Period: 1830-1890 (Abingdon: 2013). 
116
 I am in fact sceptical about the literary value of Hard Times, but for different reasons, which I discuss in 
§7.3.1. 
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Barton may not be a very convincing prostitute, but Mrs Gaskell could allow herself 
to show how a prostitute’s dependence on alcohol could effectively rule out any 
prospect of change in her way of life.  And that touch of social reality makes Aunt 
Esther memorable in a way that none of Dickens’s prostitutes, as prostitutes, are 
(1998: 108). 
According to Pittock, Dickens’ accurate representation of social ills such as prostitution was 
restricted by his own inhibitions as a writer in addition to the legal and conventional 
censorship of the era.  It thus seems likely that Dickens embellished some aspects of the 
social and psychological reality of Victorian England for dramatic and thematic purposes and 
downplayed others in order to avoid violating personal and public norms.  Were it to be 
proved that Dickens had, for example, misrepresented reality in Oliver Twist by exaggerating 
the plight of orphans, Carroll would be committed to the view that the work is 
correspondingly flawed qua realist novel.  But to evaluate Oliver Twist in this way is to 
evince a thin interest in the work, to separate the content from the formed content that 
constitutes the work.  If Dickens did exaggerate, the exaggeration appears to exemplify the 
staging – or dramatizing117 – of the cruelty faced by orphans and, in this instance, increases 
rather than decreases the value of the novel qua novel. 
  
Many more counter-examples to Carroll could be drawn from Dickens, but I shall consider 
the case of a very early realist novel instead.  Setting aside the character of Alexander 
Selkirk, upon whom Robinson Crusoe may have been based, Coetzee’s Foe presents a much 
more likely – and therefore realistic – portrait of Crusoe’s character than Defoe in the original 
novel.  Coetzee’s Cruso is suffering from a variety of physical and psychological ailments 
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 See §3.2.1. and fn.61. 
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caused by his enforced residence on the uninhabited island and the following description by 
the narrator, Susan Barton, is indicative of both: 
‘Sometimes Cruso kept me awake with the sounds he made in his sleep, chiefly the 
grinding of his teeth.  For so far had his teeth decayed that it had grown a habit with 
him to grind them together constantly, those that were left, to still the ache.  Indeed, it 
was no pretty sight to see him take his food in his unwashed hands and gnaw at it on 
the left side, where it hurt him less.  But Bahia, and the life I had lived there, had 
taught me not to be dainty (1986: 19). 
This portrait provides a stark contrast with Defoe’s Crusoe, who – aside from his illness in 
his first year and a few moments of despair – essentially retains his health, energy, and 
optimism for twenty-four years of solitude before rescuing Friday in the twenty-fifth.  Selkirk 
spent a little over four years on his own and he would have been a remarkable man indeed if 
he could have sustained both his physical and mental health for more than two decades of 
isolation.  Nonetheless, it would be difficult to make a convincing argument that Coetzee’s 
re-imagining of Defoe’s work shows the latter as defective qua literature due to the mimetic 
failure revealed.  In addition, despite its realistic portrayal of Cruso, Foe is not itself a realist 
novel (the notoriously impenetrable ending is probably the most obvious evidence for this 
claim), which indicates the complexity of the relation between mimetic and literary value.  As 
with my response in §6.3.1., the problem with Carroll’s objection is not just that there appear 
to be counter-examples, but that the existence of these counter-examples indicates a more 
serious issue: if virtue wheels are literary merits in virtue of refining moral concepts, then 
vice wheels should be literary defects; if accurate mimesis is a literary merit in virtue of its 
truth value, then failed mimesis should be a literary defect.  The practice of literature, 
including in particular literary criticism, simply fails to support either claim.   
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6.4. Literature in Two Dimensions 
 
In §6.3. I responded specifically to the two objections to my position set out in §6.2.  In this 
section, I shall show why, despite the merits which I mentioned in §6.1., Carroll’s ‘literature 
in three dimensions’ does not constitute a threat to literary autonomy more generally.  I begin 
by making my agreement with Carroll on four points clear.  First, it would be foolish to deny 
that art originated in non-artistic practices and was – perhaps for a very long period of time – 
indistinguishable from these practices.  Second, it would be almost as foolish to deny that art 
continues to be a significant source of enculturation.  I think Carroll overstates the case 
concerning the separation of the artworld from society (and aestheticians from other 
philosophers), but even if I am wrong, I propose no such separation myself.  Third, I have 
been explicit throughout my thesis that I neither wish to deny the existence of instrumental 
values of art or – in the case of religious, ethical, political, and cognitive values – their 
significance.  There are many circumstances where a work’s ethical value will be more 
important than its value as artistic value; in fact, a work’s ethical value may always be more 
important than its artistic value (except when the work is being evaluated qua art).  Finally, 
the weight of history does indeed lend force to the association of art with instrumental values, 
and Carroll is correct to place the burden of proof upon those who seek to identify the 
characteristically artistic value as final.   
 
With regard to literature, I believe this is precisely what I have done: presented an argument 
for literary value as final rather than instrumental.  The argument is reliant upon my 
identification of two opposing axes, the substantive and the formal.  The substantive axis 
retains the link between work and world by means of reference, which makes ‘Gerontion’ 
and Oliver Twist about London, ‘Yew-Trees’ about the yew, and ‘The Lives of Animals’ 
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about vegetarianism.  The problem is not connecting work and world – this function is 
already served by the substantive axis – the problem is reconciling this substantive interest in 
the external relations of the work with the formal interest in the internal relations of the work.  
To employ Searle’s terminology again,118 ‘human’ still means human in Oliver Twist; the 
question is how to reconcile the semantic interest in ‘human’ with the interest in the role that 
‘human’ plays in establishing an atmosphere of inhumanity in the first part of the novel.  The 
answer is, of course, to adopt the integrative standpoint, which is characteristic of literary 
appreciation. 
        
Bradley as quoted in §1.4.3. is doubly erroneous: not only is one not required to ignore the 
beliefs, aims, and conditions which belong to you in the world of reality when appreciating 
literature, but one cannot.  I do not, would not want to, and could not, abandon my belief in 
the evil of paedophilia, for example, when I read Lolita.  Furthermore, it is this very belief 
which creates the dramatic tension in the novel (as soon as I become aware that the 
protagonist and narrator is an unrepentant paedophile).  Nabokov knew that – I would like to 
say all, but realistically – most of his readers would be horrified by Humbert Humbert’s 
thoughts, and his selection of a vice that most people cannot tolerate or forgive is essential to 
the work.  If I were willing to set my ethics aside and imagine a world where paedophilia was 
morally acceptable, Lolita would fail qua literary work.  Nabokov’s composition is so skilful 
that one is gripped by the story and fascinated by the promised finale despite reading 
descriptions which make one’s skin crawl.119  This ‘satisfying horror’, with its sensory, 
imaginative, affective, and intellective aspects, is facilitated by the fact that the perspective 
Nabokov offers on Humbert Humbert is one of disapproval, that one is invited to regard him 
as contemptible.  Like all literary works, therefore, Lolita requires one to bring the world to 
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 See §4.2.3. 
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 I noted the existence of such a phenomenon in my mention of the paradox of painful art in §5.2.2. 
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the work even if the world in the work is a little – or a lot – different from that world.  
Depending upon how charitably one reads Bradley, Carroll’s objection may or may not 
succeed, but it fails against my thesis.   
 
My main dispute with Carroll is thus that he includes art for art’s sake and artistic autonomy 
with formalism and aesthetic theory in the category of one-dimensional views of art.  As such 
he, like many other instrumentalists, sets up a false dichotomy of either one or three-
dimensional art – faced with which, art in three dimensions is evidently the preferable option.  
This dichotomy is false because, in the case of literature at least,120 there is a second option.  
In my argument, which could be called literature in two dimensions, both form and content 
are salient to literary value and my approach therefore retains the one-dimensional view of 
form as significant and the three-dimensional view’s link between work and world.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
120
 I discuss the extension of my argument beyond literature in the concluding section of my thesis, §7.4.2. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LITERARY EDUCATION 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why my autonomy thesis is preferable to 
Martha Nussbaum’s theory of literary education.  I provide a summary of Nussbaum’s 
position in §7.1., explaining why she regards certain realist novels as being able to both 
communicate a unique kind of moral knowledge and to cultivate the moral abilities of 
readers.  In §7.2. I isolate two specific objections to the autonomy of literature: that the moral 
value is part and parcel of the literary value of the realist novels of Charles Dickens, Henry 
James, Marcel Proust, and Richard Wright; and that the experience of reading these works 
qua literature is a means to moral improvement.  I respond, in §7.3., by first showing that 
Nussbaum fails to admit the complexity of the relationship between moral value and literary 
value and then that she fails to offer evidence for her empirical claim.  I agree that the 
experience of reading literary narratives qua literary narratives is an essentially moral 
experience, but deny the proposed relation to moral improvement.  §7.4. concludes both my 
reply to Nussbaum and my thesis.  Following a brief criticism Nussbaum’s instrumentalism, I 
consider the implications of my argument for literary autonomy for art forms other than 
literature.   
 
7.1. Literature as Moral Philosophy 
 
7.1.1. Moral Knowledge 
Nussbaum is one of the few professional philosophers whose work has reached a popular 
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audience and she has produced a vast oeuvre in addition to spending a significant proportion 
of her career actively involved in the promotion of human and animal rights across the globe.  
Her writing is passionate, compelling, and assured, and I am deeply sympathetic to her desire 
to promote the importance of literature and the humanities.  Her particular combination of 
celebrity and adversarial style has, however, resulted in caustic criticism from both the 
philosophical and theoretical traditions, epitomised by judge and economist Richard Posner 
(1997, 1998) and literary critic Geoffrey Galt Harpham (2002) respectively.  Nussbaum has 
published two books dedicated to her theory of aesthetic education, the thesis – which 
originated with the Third Earl of Shaftesbury and was popularised by Friedrich Schiller121 – 
that the experience of art provides a moral (and political) education.  The first, Love’s 
Knowledge (1990), is a themed collection of essays that includes her initial papers on the 
subject: ‘Flawed Crystals: James’ The Golden Bowl and Literature as Moral Philosophy’ 
(1983), ‘“Finely Aware and Richly Responsible”: Literature and the Moral Imagination’ 
(1985), and ‘Love’s Knowledge’ (1988).  The second, Poetic Justice (1995), is a monograph 
that assesses the impact of the novel on the public sphere.  Three other books – The Fragility 
of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986), The Therapy of 
Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (1994), and Upheavals of Thought: The 
Intelligence of Emotions (2002) – also discuss the relationship between literature and 
philosophy.   
 
Nussbaum’s view of literary education is thus expounded across at least five books and two 
decades and the claims she makes are not entirely consistent.122  Posner (1997: 5 & 16-17), 
                                               
121 See: Third Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley-Cooper), Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times 
Volumes I-III (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1714 [2001]); and Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man: In a Series of Letters, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1794 
[1967]).  Shaftesbury’s theory is spread throughout all three volumes of the Characteristics. 
122
 For a charitable but nonetheless critical view of inconsistencies within Loves’ Knowledge, see: Jesse Kalinn, 
‘Knowing Novels: Nussbaum on Fiction and Moral Theory,’ Ethics 103 (1992), 135-151. 
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for example, is justified in reading literary education as holding for all novels despite 
Nussbaum’s claims to the contrary in her defence of ethical criticism (1998: 346).  There are 
also times when her rhetorical skills appear to disguise flaws in her arguments and Harpham 
(2002: 55-56) compares Nussbaum to Derrida in terms of both the quantity and quality of her 
philosophy, notwithstanding her (1990: 170-171) criticism of literary theory in general and 
Derrida in particular.123  I shall attempt to present the most rewarding reading of her work, 
drawing on the most concise and rigorous presentations of her position.  In this respect, the 
paper entitled ‘Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism’ (1998), from her 
exchange with Posner, is exemplary.  Of the two books dedicated to literary education Poetic 
Justice is the clearest and most focused, but the introduction to Love’s Knowledge provides a 
detailed overview of her argument for the moral value of literature. 
 
Nussbaum’s ultimate aim is to replace deontological and teleological approaches to ethics 
with an Aristotelian perspective and she envisages literature as playing a crucial role in this 
project.  As quoted in §1.4.4., she holds that certain truths can only be conveyed in the form 
of narrative art such that there is a unique kind of non-propositional ethical knowledge 
communicated in the “realist Anglo-American” (1995: 10) and “realist social” (1995: 87) 
novels of Dickens, James, Proust, and Wright.124  Nussbaum begins Love’s Knowledge by 
taking form-content inseparability for granted: “Literary form is not separable from 
philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of content – an integral part, then, of the search for 
and of the statement of truth” (1990: 3).125  Form-content inseparability plays an essential 
role because of the resultant resistance to paraphrase (1998: 345).  If the moral content of a 
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 Patrick Fessenbecker has a stronger view, maintaining that Nussbaum and Derrida share the same critical 
project and identifying “neo-Aristotelian moral philosophers and Levinasian poststructuralists” as being at the 
core of the recent revival in ethical criticism (‘In Defense of Paraphrase,’ New Literary History 44 [2013], 117-
139: 118).  
124
 I shall hereafter employ the term realist novels to denote this sub-category alone. 
125
 Her subsequent discussion does not limit ‘content’ to philosophical content. 
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realist novel could be paraphrased without loss of identity then there would be no need to 
experience the work and literature would not communicate a unique kind of knowledge.      
 
Nussbaum maintains that the substantive view of life expressed in the narrative structure of 
realist novels has several points in common with the Aristotelian ethical perspective: 
noncommensurability of values, priority of the particular, ethical value of the emotions, and 
ethical relevance of uncontrolled happenings (1990: 36-44).  Novels are especially suited to 
the Aristotelian conception because of their structural complexity, open-endedness (1990: 46-
47),126 and concern with the ordinary and the everyday (1995: 9).  They extend life 
horizontally by broadening the reader’s experience of people, places, and events, and 
vertically by the precision and richness of their representations (1990: 48).127  This extension 
is facilitated by the relationship between literature and life: (i) literature is like life in that the 
reader has an emotional involvement and an awareness of her own limitations; (ii) literature 
is unlike life in that the reader maintains a distance from the work and is able to maintain an 
“(ethically concerned) aesthetic attitude” towards the narrative; and (iii) literature creates a 
community of mutual respect between author and readers (1990: 48).128  Nussbaum 
elaborates on the aesthetic attitude by introducing Adam Smith’s notion of the “judicious 
spectator” (1995: 74).129  Smith’s idea is that when one is a witness to – rather than a victim 
of – a wrongdoing, one’s emotion is less excessive, partisan, and debilitating such that one is 
better placed to make rational judgements.  Nussbaum notes that Smith employed readers of 
literature and spectators of dramas to illustrate the concept, and claims that literary 
                                               
126
 See also Nussbaum 1995: 5. 
127
 Nussbaum’s horizontal and vertical extensions should not be confused with the horizontal and vertical axes I 
discussed in §4.3.1. 
128
 See also Nussbaum 1995: 7. 
129
 See: Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1759 [1982]), especially 
Part I, §1. 
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appreciation is paradigmatic because “we are not prejudicially located” when we read a novel 
(1995: 75).  Thus: 
 When we read a novel such as Hard Times, reading not as literary theorists asking 
 about theories of interpretation, but as human beings who are moved and delighted, 
 we are, I have argued, judicious spectators, free from personal bias and favor (1995: 
 83).   
 
Nussbaum uses The Golden Bowl (1990: 139-143) and Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past 
(1990: 280-283) as examples of novels that do not just provide lessons in Aristotelian ethics, 
but lessons that impart exclusive ethical knowledge that could not be conveyed in works of 
philosophy.  There are two ways in which novels are unique in this respect.  First, works 
make claims about value and imperfection that can only be made in the context of a sustained 
exploration of character and event, and which would be difficult to make in a philosophical 
argument (1990: 139-140).  The novel thus constitutes an elaboration of the good life, a life 
that Aristotle claimed only to have outlined in his philosophy, and which required 
clarification by means of both lived and literary experience (1990: 141).  Second, the 
appreciation of novels requires imaginative and emotional engagement on the part of the 
reader, abilities which are exercised and developed in the reading of the novel in a way which 
philosophy has difficulty achieving (1990: 143).  Referring to James and The Golden Bowl, 
Nussbaum proposes that moral knowledge is not merely an intellectual understanding of 
propositions, but perception, i.e. the ability to discern the salient moral features of one’s 
specific situation (1990: 152).  The literary experience thus not only involves the 
communication of a unique type of moral knowledge, but cultivates moral capacities that are 
required in order to understand moral philosophy (1995: 12).130  Philosophical works play an 
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important role in locating a particular literary work in the context of moral writing as a 
whole, but philosophy has a subordinate role to the novel in moral education (1990: 161).131 
 
7.1.2. Moral Imagination 
Nussbaum initially proposes a necessary relation between realist novels and a unique type of 
moral knowledge; subsequently she makes the even stronger claim that novels promote 
liberal democracy and thus elevates literary education from the moral realm to the political, 
following in the footsteps of Shaftesbury and Schiller.  The moral aspects of this political 
value are the virtues of egalitarianism and compassion.  Regarding the former, she states of 
Hard Times:  
 reading a novel like this one makes us acknowledge the equal humanity of members 
 of social classes other than our own, makes us acknowledge workers as deliberating 
 subjects with complex loves and aspirations and a rich inner world (1995: 34). 
The mechanism in operation is that in order to appreciate the novel one must engage not only 
with the people, places, and events described, but with the point of view from which they are 
described.  A consequence of narrative thickness is, as discussed in §3.2.2., that I cannot both 
appreciate Hard Times and adopt anything but a negative attitude towards Coketown.  In 
Nussbaum’s terms, I cannot appreciate the novel without accepting that the factory workers 
are fully human.  Hard Times embodies a liberal democratic vision in its form, enacting this 
vision in its structure (1995: 36).  Realist novels promote compassion as well as 
egalitarianism because “concern for the disadvantaged is built into the structure of the literary 
experience” (1995: 87).  Literary understanding contributes to the dismantling of negative 
stereotypes (1995: 92).  Using the example of Wright’s Native Son, Nussbaum claims that 
novels equalise in two ways: (i) by making the misery plain and (ii) focusing on an individual 
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character (1995: 93).  She quotes Walt Whitman on the democratising mission of poetry, 
which she describes as:  
 a mission of imagination, inclusion, sympathy, and voice.  The poet is the instrument 
 through which the ‘long dumb voices’ of the excluded come forth from their veils into 
 the light (1995: 119).     
The literary imagination promotes – and teaches – empathy and attention to the historical and 
social contexts of moral judgement (1995: 115).  In making a moral judgement of an action 
or individual, the literary judge will attempt to imagine herself in the situation and consider 
context carefully. 
 
The imaginative engagement with literature is crucial to the ethical value of literature and is 
characterised by Nussbaum in terms of Aristotle’s observation on the difference between 
history and literature (which I quoted in §4.3.1.):  
Unlike most historical works, literary works typically invite their readers to put 
themselves in the place of people of many different kinds and to take on their 
experiences (1995: 5). 
There is thus an immediacy which is lacking in the respective engagements with history, 
biography, and philosophy.  The most important feature of the literary imagination is the 
balance between the universal and particular, which is built into the form of realistic novels 
such that they present an invitation to imagine concrete situations in terms of a general 
conception of human flourishing (1995: 8).  The imaginative engagement with realist novels 
is concerned with the agency of the characters portrayed therein and is thus essentially rather 
than contingently moral.            
If we think of reading in this way, as combining one’s own absorbed imagining with 
periods of more detached (and interactive) critical scrutiny, we can already begin to 
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see why we might find in it an activity well suited to public reasoning in a democratic 
society (1995: 9).  
 
Nussbaum’s concern with the literary imagination involves moral perception, which is – as 
noted in §7.1.1. – the ability to discern the salient features of a particular situation.  This 
emphasis on particulars prompts Mavis Biss to construe Nussbaum’s approach to the role of 
imagination in moral reasoning as a way of seeing:  
the apprehension of morally salient particulars, which may encompass empathy and 
mental framing of particulars as well as other elements such as emotional balance and 
self-awareness (2014: 4).   
Biss maintains that practical reason consists of three elements: (i) moral perception, which is 
a responsiveness to particulars; (ii) moral judgement, which relates the perceived particulars 
to universals; and (iii) moral imagination, which presents possibilities for achieving moral 
ends (2014: 12-14).  Biss’ characterisation of Nussbaum’s moral imagination as restricted to 
perception leaves Nussbaum with an incomplete approach on Biss’ model, involving (i) and 
(ii) but not (iii).  Biss fails to do justice to the sophistication of Nussbaum’s position, 
however, and my reading of Nussbaum is that she associates literary content with moral 
perception, literary form with moral judgement, and the literary imagination with moral 
imagination.  If form and content are inseparable, then the responsiveness to particulars 
cannot be isolated from the play back and forth between the particular and the universal, and 
the literary imagination therefore opens up possibilities for moral deliberation and action.  
The literary imagination involves more than the perception of moral particulars and the 
judgement of those particulars in terms of universals because the experience of reading 
combines absorbed imagining with critical scrutiny and thus facilitates the reflection on 
achieving moral ends that makes literature useful to public reason.  This reading of 
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Nussbaum also explains why literature has such an important role to play in moral education: 
literature provides a unique type of moral knowledge, literature “develops moral capacities 
without which citizens will not succeed in making reality out of the normative conclusions of 
any moral or political theory” (1995: 12), and literature opens up new possibilities for 
realising moral ends.         
 
7.2. Contra Autonomy 
 
7.2.1. Ethical Criticism 
The general incompatibility of Nussbaum’s position on the relationship between literature 
and moral philosophy with my thesis of the autonomy of literature should already be evident 
from my summary in §7.1.  In this section, I shall focus on what I consider the two strongest 
challenges to literary autonomy, both of which she makes explicit in her defence of ethical 
criticism against Posner, whose position is similar (though not identical) to my own.  As 
noted in §1.4.4., Nussbaum maintains that the moral value of realist novels is absolutely 
central to their literary value: literary form and moral content cannot be separated and the 
unique moral knowledge communicated by novels is part and parcel of their literary value.  
As such, the “ethical properties” (1998: 358) of these novels is salient to their value qua 
literature and literary criticism can “legitimately invoke ethical categories” (1998: 344).  
With regard to Hard Times, therefore, moral content and narrative form unite to produce a 
liberal democratic vision which is a literary merit in virtue of the moral merit of the vision as 
well as the aesthetic merit of the way in which the content is integrated with the form.  A 
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crude but accurate way of putting this point is that: a moral merit in a realist novel is a 
literary merit.132   
 
Nussbaum admits that readers bring a diverse array of interests to novels and therefore 
concurs with my view that works of literature can be read qua philosophy, qua history, or – 
as she puts it – for their “rhetorical and grammatical interest” (1998: 356), i.e. attention to 
their form alone.  When they are read qua literature, with attention to both form and content, 
they are, however, read ethically.  Responsible, ethical readings of novels do not presuppose 
a homogenous moral background for readers and the different responses by readers are part 
of the ethical value of literature.  This diversity also applies to the literary value of the works 
themselves, because works which are defective in one way can be meritorious in another 
(1998: 356).  Nussbaum thus shows that novels with immoral perspectives do not constitute 
counter-examples to her position.  “Literature has great seductive power: it can get us to 
sympathize with class privilege, the oppression of women, war and pillage, and […] hideous 
racism” (1998: 355).  All that this diversity entails for Nussbaum is that the category of 
works upon which her theory is based must be selected with great care.  Once the appropriate 
novels and the context of their impact are specified, these works “nourish the ascription of 
humanity, and the prospect of friendship” (1995: 39).     
 
Nussbaum addresses literary autonomy as an objection to her theory, stating: “Most difficult 
to answer is the aesthetic-autonomy argument” (1998: 357).  She begins her response by 
reiterating that not all art – and not even all literary works of art – address the Aristotelian 
question of how to live.  Nonetheless, those novels she has identified both address this 
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 Stating Nussbaum’s position in this way situates her within the value interaction debate, mentioned in 
§1.3.2., and her exchange with Posner is indeed often regarded as a significant contribution to that debate.  
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question and provide an answer in their invitations to readers to respond to the suffering they 
depict with compassion: 
It seems to me impossible to conceive of an attentive and responsive reader of 
Dickens who did not pose the question, ‘How should we live?’ and who did not 
connect this reflection with thought about the social condition of the poor” (1998: 
359). 
The combination of moral content and narrative form in Dickens is designed to promote the 
value of egalitarianism and the failure to read Dickens ethically is a failure to read his novels 
qua literature.  Egalitarianism is not only relevant to the literary value of his works, but 
essential, such that the novels cannot be appreciated without an evaluation of egalitarianism 
(1998: 360).  Literary criticism of Dickens that omits ethical criticism therefore omits 
judgment of one of the – perhaps most important – aspects of the literary value of his works.  
The novels of Dickens and James are paradigmatic cases of moral value being part and parcel 
of literary value and thus counter-examples to my thesis.   
 
7.2.2. Moral Improvement 
In §1.4.4. I stated that Nussbaum’s theory posed a twofold problem for my thesis, in terms of 
both a theoretical and empirical claim about literary appreciation.  Nussbaum is explicit about 
the practical consequences of reading realist novels qua literature: 
I make two claims, then, for the reader’s experience: first, that it provides insights that 
should play a role (though not as uncriticised foundations) in the construction of an 
adequate moral and political theory; second, that it develops moral capacities without 
which citizens will not succeed in making reality out of the normative conclusions of 
any moral or political theory, however excellent (1995: 12). 
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Nussbaum’s claim is empirical rather than behavioural and she admits that the moral 
capacities developed during the literary experience need not play a dominant role in the 
reader’s moral judgement; nor will an increase in the time spent reading produce a greater 
likelihood of this dominance (1998: 353).  In a similar manner to that in which the moral 
merits of Dickens are also literary merits, so the literary experience offered by his work is 
also a moral experience.  The experience of reading Dickens, of imagining the particulars 
represented in terms of the general conception of human flourishing represented, is an 
experience which is morally valuable and – as noted in §7.1.2. – an experience that opens up 
possibilities for achieving moral ends.  Nussbaum identifies her concern as “the interaction 
between novel and mind during the time of reading” and maintains that “if the novels are 
ethically good it will have a good influence, other things equal” (1998: 353).  These practical 
effects of the literary experience are precisely why realist novels are so useful a tool in legal 
instruction, because the imaginative engagement cultivates and reinforces moral abilities – 
such as the awareness of the significance of the context in which an action occurs – in moral 
deliberations (1998: 346).  The literary experience afforded by these novels is therefore an 
experience in which the reader’s satisfaction is accompanied by moral development.   
 
Once more, Nussbaum is careful to make the scope of this empirical claim clear:  
I begin from the assumption that we are thinking about good citizenship in connection 
with the situation of the poor and excluded, and I intend simply to convince people 
already interested in these same issues that they can get some assistance from 
literature, even though many views of rationality around in the academy will have 
suggested to them that they cannot” (1998: 351). 
Reading Dickens will not thus make liberal democrats of Ku Klux Klan or al-Qaeda 
members, even if they are able to overcome their respective prejudices and read his works 
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responsibly.  If, however, one is receptive to the values of compassion and egalitarianism, 
then reading Dickens will develop one’s moral capacities in addition to communicating 
unique moral knowledge that one would not be able to learn by reading philosophy.  Despite 
these limitations, Nussbaum leaves no room for doubt that the imaginative engagement with 
realist novels has an effect on the receptive and responsible reader.  Referring to the 
compatibility of her position with Wayne Booth’s, she states:                 
Our thesis about the effects of literature is only in part a causal thesis, a thesis about 
what reading literature does to the personality.  It is also, clearly, a conceptual thesis.  
We claim that the activities of imagination and emotion that the involved reader 
performs during the time of reading are not just instrumental to moral conduct, they 
are also examples of moral conduct, in the sense that they are examples of the type of 
emotional and imaginative activity that good ethical conduct involves.  It is by being 
examples of moral conduct that they strengthen the propensity so to conduct oneself 
in other instances” (1998: 355).  
The literary experience of realist novels – i.e., reading them qua literature – develops one’s 
imaginative abilities and these abilities are useful in both literary appreciation and moral 
judgement (1998: 349).   
 
The emphasis on conduct in the above passage suggests that Nussbaum’s empirical claim 
may actually be a behavioural claim, i.e. the literary experience develops the moral faculties 
and in doing so makes readers more likely to act in a moral manner.  I shall take her to be 
arguing for the former alone.  To state her position crudely but accurately again: reading 
realist novels responsibly and receptively will ceteris paribus improve one’s moral 
judgement.  The literary value of a realist novel is therefore partly derived from its value as a 
means to the end of moral improvement.  I shall discuss Nussbaum’s own classification of 
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her theory of literary education in terms of final and instrumental value in §7.4., but 
regardless of whether one considers the communication of moral knowledge a final or 
instrumental value of literature, it is difficult to construe moral improvement as anything 
other than an instrumental value.  Her position is of particular concern to me as our 
approaches concur on at least three important points: works of literature can be read in 
different ways, including qua literature; when works of literature are read qua literature, the 
experience is the locus of value; and form-content inseparability is crucial to understanding 
literary value.  Nussbaum’s emphasis on form-content inseparability presents the greatest 
problem: both elements of her literary education – moral knowledge and moral improvement 
– are based on her premise of form-content inseparability.  Moral merits are literary merits 
because the moral content cannot be extracted from the literary work without loss of identity 
and the irreducible combination of the realist novel’s form and content affords an experience 
that causes moral improvement.  Like Carroll’s literature in three dimensions, Nussbaum’s 
literary education therefore contradicts premise (6) of my argument for autonomy: if the 
experience of literary appreciation requires the adoption of the integrative standpoint, then 
literary value is final. 
 
7.3. Responses 
 
7.3.1. Moral Merits 
In §7.2.1. I summarised Nussbaum’s first objection to my thesis as: a moral merit in a realist 
novel is a literary merit.  I am not denying that a moral merit is one of the many ways in 
which a novel can be judged as being valuable, merely that a moral merit is a literary merit, 
so a more accurate way to express Nussbaum’s position is: a moral merit in a realist novel is 
(also) a literary merit (and therefore part and parcel of literary value).  The first point to note 
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is that, as with Carroll in §6.2.2., realist novels are presented as problematic for the literary 
autonomist.  I dealt with the objection in Carroll by arguing that mimetic failures – Dickens’ 
distortions of truth and Crusoe’s cheery disposition – are not necessarily literary defects and 
may even enhance the literary value of a work.  A similar strategy will not work here because 
Nussbaum has restricted her thesis to a sub-category of realist novels that are morally 
meritorious and any discussion of works which embody flawed moral perspectives will move 
beyond that sub-category.  I shall, instead, begin by stating my agreement with Nussbaum: 
there are numerous literary works, including her sub-category of realist novels, where moral 
content is particularly relevant to literary value.  In fact, given that all narratives are 
concerned with agency – not only that of the narrator but also in virtue of their combination 
of character, action, and connectedness – and that all agency is subject to moral appraisal, 
there appears to be an essential link between narrative representation and moral value. 
 
The problem for Nussbaum is that this relation is not as simple as she suggests.  In §3.3.1. I 
quoted Repp as stating it is generally understood that didacticism refers to some sort of 
defect in a work of literature.  I claimed that works which instantiate this defect – where 
messages are clothed, enveloped, or towed by fiction – will not reward the demand for literary 
thickness.  I identified ‘The Lives of Animals’ as being a potential example of didactic 
thinness and although I demonstrated that it was not, I also demonstrated that there was – at 
the very least – a tension between didacticism and literary value (evinced in the difference 
between reading the work qua philosophy and qua literature).  Marcia Muelder Eaton claims 
that sentimentalism is also generally understood to refer to a defect in a work of literature.  
She identifies the earliest unambiguous employment of the term as being in 1749, claims that 
by 1785 it had already assumed a derogatory connotation, and states that “‘sentimental’ is 
used most often in straightforward negative assessment, both ethical and aesthetic” (1989: 
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270).  Eaton cites Richards’ discussion of sentimentality in Practical Criticism (1929) as an 
example of an early and extensive analysis of sentimentality as an aesthetic defect (1989: 
271-272).  I shall not discuss her argument for sentimentalism as a moral defect, but it is 
worth noting that she regards it as a vice of excess rather than deficiency.  The relation 
between sentimentalism and appropriate affect is thus akin to the relation between rashness 
and courage rather than cowardice and courage.  As such, sentimentalism in literary works is 
usually a feature of a morally meritorious rather than a morally defective intention on the part 
of the author.  In fact, the two literary defects of didacticism and sentimentalism are 
frequently instantiated in the same works and these are often works with a virtuous moral 
message. 
 
In §6.3.2. I quoted Kieran’s scepticism of proffering examples in lieu of philosophical 
arguments, including his claim that one theory’s example can be another theory’s counter-
example, which is particularly apt with regard to Hard Times.  Dickens has frequently been 
accused of both didacticism and sentimentality in his works and, despite Leavis’ (1948: 227-
248) argument to the contrary, much of this criticism has focused on Hard Times.  The 
following four examples are representative:   
(i) “Is it not as foolish to estimate his melodramatic and sentimental stock-in-
trade gravely, as it would be to undertake a refutation of the jokes of the clown 
in a Christmas pantomime” (James Fitzjames Stephen 1857: 345)?  
(ii) Following discussion of Dickens’ didacticism, flat characterisation, and 
sentimentalism, David H. Hirsch states that Hard Times is “one of his dullest 
and least successful works” (1964: 16). 
(iii) “If one begins to question Hard Times, the structure which sustains the 
didactic message also begins to buckle” (Pittock 1998: 112). 
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(iv) “Hard Times illustrates, in fact, the frequent banality of literary moralizing” 
(Posner 1998: 410 fn.23). 
I am not denying that Hard Times is a work of literature, or that it rewards the demand for 
literary thickness, but I am suggesting that it is a borderline case.  The novel is riddled with 
instances of didacticism and sentimentality, from the exclamations Dickens directs at his 
readers throughout, to the straw man of Gradgrind’s school at the beginning of book one, 
Louisa’s confrontation with Gradgrind at the end of book two, and Stephen’s death in book 
three.  If my criticism seems harsh, a comparison of the contrasting manner in which Hard 
Times and Oliver Twist treat similar themes is instructive in revealing the difference between 
the two types of didacticism discussed in §3.3.1. 
 
My point is that there is a strong argument that the moral merits of Hard Times – for 
example, its promotion of egalitarianism and compassion – are literary defects due to the 
didactic and sentimental way in which the novel enacts its liberal democratic vision.  The 
complexity of the relation between moral merits and literary value is revealed in a more 
obvious example, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin; or, Life Among the Lowly.  
The moral merit of Stowe’s abolitionist novel is beyond question, but so is the extent to 
which the work instantiates the literary defects of didacticism and sentimentalism.  The 
following four comments are both representative and free from controversy: 
(i) “As is well known, American literary history has almost always been uneasy 
with Uncle Tom’s Cabin, as it has been with sentimentality in general” 
(Winfried Fluck 1992: 319). 
(ii) “Uncle Tom's Cabin has not survived as literature – the only interest that it 
holds for us is historical – even though its author’s opposition to slavery now 
commands universal assent” (Posner 1997: 7). 
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(iii)  “Unfortunately, in the history of art there are many instances of works like 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin; works which hit us over the head with the right moral 
message while betraying their overall mediocrity in terms of style and 
engagement” (Thomson-Jones 2002: 203). 
(iv) John Havard identifies Stowe as making a direct and explicit call for social 
change and the novel as “implementing a sentimental, typological jeremiad 
against slavery” (2012: 259). 
It seems, therefore, that there are cases where a moral merit can be a literary merit or a 
literary defect, but in fact the issue is still more complex.  The question is not whether a 
moral merit is a literary merit or defect, but rather the extent to which the moral content of a 
work is relevant to its literary value.   
 
I suggested above that due to the necessary relation between narrative representation and 
moral value there will be many instances where moral content is relevant to literary value and 
this is certainly the case in realist novels.  The contribution the moral content makes to the 
literary value of a work is not a function of the virtue or vice of the perspective a work 
embodies, however, but a function of the way in which that content is integrated with the 
novel’s form.  In Nussbaum’s terminology, the responsiveness to moral particulars is 
integrated with the play back and forth between the particular and the universal characteristic 
of realist form.  She gestures towards the significance of literary satisfaction, which I 
associated with the integrative standpoint in §5.2.2., in the following passage: 
This brings me to one further feature of the novel: its capacity to give pleasure.  Its 
moral operations are not independent of its aesthetic excellence.  It binds us to the 
workers because it causes us to take pleasure in their company.  A tedious novel 
would not have the same moral power, or rather, the precision of attention that makes 
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for interest is itself a moral feature.  This is no incidental aspect of Hard Times, but 
one that it prominently stresses (1995: 35). 
Nussbaum and I obviously disagree on whether Hard Times is tedious, but we would likely 
both agree that Uncle Tom’s Cabin is a novel whose moral power is inhibited by its aesthetic 
defects and Oliver Twist a novel whose moral power is enhanced by its aesthetic merits.  
Assessing the moral operations and moral power of a novel in terms of the pleasure produced 
by the thick combination of content and form in the work is, however, a completely different 
type of evaluation to assessing the virtue of liberal democratic or abolitionist moral 
perspectives.   
 
As I noted in my discussion of ‘The Lives of Animals’ in §5.3.2., the moral virtue of the 
theme – humans are inflicting a holocaust on animals – is less significant to appreciation 
than the way in which the theme is integrated with the form selected for the story.  Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin serves as an example that Nussbaum’s theory conflates two evaluations: the 
novel’s moral value is beyond criticism, but its numerous flaws as a work of literature detract 
from its moral power.  M.M. Eaton (1989) and Thomson-Jones (2002) regard this particular 
type of failure – the loss of moral impact as a result of aesthetic flaws that distract readers or 
trivialise the moral content – as a moral flaw.  I prefer to call the failure a literary flaw 
because the loss of moral impact is a result of a defect in the integration of content and form, 
but the nomenclature is not particularly important.  What is important is that this type of 
defect is distinct from the type of defect – an immoral perspective – which Nussbaum has in 
mind in her discussion of the moral merits of realist novels.  Virtuous and vicious moral 
content can both form part of the thickness of a literary work and virtuous and vicious moral 
content can both be enacted in a didactic, sentimental, or otherwise non-literary manner.  
Nussbaum is thus correct to state that examples of literary works which embody immoral 
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perspectives are not counter-examples to her theory of the moral merits of realist novels, but 
she is nonetheless merging two distinct types of evaluation of a work of literature.  The 
liberal democratic vision of Hard Times is a moral merit, but the relation between that moral 
merit and literary merit is determined by the way in which the moral content is integrated 
with the realist form in the novel.  In Nussbaum’s interpretation, the novel exemplifies both 
moral and literary merit; in mine, it exemplifies only moral merit; the point is that two 
separate evaluations are being made employing different criteria in each case.  A moral merit 
is not therefore a literary merit in realist novels and moral value is not therefore part and 
parcel of literary value.   
       
7.3.2. Empirical Evidence 
In §7.2.2. I summarised Nussbaum’s second objection to my thesis as: reading realist novels 
responsibly and receptively will ceteris paribus improve one’s moral judgement (and the 
experience of reading is thus a means to moral improvement).  I noted that I would take her 
claim as empirical rather than behavioural due to the extensive problems associated with 
establishing the effects of reading literature on ethical behaviour, mentioned in §1.3.3.133  If 
Nussbaum is making an empirical claim, however, then it is precisely the type of claim for 
which empirical evidence could – and should – be provided.  In my summary of the moral 
improvement Nussbaum envisages, I quoted the following statements about the experience of 
reading realist novels: 
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 See fn.20.  The problems with attempts to determine the effects of reading literature are not restricted to 
behavioural as opposed to psychological or cognitive changes.  A recent empirical study purporting to show that 
reading literature improves understanding of the mental states of others serves as an unwitting example of the 
difficulty in selecting an appropriate methodology.  See: David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, ‘Reading 
Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind,’ Science (2013), accessed 29 May, 2014, doi: 
10.1126/science.1239918.  Gregory Currie provides an excellent overview of the impediments researchers face.  
See: ‘Does Fiction Civilize Us?’ New York Times, 6 February, 2013, 12. 
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(i) the experience develops moral capacities without which citizens will not 
succeed in making reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or 
political theory; and 
(ii) the experience is an example of moral conduct which strengthens the 
propensity so to conduct oneself in other instances. 
These are very strong assertions to make about the value of realist novels.  (i) states that 
reading such novels is a prerequisite for, and necessary condition of, understanding moral and 
political philosophy.  Setting aside the second token of ‘conduct’ in (ii), Nussbaum is stating 
that reading the relevant novels is itself a moral exercise, the literary experience a kind of 
moral gymnasium in which one’s moral muscles are strengthened regardless of whether and 
how that strength is subsequently employed.  The proffering of these substantial claims 
without any supporting evidence is, I think, the kind of philosophical flaw to which Harpham 
alludes when he compares the quality of Nussbaum’s philosophy with Derrida’s (noted in 
§7.1.1.).  Nussbaum is no more justified in stating that reading realist novels improves the 
moral judgement of readers sympathetic to liberal democratic ideals than I would be in 
stating that reading existentialist novels worsens the moral judgement of readers sympathetic 
to amoralism.  If either statement is to rise about the trivial or banal, evidence must be 
provided and, in lieu of any evidence, neither statement should be accepted. 
  
Nussbaum claims that the experience of reading realist novels is a moral experience and I 
agree completely.  Realist novels are narratives and I mentioned in §7.3.1. that there is a 
necessary relation between narrative representation – specifically the dual concern with 
agency instantiated – and moral perception and judgement.  Narratives are, as I noted in 
§3.1.2., stories and stories are necessarily told by an agent, even if one is unable to discover 
the identity of that agent.  Similarly, stories contain characters who make decisions and 
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perform actions (or refuse to make decisions and do nothing).  In any complex narrative, 
including short stories such as ‘The Lives of Animals’ and all of Nussbaum’s realist novels, 
the author and the characters he or she depicts are subject to moral evaluation.  The essential 
connection is between narrative representation and the moral sphere, however, not between 
narrative representation and (positive) moral value.  In other words, narratives are necessarily 
moral, but moral as opposed to amoral rather than moral as opposed to immoral.  It is of the 
essence of narrative representation that it is subject to moral judgement – and that the 
experience of a narrative is to this extent a moral experience – but that judgement may be 
positive, negative, or ambiguous.  The experience of reading realist novels is thus indeed a 
moral experience, but so is the experience of reading ‘The Lives of Animals’, Tropic of 
Cancer, Waiting for Godot, and White Jazz.  Given that the moral experience can be so 
varied, any connection to moral improvement requires evidence – evidence which Nussbaum 
fails to provide.      
 
7.4. Beyond Literature? 
  
7.4.1. The Humanities 
Nussbaum’s literary education advances literature as a means to a moral end and attempts to 
establish a link between literary value and moral value.  In a similar vein, Olsen identifies the 
thematic concepts of perennial interest in which literature trades134 as shared by philosophy 
and religion.  He proposes a “special connection” between literature, philosophy, and religion 
(1987: 190), but restricts this connection to the common subject matter.  Literature, 
philosophy, and religion all address eternal human problems, but they do so in different ways 
and with distinct purposes.  Olsen rejects “the dulce et utile” approach to literature I 
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identified in §1.4.4. and his phrasing draws attention to what I consider an irony in 
Nussbaum: Poetic Justice criticises the reductive utilitarianism of Gradgrind, but reduces the 
value of Hard Times to its ‘usefulness’ as anti-utilitarian philosophy, a usefulness which is 
enhanced by the ‘sweetness’ noted in §7.3.1., and which can be put to further political and 
legal uses.  Unlike Carroll, Nussbaum does not describe herself as an instrumentalist but her 
approach to literary value has a greater focus on instrumental values than his.135  Poetic 
Justice, for example, originated in a university course on ‘literature for lawyers’, the subject 
of which was literature’s “contribution to the law in particular, to public reason generally” 
(1995: xv).  In her criticism of Posner’s choice of canonical examples, Nussbaum (1998: 360-
361) regards T.S. Eliot and William Butler Yeats as having less literary significance than 
V.S. Naipaul and Rohinton Mistry.  She may be correct, but there is a strong implication that 
the only literary works she thinks should be taken seriously are those which embody a liberal 
democratic perspective and are therefore useful as instruments of moral and political 
education.   
 
Nussbaum’s instrumentalism is most explicit in her defence of the humanities, which she 
values principally as a means to the political end of liberal democracy.  In his review of Not 
for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (2010), Matthew Reisz asks if Nussbaum’s 
approach runs the risk of disguising propaganda as teaching:  
‘I don’t say the humanities have only one use,’ replies Nussbaum.  ‘I’m focusing on 
their role in inculcating citizenship.  You can also investigate works for their 
contribution to literary history, for their own sake as aesthetic objects (2010). 
Nussbaum’s defence of the humanities replicates the structure of her defence of literary 
education: literature and the humanities are primarily valuable for their unique contribution to 
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 I mentioned this difference in my initial discussion of Carroll and Nussbaum in §1.4.4. 
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philosophy and liberal democracy respectively and this unique contribution is supplemented 
by secondary aesthetic and other values.  Reisz’s conclusion is: “Perhaps because she 
believes so much is at stake, Nussbaum takes a strikingly instrumental view of the value of 
the humanities in schools and universities” (2010).  I think the same can be said for her view 
of the value of the institution of literature.  As I have maintained throughout my thesis, I do 
not wish to deny the numerous instrumental values of literature nor the significance of those 
values.  But instrumental accounts of literary value are reductive, marginalising literature’s 
capacity to afford satisfaction as the means by which the useful end for which literature is 
valued is achieved.  Nussbaum’s literary education thus minimises what I believe to be most 
important about literature, the literary satisfaction that forms the basis of literature’s sui 
generic value and the freedom from limitation which is unique to the literary use of language.        
    
7.4.2. The Arts 
My thesis has proceeded by presenting two distinct arguments for form-content 
inseparability, one for poetry and the other for literary narratives, in order to establish the 
premise that literary thickness is a necessary condition of literature.  The salience of both the 
formal and substantive axis – two different types of interest that can be taken in a literary 
work – to literary appreciation was then revealed as a consequence of the demand for literary 
thickness.  I argued that the integrative standpoint reconciles these opposing interests and is 
characteristic of literary appreciation.  Having identified literary value as the value afforded 
by the literary experience, I demonstrated that the integrative standpoint has a necessary 
relation to final rather than instrumental value.  Finally, I addressed two objections to my 
thesis, both of which I construed as characterising literary value as instrumental.  In my 
responses, I showed that neither cognitive value nor moral value is part and parcel of literary 
value and that my argument for the autonomy of literature therefore stands.   
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Aside from brief discussions of The Birth of a Nation in §4.3.4. and §7.3.1., I have avoided 
making claims about non-literary works of art.  In the early stages of my research, I 
anticipated that whatever verdict I reached on the value of literature would hold for all art 
forms.  I now think that this was naive.  Looking at Batteux’s much-maligned list of fine arts, 
Carroll is correct to claim that music (absolute music) has no representational content and 
perhaps Kivy is also correct when, in Philosophies of Arts (1997), he argues that it has no 
content at all.136  In the visual arts of painting and sculpture, form and content are completely 
different from their counterparts in both poetry (literature) and dance.  As useful as the form-
content distinction may be across all the arts, colour, shape, scale, contrast, harmony, and 
proportion are simply too distinct from morphology, syntax, metre, and tropes for me to be 
confident in extending my conclusion for literature to the visual arts.   
 
In §1.2.2. I noted that my references to plays would be to the scripts as works of literature.  
The art form of theatre combines plays as literary works with plays as performed events, and 
might be considered a composite of poetry and dance in Batteux’s list (setting aside the oral 
tradition of poetry).  Once again, the differences between style in dance and form in literature 
are too great for me to extend my conclusions to an art form which combines both, and my 
reluctance also applies to other composite art forms such as opera and film.  Carroll’s brief 
but enlightening discussion on the difference between representation in dance and 
representation in other art forms (2010: 486) is indicative of precisely how distinct form and 
content are across different art forms and among the constituent art forms of a composite art.  
Novels, plays, operas, and films, for example, are all usually narratives, but my argument for 
narrative thickness in CHAPTER THREE could not be applied to works of theatre, opera, or 
cinema without substantial alteration, perhaps so much that little trace of the original 
                                               
136
 I am undecided on this issue. 
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remained.  My thesis may nonetheless provide a springboard for arguments for theatrical, 
operatic, or cinematic thickness as I see no reason a relationship between thickness and final 
value should not hold for art forms other than literature.  My inquiry into that relationship, 
however, does not extend beyond literature.   
 
Despite this limitation, there are at least two important consequences of literary autonomy 
that provide evidence for the philosophical significance of my thesis.  The first applies to the 
value interaction debate, the controversy over whether a moral defect in a work of art is (also) 
is an aesthetic defect, discussed briefly in §1.3.1.  The dispute, which is not only far from 
resolved but has recently spread beyond the confines of aesthetics journals,137 is revealed as 
being undercut by the question of whether the characteristically artistic value is final or 
instrumental, as I have argued elsewhere.138  The second consequence concerns the false 
dichotomy that I mentioned in §6.4.  Carroll, and to a lesser extent, Nussbaum, suggest that 
anyone who does not consider either cognitive value or moral value (or both) as part and 
parcel of literary value is a formalist.  I have provided a ‘third way’ between instrumentalism 
and formalism, an ‘art in two dimensions’ approach to literature that negotiates a safe passage 
between the Scylla of formalism and the Charybdis of instrumentalism.  In my account, 
literature can be valued for the particular satisfaction that appreciation affords without 
ignoring the content of the work or divorcing the work from the world; as a result, literature 
is not required to be a vehicle for education of any sort in order to be attributed value.   
 
                                               
137
 Since 2000, contributions have appeared in: Ethics, Hypatia, The Philosophical Forum, Philosophy 
Compass, Philosophia, the South African Journal of Philosophy, The Journal of Value Inquiry, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, Ratio, and Ethical Perspectives.  The most recent contribution is: Ted Nannicelli, 
‘Moderate Comic Immoralism and the Genetic Approach to the Ethical Criticism of Art,’ The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (2014), 169-179. 
138
 See fn.15. 
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In nuce I hope, at the very least, to have explained the confusion Leopold Bloom experiences 
when he considers the failure of the works of Shakespeare to provide him with instruction: 
 Concluding by inspection but erroneously that his silent companion was engaged in 
 mental composition he reflected on the pleasures derived from literature of instruction 
 rather than of amusement as he himself had applied to the works of William 
 Shakespeare more than once for the solution of difficult problems in imaginary or real 
 life. 
 Had he found their solution? 
 In spite of careful and repeated reading of certain classical passages, aided by a 
 glossary, he had derived imperfect conviction from the text, the answers not bearing 
 in all points (Joyce 1922: 17.383-391). 
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